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PERMANENT GENERAL SECRETARIAT
in French Africa

NORTH AFRICAN CONFERENCE

May 24 and 25, 1942

STEEL INDUSTRY

MINUTES

SUMMARY

- I. List of persons participating in the discussions
- II. Agenda
- III. Account of the discussions and conclusions

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I. Conference of May 24 and 25, 1942, presided
by Admiral Fenard

List of Participants

FRANCE:

Baboin: Chief Engineer of Mines; Director of Steel Industry
Roy: General Delegate of the Organization Committee of the
Steel Industry
Roux: General Secretary of the Organization Committee of
the Steel Industry
Paristo: Chief Engineer of Mines; Director of the Division
of Ores in the Mining Administration.
Faucheux: Chief Engineer of Mines; Chief of Division of
Mines in Secretariat of State for Colonies
Chaussois: Financial supervisor in the Division of Prices,
Mining Administration
Tunzini: Representative of the General Delegate for
National Supply

ALGERIA:

Poupet: Inspector General of Civil Engineering; Director
of Public Works
Betier: Chief Engineer for Mines; Head of Division of Mines
Peuch Lestrade: Chief Engineer; Head of Division of Indus-
trial Production
Ardoin: Director of Algerian Railroads

TUNIS:

Cosselin: Inspector General of Civil Engineering; Director
of Public Works.
Guillaumat: Mining Engineer; Head of Division of Mines.
Colgnard: Head of Division of Industry and Crafts

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MOROCCO:

Normandin: Inspector General of Civil Engineering; Director
of Public Works

Picard: Inspector General of Civil Engineering

Bendon: Chief Engineer for Mines; Head of Division of Mines

FRENCH WEST AFRICA:

Arnand: Mining Engineer; Head of Division of Mines

A.G.P. (?)

Gandilhon

Pecheur

Perret

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II. Agenda

1. Discussion of the present situation and of future possibilities of the local resources in coal, iron ore and scrap iron in each of the three countries of North Africa.
2. North Africa's requirements in steel products.
3. Discussion of the present condition of steel industries in Algeria, Tunis, Morocco.
4. Discussion of the plans for new installations or extensions of steel mills in each of the three countries or concerning North Africa as a whole (Plan of the Blast Furnace Company of Pont-a-Mousson; Plan of "Forges and Steel Mills of Tunis", etc.
5. Information to be received from France concerning the plan of erecting a steel mill in the Hone region (Champion Plan)
6. Conclusions - Requirements of North Africa

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III. Account of the Discussions and Conclusions

Vice-Admiral Fenard, Permanent Secretary-General, opened the meeting and drew the attention of the members of the conference to the importance of the problem of supplying North Africa with steel product.

The Conference then proceeded to examine the questions on the agenda. Those questions concerning the present situation and local coal and iron ore resources having been examined at the North African Mining Conference, May 21, 22, and 23, 1942, it was decided to discuss the following questions:

1. LOCAL SCRAP IRON RESOURCES

Present situation in each of the three countries of French North Africa:

MOROCCO:

Morocco estimates that one cannot count on an annual production higher than 5,000 tons in normal times (actually, 2 to 3,000 tons). Present stock is about 2,000 tons.

ALGERIA:

Algerian pre-war scrap iron production can be said to be about 20,000 tons per year.

Annual pre-war export average was about 18,000 tons.

In June 1940, stock on hand was 22,000 tons. This included not only that existing in stock of scrap-iron dealers, but also stocks declared to be on hand by producers (particularly those of the Algerian Railways.)

Present stock is said to be 14,600 tons. Scrap iron exports to France from June 1940 to May 1, 1942, rose to 8,300 tons; home consumption was 6,500 tons; therefore 7,400 tons were recovered.

At present, Algeria is taking steps to intensify the collection of scrap iron. She expects to succeed, particularly by altering the sale price, which will be raised to 600 francs the ton.

Algeria emphasizes the obstacles in the way of this collection. Up until now, the major part of the scrap iron was gathered in the large cities, or near big piles. There are also scattered stocks in the country on farmers' lands; but the farmers are not disposed to give up their iron scrap; at least, they demand in exchange certain pieces of machinery which are necessary for their agricultural equipment.

In connection with this, it should be pointed out that the Comité d'Organisation of the Algerian farm party (literally, mechanism) has just decided that in the future, no spare parts will be sold for agricultural, vinicultural, or viticultural machines unless the buyer turns in the used or broken piece. Exceptions to this will be granted in the case of certain articles like ploughshares and mould-boards of plows.

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Besides the difficulties of return, the difficulties of transportation should be noted.

It is also pointed out the possible interest which recovery of wreckage might have (sheet iron particularly) from the North African coast.

Exports to France

The Iron Coordinator (Directeur de la Siderurgie) points out the difficult situation of France from the point of view of supply of scrap iron; he has asked Algeria to try to increase her scrap iron exports to the mother country, all the while taking into account what Algeria can use locally.

Algeria says she is able to deliver 2,500 tons of light scrap iron, but that she cannot promise undelayed delivery. The Iron Coordinator asks that as much as possible, shipment of turnings should be avoided.

Old Castings

Algerian stock in June 1940 was 3,500 tons. At the present time it is only 1,200 tons.

In the old castings sphere, recuperation was pushed more than in that of scrap iron; in twenty-two months from June 1940, consumption rose to about 6,700 tons. Recuperation during the same lapse of time therefore was 4,400 tons. Prices for old castings will be those employed in the mother country.

TUNISIA

Iron scrap exports are shown in the following figures:

1936.	12,000 tons
1937.	30,000 tons
1938	9,000 tons
1941.	3,500 tons (to the G.I.A.F.)

It should be noted that the figures for 1937(30,000 tons) are due to an exceptional situation of that time: demolition of Russian ships.

For 1942, Tunisia figures that she will be able to export 5,000 tons. Two thousand tons of this will be taken from known stocks, three thousand to be supplied by collection. The total amount will be made up largely of light scrap iron.

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In recovery of iron scrap, Tunisia experiences the same difficulties as Algeria; return, transportation.

Taxation orders will appear incessantly which will augment scrap iron prices to the level of those in France. French prices are a little lower than those in Algeria.

Tunisia considers that another method of increasing collection would be to "commercialize" scrap iron; it is probable that the colonist will not easily give up his scrap iron if he is not sure of getting something in return. The Iron Coordinator then points out that this procedure raises the difficulty of driving iron scrap into the black market. He then outlines conditions under which, in France, it is possible to negotiate "scrap iron agreements": the O.F.F.A. can consent to a special allocation of currency which is to be used exclusively for purchase of new machinery, against delivery, effective when transacted, of fixed tonnage of material in condition to be demolished--but not scrap iron. Scrap iron, compulsorily declared at the O.F.F.A., is rendered for transaction without any reimbursement whatsoever in currency form.

Algeria and Tunisia point out certain difficulties encountered in the purchase of goods in Switzerland; this country sometimes requires a return in scrap iron or other scrap goods.

2. NEEDS OF NORTH AFRICA IN IRON PRODUCTS

Annual needs of all the three countries of North Africa in regard to iron products which are not converted or which can be converted in North Africa are evaluated at about 200,000 tons.

3. PRESENT SITUATION IN THE NORTH AFRICAN IRON INDUSTRY

MOROCCO:

Morocco has established at Casablanca a small smelter (known as R.E.I.P.--Administration of Industrial Exploitation of the Protectorate), which includes a blast furnace capable of producing 10 tons of pig-iron daily. Morocco hopes to better this output and to raise it to 15 or twenty tons per day.

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This blast furnace began operating in November 1941, and had to be stopped in January 1942, for heating installations.

It is completed by the following:

A Bessemer converter, 8 tons per hour, which will soon be put into operation.

An electric furnace, 4 tons, (Stein and Roubaix, ordered in April 1941) which it is expected will be in operation in October-November 1942, if certain parts are received.

Rolling mills installations, for which are lacking certain parts--bellows oven (four pousant), and laminating cylinders for T irons; these installations allow the construction of the following: bar iron from 10 to 40 m/m
T irons up to 100
sheets up to 30 wide

Morocco hopes that the R.E.I.P. (see above) will be able to realize an annual production of about three to four thousand tons.

This blast furnace now consumes about 2 tons of coke for each ton of pig iron produced. This percentage is very high and the Iron Coordinator believes that if this coke consumption cannot be lowered to about 1250 kilos, which corresponds to the normal figures of French iron smelters, it would be advisable to stop the blast furnace.

Morocco points out the installation of an electric furnace of one ton at Casablanca. Set up by the Etablissements Tournier, this furnace will allow production of cast steel.

Finally, Morocco anticipates installation at Khaloua, east of Rabat, of a small blast furnace of 4 tons which runs on charcoal and would be placed on the site of an iron mine. This establishment will undoubtedly be ready for operation by the end of 1942.

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ALGERIA

The steel mills, forges, and rolling mills of Algeria (SAFIA) located at Oran have now the following equipment:

Two Martin furnaces of 7 tons each, heated by heavy oil.

One rolling mill installation capable of turning out bar iron from 8 to 28 m/m, and T-irons up to 80 m/m.

Two soldering furnaces provided with a gas generator.

Also, the SAFIA has ordered an electric furnace from Stein and Roubaix, which should in principle be delivered at the beginning of 1948, and whose use would permit complete independence from use of heavy oil.

The General Delegate of the Organization Committee of the Iron Industry points out, with regard to the SAFIA, that this plant is playing a particularly interesting role--use of local scrap iron, possibility of quickly serving a restricted clientele--and that it is of the same standard as French plants of a similar type. This plant should operate normally, and is worth operating well. The General Delegate believes that in this regard it would be a good idea to set up a reheating furnace alongside the soldering furnaces; certainly, the idea of soldering furnaces is a good one, but the use of these furnaces for reheating operations would incur a high cost for fuel.

The Iron Coordinator states that he is disposed to furnish the SAFIA with 300 to 400 tons of firewood, taken out of the Algerian quota, and with due regard to the proper percentage. This procedure would afford a rise in rolling mills production and at the same time an economy in use of fuel oil.

The General Delegate believes that 700 to 800 tons should be set aside monthly for the SAFIA, in order to allow normal production; but he would make a definite selection of this iron scrap, separating it into the following divisions:

Iron scrap for the Martin furnace.

Iron scrap for the soldering furnace, for lamination in packages.

Scrap iron directly re-aminable.

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On the other hand, Algeria requests that the Organization Committee of the Iron Industry should bring its aid to bear on the installation at the SAFIA of supplementary cages made from second-hand material. This installation would allow production of bar iron of 6 m/m and wire of 4 m/m ϕ . The General Delegate has agreed to this.

The Ducros foundry at Oran has a small 1-ton electric furnace, with an approximate monthly production of 60 tons of cast steel.

The Blachere Company at Algiers is going ahead with the installation of a small steel foundry which has, in particular, a 3-ton Bessemer converter, working in connection with the existing cupolas. This will undoubtedly be working in about three or four months.

Note should be taken also of the projected installation of a second converter at the NIBELIE workings at Algiers. Prospect of realization of this project is slight.

TUNISIA

There are no existing installations, with the exception of one 1-ton electric furnace at the arsenal of Sidi-Abdallah.

VARIOUS SOURCES OF SUPPLY FOR THE EXISTING PLANTS

MOROCCO

Ferro-manganese needs of Morocco are about 40 tons. This figure is important with respect to possibilities of production, since it corresponds to a steel production of about 5,000 tons. These 40 tons will be the subject of a later communication.

ALGERIA

At present Algeria uses 300 tons of forged pig and 150 tons of spiegeis (sic).

Algeria will soon make known her other needs.

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INFORMATION ON LOCAL IRON PRODUCTION

The Iron Coordinator requests that he be regularly informed of the iron production of North Africa.

This information, gathered together by the Permanent Secretary General, will be supplied in a monthly report modeled after a special form provided by the Coordinator.

4. STATEMENT OF NEW INSTALLATIONS OR OF EXPANSION OF IRON PLANTS IN EACH OF THE THREE COUNTRIES**MOROCCO**

Morocco has no proposed erection or expansion in the near future, with the exception of the projected installation of a small blast furnace at Khaloua, of which mention has already been made.

ALGERIA**Pont-a-Mousson Company Project**

This project aims at the erection of an iron "factory" which will fill the most urgent needs of Algeria and which will be connected with a "cokery" which is to supply gas (lighting?) to the town of Oran.

Essentially, the "factory" will be made up of the following:

Two blast furnaces of 100 tons each, one for the working of foundry pig, the other for supplying a steel works.

A steel works and rolling mills.

The plant will have an annual production of about 70,000 tons, of which 40,000 tons will be steel.

Finished iron products which can be turned out will be mainly the following:

Casting--centrifugated pipes from 30 to 300 m/m in diameter

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Rolled products--bar iron for concrete (ronde beton) to 40 m/m
--iron of square cross-section to 50 m/m
--iron in sheets to 50 x 100 m/m
--hoop irons to 110 x 5 m/m
--T irons to 80 m/m
--U, T, rails, machine wire

In order to further this project, Algeria points out that she is more and more disturbed in her supply of iron products; the insufficiency of the allotted quota does not allow the most essential upkeep needs of the country to be met; on the other hand delays in delivery from France are as great as 8 months and more, and are incompatible with the urgency of the need. The SAFIA works at Oran make up the lack to a certain degree, but their production is weak.

Establishment of the iron works suggested by the Pont-a-Mousson Company would allow the filling of present needs of North Africa in direct iron products. In particular, Algeria is a great consumer of cast-iron pipes, which are required for the development of her program of irrigation projects.

The Iron Coordinator, while realizing that this project is sensible in itself, nevertheless points out that the basis of the problem is that of fuel (oil); this project does not bring in any new economy of coal; the whole of the resources of France and of North Africa will not be augmented by it.

Also, the ore process method (Martin steel from liquid casting) is particularly costly, particularly if it is compared to the Thomas process which uses about two times less coal and which has the advantage of furnishing dephosphorization slag particularly useful as manure.

Algeria points out at this point that perhaps all the steel will not be worked in the Martin furnace and that it would be possible to use a Bessemer converter.

Algeria emphasizes that one must foresee the possibility of communications difficulties would not allow a sufficient supply to reach North Africa, and that provision should be made from the present time for a certain minimum, in case of isolation.

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The Iron Coordinator then asks what would be the local resources of North Africa in coal. At present, these resources figure about 30,000 tons monthly; Algeria hopes that in two years from now, with some doubt as to the delay of the works in question in functioning, the monthly production of Kenadza will rise to 15,000 tons more. One can therefore estimate that at that time the coal resources of North Africa will be augmented to 45,000 tons per month.

The Iron Coordinator then asks if, given the situation of interrupted relations between Algeria and France, Algeria could, out of these 45,000 tons, provide the tonnage required for the operation of the Pont-a-Mousson works; he presumes that the local coal would undoubtedly be used for more essential ends.

With regard to this subject, Algeria estimates that, in spite of these difficulties, she would be able to turn over if not all at least a part of her local resources to that works, thus allowing it to fill certain essential needs in iron products.

Also, the Iron Coordinator brings out the acuity of the problem of the money necessary for the building of the works of say 10,000 tons, since present resources hardly allow the upkeep of actually-existing French iron works. He believes that it would be better to plan simply on the installation of a converting works, including a Martin furnace and rolling mills; such an installation would require only a small money investment, whereas the construction of blast furnaces requires a large investment.

It would be easy to find in France a rolling mill which would be suitable for the projected program.

The General Delegate of the Organization Committee of the Iron Industry points out that such an installation, susceptible to completion later on by addition of one or two blast furnaces, is a digression.

Algeria points out that the sum of money necessary for the complete realization of the Pont-a-Mousson project, no matter how large this sum may appear to be, would be paid in several monthly instalments; on the other hand, the Pont-a-Mousson Company will be asked to reduce this amount to the lowest minimum, by

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particular attention to the possibility of using existing material which is in good condition--rolling mills.

Finally, Algeria, in defense of the project under consideration, shows the necessity for decentralization and the use of the existence of a tool well-adapted to the particular needs of North Africa--an existence also to the interest of National Defence; besides, the creation of such an iron unit could, upon the production of annexing chemical industries, produce interesting by-products (ammonia--manure).

POSITION OF MOROCCO

Morocco says she is interested in the realization of the Pont-a-Mousson project, from the immediate point of view, and in the measure in which she could benefit from a portion of the products of the works. However, Morocco does not intend to make any commitments for the future.

POSITION OF TUNISIA

Tunisia demands that the creation of an iron industry in North Africa be regarded in the light of general benefit; in particular, she does not wish such a project to reduce the North African coal tonnage which is obtainable for the essential needs of the local economy--railroads, electrical energy. This tonnage is already very insufficient in case of breaking of communications lines with France.

In short:

Algeria persists in her desire to see this project realized in its entirety, such as it was submitted to the Mother country.

The Permanent Secretary General in French North Africa shares the point of view of Algeria.

The Iron Coordinator agrees to the installation of the Martin furnace and the rolling mills, given the benefit to North Africa to have this installation in case of isolation from France; however, he believes that he should reserve his decision as to the installation of the blast furnaces, whose present necessity he contests, in view of the small amount of coal available to North Africa in case of isolation.

The coke furnaces can already justify their existence by the

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necessity of reconstructing the Gran works and the possible use of coke at the Oujda lead foundry.

TUNISIA

Tunisia places her confidence in the investigation committee (Direction de la Siderurgie) and in the various organisms which she has set up to investigate and settle, on her territory, the iron works question; in war time, by the maximum economy of coal and natural resources, in peace time, by the most harmonious interplay of the resources of France and of the Empire.

She is determined to follow and to intensify her search for natural gasses, whose presence has already been recognized, and for their use in the iron industry.

The General Delegate of the Organization Committee of the Iron Industry will, upon his return to France, study the methods pertinent to rapid realization of an alteration works (usine de denaturation) scaled to the needs of Tunisia--a works which could subsequently be combined with the utilization of gas in the production of metal.

FRANCE WEST AFRICA AND DEPENDENCIES

At the present time the formation of two regiments of automotive drawn artillery is being pushed to the maximum. For several months passed two master saddlers have been assigned especially to Dakar, the base of these two regiments, with the object of adapting and putting into service the materiel which has come from France and is destined for these formations. At Bobodionlasso (Ivory Coast) there is being formed a motorized brigade. The materiel which has come and is still coming from France is being received and put into service with by Commandant Hervé, formerly at Marrakech, and who is charged with the automotive and artillery section. Several groups of that brigade are already at Zinder. Certain ones are destined for Agades. Extract from a letter of first class gunner (Radio) ? F. Verdu, of the staff of the group of Zinder. I have just learned a piece of news which will, no doubt, surprise you. I am assigned to Agades, a little town situated 500 kms. from Zinder, in the direction of the north, that is to say of Lybia, and I must leave at the end of the month, or beginning of July.

Letter of June 1, 1942

From the letter in question it seems that the brigade is destined for Lybia and that it is intended for an attack on the oasis of Fezzan.

MOROCCO

As a result of a new distribution of the troops it has been confirmed that the regiments grouped at Vichy (Moroccan) ... The regiment of the Colonel ... the German

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Battalions of the Foreign Legion) have been distributed along the coast in a state of readiness for action.

The Spanish Battalions of the Foreign Legion, a few artillery groups of the 64th R.A.A. and of the Regiment of the Colonial Artillery of Morocco, suspected of de Gaullist sympathies have been sent to work on the roads far into the interior.

Besides the fact that those regiments which have been placed in a state of readiness for action extend from Attir to Port Liaubey (?), the officers of all armaments, suspected of sympathy with de Gaulle (particularly in the goum) have been automatically retired.

There is to be noted an active propaganda for recruiting of natives for Germany. The recruiting officers at Marrakech are: Si Mohammed Ould Draa, Joseph Nateraz (called Pépé the Maltese). There is likewise intense smuggling in arms through Ifni destined for the Souss and the region of Marrakech, organized by two German agents: Keller and Vazari, aids of Axel Viale and of Germain.

With regard to requisitions of wheat, barley, dried vegetables, dried fish, cattle, sheep and horses, they have increased at Marrakech by 75% under the direct control of the civilian and military authorities.

The "Comte de Paris", who came on a visit to Marrakech on June 22, 1942, made a short speech in one of the factories of the town eulogizing Petain and collaboration.

On June 22, 1942, two carriers of tracts, coming from Tangier, were arrested at Marrakech in the Hotel des Negociants, upon investigation of Inspector Fraisse, an agent of the German Armistice Commission.

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Besides the tracts, Korrbi Albert and Kolts Maurice were in possession of a plan for passing the Spanish Moroccan frontier and means for reaching Tangier.

Since the month of June 1942, all ~~change~~ ships of the French squadron in Morocco, with the exception of convoy vessels and submarines assigned to the escort of convoys, received orders to hold themselves in readiness to sail. Aircraft and patrol hydroplanes have their war equipment on board.

Upon confirmation it appears that in the garrison of Marrakech-Agadir -Confirms 90% of the officers have agreed to sign an engagement (undertaking) not to bear arms against Germany and to defend the empire against any aggressor (Anglo-Saxon understood).

Summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

W. A. EDDY,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC (Ret).

[illegible]

July 21, 1942.

QUESTIONNAIRE

For Candidates for the S. O. L;

Les S. S. de Vichy--

Des groupes "d'assaut" dits de "Service d'Ordre" sont actuellement formes dans la Legion. Le Marechal Petain vient de leur donner a Nice son investiture. Voici l'interrogatoire auquel doivent repondre les postulants a ces organizations de guerre civil:

1. Avez-vous appartenu a un ou plusieurs partis politiques ?
Lequelles ? Circonstances de votre admission dans ces partis.
2. Quelles sont les opinions politiques de votre famille ?
3. Quel role y avez-vous joue et quelles charges avez-vous rempli ?
4. Que pensez-vous de l'action de ces partis en general et en particulier en 1936 ?
5. Si vous n'avez ete inscrit a aucun parti politique, comment avez-vous reagi devant les evenements de guerre ?
6. Quelles ont ete vos reactions, quels ont ete vos sentiments a la declaration de guerre ?
7. Quels furent vos sentiments en apprenant la signature de l'armistice ?
8. Si vous-aviez eu alors ou plus tard, la possibilite d'aller en Angleterre pour continuer la lutte, l'auriez-vous fait ?
9. Comment juger-vous l'action de l'Angleterre vis-a-vis de la France depuis l'armistice ?
10. Que pensez-vous de la Franc-Maconnnerie et des Juifs ?
11. Si l'Allemagne venait a gagner la guerre que penseriez-vous de la situation ainsi cree ?
12. Que pensez-vous de de Gaulle et du mouvement Gaulliste ?
13. Comment juger-vous l'action du Marechal Petain et de son gouvernement ?
14. Faites-vous une distinction entre le Marechal et son gouvernement ?
15. Que pensez-vous de l'URSS et quel role attribuez-vous a Stalin: a) dans les evenements actuels ?
b) dans les evenements futurs ?

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16. Que pensez-vous de la constitution de l'Etat Francais qui regit la France sous les principes de Travail, Famille, Patrie ?
 17. Si le Marechal disparaissait, que devrions nous faire a votre avis ?
 18. Vous engages-vous d'accepter par avance comme Chef de l'Etat Francais l'homme que le Marechal designera, meme si cet homme n'est pas celui de votre choix ?
 19. Si le parti politique auquel vous avez appartenu voulait prendre la succession du Marechal a la disparition de celui-ci, que feriez-vous ?
 20. Dans le cas ou les ordres recus par vos chefs O. O. seraient en opposition complete avec la politique pratiquee par les chefs de votre ancien parti politique ou par les pouvoirs publics ou meme par la Legion que feriez-vous ? Quelle serait votre attitude ?

July 21, 1942.

QUESTIONNAIRE

For Candidates for the S. O. L.

The S. S. of Vichy--

The groups "of assault" called "Service d'Ordre" are actually formed in the Legion. Marshal Petain has just given them their investiture in Nice. Here is the questionnaire to which the candidates for these organizations of civil war must respond:

1. Have you belonged to one or several political parties? Which ones? Circumstances of your admission into these parties.
2. What are the political opinions of your family?
3. What role did you play in it and what commissions have you filled?
4. What do you think of the action of these parties in general and in particular in 1936?
5. If you have not been registered in any political party, how did you react before the events of war?
6. What were your reactions, what were your sentiments at the declaration of war?
7. What were your sentiments on learning of the signing of the Armistice?
8. If, then or later, you had had the opportunity to go to England to continue the struggle, would you have taken it?
9. How do you judge the action of England vis-a-vis France since the Armistice?
10. What do you think of Free Masonry and of the Jews?
11. If Germany were to win the war, what would you think of the situation thus created?

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12. What do you think of de Gaulle and of the de Gaul-
list movement?

13. How do you judge the action of Marshal Petain and
of his government?

14. Do you make a distinction between the Marshal and
his Government?

15. What do you think of the USSR and what role do you
attribute to Stalin: a) in actual events?
b) in future events?

16. What do you think of the constitution of the French
State which governs France under the principals of Work,
Family, Native Country?

17. If the Marshal were to disappear, what in your
opinion should we do?

18. Do you pledge yourself to accept in advance as Chief
of the French State the man whom the Marshal will desig-
nate, even if that man is not of your choice?

19. If the political party to which you belonged wished
to take succession to the Marshal at the disappearance
of the latter, what would you do?

20. In the case where the orders received by your S.O.
chiefs were in complete opposition to the politics prac-
tised by the chiefs of your former political party or
by the public powers or even by the Legion, what would
you do? What would be your attitude?

Paris, le 15 Jan. 1942.

Monsieur le Ministre

Suivant votre demande, je vous adresse le rapport suivant:

1) Après sondage en divers milieux, je constate une évolution marquée en faveur du mouvement France-libre. Le Général de Gaulle est dans les milieux gagnés accepté comme chef hors de toute opinion politique. Il est considéré sans opposition comme le chef chargé de réorganiser la démocratie française après la victoire des nations unies, victoire inéluctable dont les partisans du régime actuel eux-mêmes ne doutent pas.

2) Les gains sont marqués par les statistiques que vous nous avez demandées. Elles donnent d'une manière générale un nombre égal de pour et de contre, mais un chiffre impressionnant de neutres d'opinion. Mais nos amis chargés de l'établissement de ces statistiques nous les garantissent comme gagnés à notre mouvement dès qu'il pourra se manifester librement.

3) Evolution dans le langage. Les critiques acerbes contre le mouvement France-libre ont pour ainsi dire disparu, même de la presse. Plus de trahison, plus de vendus aux Anglais. Les Anglophiles nombreux tels que vous, moi et tant d'autres sont connus et ne me paraissent plus suspects comme ils le furent. Ils ne sont pas inquiétés et s'expriment plus librement. Pour désigner les écervelés qui croient en Hitler et ses séides, on dit pro-boches ou pro-nazis et non plus germanophiles. La germanophilie se camoufle derrière les grands sentiments de la Révolution nationale ou de collaboration, sentiments qu'on n'ose plus exprimer au grand jour. Leur succès n'hoite plus à l'enthousiasme délirant. Notre presse même, si peu libre, est assez timide.

4) Le récent discours de P. Laval, jetant bas le masque, n'est pas défavorable à nos idées - nul n'ose déclarer qu'il partage de semblables opinions.

D'où vient donc la difficulté que nous rencontrons à grouper solidement avec un élan spontané toutes les sympathies qui nous environnent, tous les coeurs généreux qui croient à la France immortelle, qui ne peuvent et ne veulent admettre qu'après la succès de lutte notre pays soit définitivement terrassé sous la hôte germanique ? A mon sens, j'y vois deux causes:

a) La popularité du M. Hétain que ses fautes et ses faiblesses n'ont pas encore entièrement détruite. A la croyance inférieure carnales qu'il joue double jeu, trompe et les Allemands et nous. Enfin un moderne machiavel, un géant de la politique comme Napoléon III, c'est qu'un enfant. En définitive, il trahit la France et la démocratie.

b) La propagande. Elle n'est pas étrangère à la situation actuelle du chapitre précédent. L'entourage du M. Hétain et de ses séides n'est pas un discours pas

-4-

un article qui ne se réfère au chef qui a tout sauvé même alors que nul n'a la moindre idée de la facture qui sera présentée si la victoire est remportée par l'humaine Allemagne.

5) La propagande n'est pas seule en cause. Il y a l'action gouvernementale. On ne donne pas de permis de séjour au Maroc aux jeunes militaires libérés, même s'ils ont trouvé un emploi. Ils doivent rentrer en France. On a besoin d'eux pour y travailler. Je regrette d'avoir négligé ce renseignement et de n'avoir pas noté ces renseignements avec précision lorsqu'ils m'ont été communiqués. Je les avais jugés insignifiants. Laval n'avait pas encore prononcé son discours faneux et indigne de la France. Les jeunes filles trouvent dans les administrations publiques ou confection des emplois qu'elles désirent et bien rétribués. Il est quasi impossible aux jeunes gens libérés du service militaire de se caser. On disait alors que c'était pour les forcer à s'engager dans la nouvelle armée. Est-ce aussi vrai aujourd'hui?

6) Barade. Rétive après l'armistice elle évolue à son tour. De tous nos renseignements on peut sans crainte tirer la conclusion qu'elle n'est pas collaboratrice. Elle éprouve de plus en plus de difficultés à admettre son infériorité et commence à comprendre bien des choses. La légion française des combattants s'occupe à décaler les officiers gaullistes et à les dénoncer à Vichy. Quelques mutations interviennent. Elles ne changent rien à nos gains. Les armes les plus redoutables, telles que l'Aviation et la Marine nous sont gardées pour moitié chacune. Je vous rappelle à ce sujet notre conversation de l'après midi avec un camarade pilote aviateur: un lieutenant pilote titulaire de deux citations en Syrie contre les anglais rentre de permission en zone occupée. Il est gagné à l'Angleterre par l'opinion des siens et de la France entière. Il a pu observer des écoles de pilotage nazies en France, à Dijon notamment. Les pistes sont cimentées mais minées. Beaucoup de ports reliés par les Boches sont minés, de grands bâtiments occupés par eux sont minés. Avertissement précieux pour nos alliés lorsqu'ils débarqueront en France. Il serait utile de vérifier le bruit qui circule dans l'aviation selon lequel trois cents mécaniciens brevetés seraient libérés du service militaire. L'affaire serait grave, car ayant prêté serment au chef de l'Etat ils seraient contraints de par ce serment d'accepter un engagement dans les usines allemandes.

7) La légion des Commandants que je n'ose plus appeler Française paraît en déclin. La discipline nazie qu'on veut imposer à ses membres n'arrive pas à être populaire et admise sans résistances. Le feu du début de sa création n'a plus d'aliment. Vigoureuse au Maroc parce que loin de la France et de ses souffrances, elle perd de sa vitalité de jour en jour.

Trouver une way Chap

(Copy)

Rabat, June 26, 1942

My Commandant,

Following your request, I address to you the following report:

1) After sounding in different ways, I ascertain a marked evolution in favor of the Free French movement. General de Gaulle is accepted in converted groups even beyond all political opinion. He is considered without opposition as the chief charged with reorganizing the French democracy after the victory of the United Nations, an inevitable victory of which the partisans of the actual regime themselves have no doubt.

2) The gains are marked by the statistics which you have asked of us. They give in a general manner an equal number for and against, but a number impressing those of neutral opinion. But our friends charged with the establishment of these statistics guarantee the latter to us as won to our movement as soon as it is able to manifest itself freely.

3) Evolution in the language. The severe critics of the Free French Movement have disappeared so to speak, even from the press. The more treachery, the more sold to the English. The numerous Anglophiles such as you, I and so many others are known and no more appear to me suspected as before. They are not disturbed and express themselves more freely. To designate the hare-brained persons who believe in Hitler and his fanatical partisans, one says pro-Boche or pro-Nazi and no longer Germanophile. The Germanophile camouflages himself behind the great sentiments of the national Revolution or of collaboration, sentiments which one no longer dares express in broad daylight. Their success no longer incites delirious enthusiasm. Even our press, so restricted, is timid enough.

4) The recent discourse of Pierre Laval, throwing off the mask, is not unfavorable to our ideas - no one dares declare that he holds similar opinions.

Where, then, does the difficulty arise that we meet

in grouping together with a spontaneous elan all the sympathies which surround us, all the courageous hearts who believe in immortal France; all those who cannot and will not admit that after the success of struggle our country will be definitely vanquished under the German boot? In my mind, I see two causes for it:

a) The popularity of Marshal Petain which his faults and his weaknesses have not entirely destroyed. To the deeply rooted belief that he plays a double game, deceives both the Germans and Laval. Finally, a modern Machiavelli, a giant of politics beside whom Talleyrand is only an infant. In a word, he will liberate France and the democracy.

b) To propaganda. It is not a stranger to the resistance to the sentiments which have gone before. The entourage of the Marshal uses it cleverly and there is not a discourse, not an article which does not refer to the Chief who has saved everything, even when no one has the least idea of the bill which will be presented if victory is won by humane Germany.

5) Propaganda is not the only cause. There is governmental action. One does not give young discharged soldiers permission to travel to Morocco, even if they have found employment. They must return to France. They are needed to work there. I regret to have neglected this information and not to have noted these facts with precision when they were given to me. I judged them insignificant. Laval had not yet given his famous, vile speech on France. Young girls find in the public administration positions which they desire and which are very remunerative. It is almost impossible for young men freed from military service to house themselves. One said then that it was to force them to enroll in the new army. Is it also true today?

6) The Army. Restive after the armistice it evolves in its turn. From all our information one can without fear draw the conclusion that it is not collaborationist. It meets with more and more difficulty in admitting its inferiority and begins to understand many things. La legion francaise des combattants occupies itself with betraying De Gaullist officers and denouncing them to Vichy. Several changes intervene. They change nothing to our advantage. The most rebellious branches, such as the Air Corps and the Navy, are each only half won to us. I recall to you our conversation on

the subject, our conversation of the afternoon with a comrade pilot of an aeroplane: a lieutenant, chief pilot, with two citations in Syria against the English, returns with permission to the occupied zone. He is won to England by the opinion of his people and of all France. He could observe the Nazi schools of piloting in France, notably at Dijon. The runways are cemented but mined. Many ports restored by the Boches are mined, great buildings occupied by them are mined. A warning for our Allies when they debark in France. It would be useful to verify the rumor circulating in the Air Corps according to which three hundred licensed mechanics would be freed from military service. The affair would be serious, for having given oath to the Chief of State, they would be constrained by this oath to accept an engagement in the German factories.

7) La legion des Commandattants which I no longer dare call French would appear in decline. The Nazi discipline which they wish to impose on its members does not happen to be popular and accepted without recriminations. The fire of the beginning of its creation has no more fuel. Vigorous in Morocco because far from France and her sufferings, it loses vitality from day to day.

From one of the French S.R. head men
to his chief.

David W. King

From **Madrid**, July 21, 1942

REGULATIONS REGARDING THE NATIONAL HYMN, NATIONAL SONGS, AND SALUTES

Madrid, 20. The "Boletin Oficial del Estado" (Official Gazette) will tomorrow publish a Decree from the Presidency of the Government, consolidating the existing regulations respecting the National Hymn, National Songs, and Salutes. In future it is provided:

Article No. 1. The National Hymn will be the one up to April 14, 1931, known as "Marcha Granadera" to be called "National Hymn" and played at official functions with the solemnity, deference, and respect required by the love of the Mother-Country.

Article No. 2. The National Songs to be received with the consideration, respect and high esteem afforded to them during the Glorious Campaign, will be the hymns "Falange Espanola", "Orisendi" and "La Legion". At the official functions where they may be played, they will be listened to standing in homage to the Mother-Country and in remembrance of the glorious Spaniards who fell in the Crusade.

Article No. 3. The national salute will be the right arm extended forward in front of the forehead with outstretched, open hand at a height somewhat above that of the head.

Article No. 4. During official functions, when the National Flag is carried through the streets, the National Hymn and National Songs will be sung and the people will assume the

position

position of salute.

Article No. 5. Military personnel will salute with the customary military salute.

Article No. 6. During the playing of the National Hymn and National Songs and hoisting of the National Flag at acts of a national or popular character attended by the military and civilians, the military will salute with the national salute.

Article No. 7. At individual acts among the military, or at collective acts among the service, of an exclusively military character, the military salute will continue to be used as heretofore, except as provided for to the contrary in the next article.

Article No. 8. Generals, chiefs, officers, and sub-officers, when commanding unarmed forces at displays and ceremonies, will make the national salute. The person before whom they parade will reply with the same salute, even though belonging to the military.

Article No. 9. The salute to be made by all Army, Navy, and Airforce personnel, when barchanded, will be the national salute.

Article No. 10. The salute to be made by all chiefs, officers, sub-officers and individuals belonging to the "Milicias de Falange Española Tradicionalista y de la J. O. N. S." will be in all cases the national salute.

JUL 22 1957

*Source highly placed and reliable British source**F.P. Wilson***AVIATION ITALIENNE**Très sûrS.82 récemment passé Tunisie portant
matricule 60.739

26/6

278ème escadrille Aéro-Silurante étant
en 505 commandé par Capt. R Ugo RIVOLI
Magasin territorial M.S.A. se trouve
en 358 et est commandé par le Colonel
ASSENSO

Un MC 200 de la 86ème esc. atterri le
10/7 en Tunisie venant de Pantelleria
Matricule S.866

Le 15/7 vers 8h du soir toute une série d'atterrissage
a eu lieu en Tunisie:

un Ju 87 Italien de l'escadrille 238 ou
239 No. Matric. 8.201. Armé d'une bombe
de 500 kg. et 2 bombes incendiaires de
80 kg. (noté un réservoir supplémentaire
non protégé de 300 litres entre pilote
et mitrailleur)

Cet appareil était parti ~~maxxair~~ en
mission de Sicile (probablement Castel
Vittrano) même jour même heure

1) un RS 14 de la 144ème Esc. ameri à
Hammamet

2) un MC 200 de la 76ème Esc. Matr. 6.875
atterri train rentré près de Tunis
On ne voit pas clairement quelle est la
raison de ces atterrissages. Y a-t-il eu
crainte d'un convoi Américain ou protection
d'un convoi italien?

Le 15/7 (Matin) Un Cant Z.501 de la 197ème Esc. a
atterri près de Tunis venant de Sicile
(escorté de convoi)

Le 18/7 Un CR 42 de la 208ème Esc. matric. 8.872
et appartenant au 101ème groupe a atterri
au Cap Bon. Le pilote a déclaré que son
groupe le 101ème était composé de son Esc.
(208) équipé en CR 42 et qui faisait du semi-
piqué et de l'escadrille 238 ou 239 équipées
en Ju87 (escadrille dont un appareil a
atterri en Tunisie le 15/7)

NOTE:

Ceci détruit formellement votre suggestion
sur la dissolution des unités en piqué ital-
iennes. Par contre, il semble y avoir eu
transformation

Le 19/7 La 2ème Nucleo Aéro-Silurante était en 426 sou
le commandement du lieutenant Marcel Mario

Le 20/7 La 144ème Esc. était en 512 ce qui confirme bien

(aviation italienne page 2)

Il y a un camp de parachutistes à Mizda (avec des indigènes)

Le 68ème groupe commandé par le Major Nicolo était à Zuara le 6/7

Il y a une école d'observation aérienne maritime à Orbetello

La 604ème Escadrille SAS était en 705 le 20 Mai

La 33ème Esc. O-A était en 703 le 22-6 et commandée par le Capt. Atzori.

Le Commandant tactique de la 5ème Squadra Aerea était à Derna le 31/5/42

Appareils italiens vus le long des côtes tunisiennes:

le 1/7 un 506 de la 144ème Escadrille

" deux B.79 de la 53ème "

3/7 un B.79 " " 56ème "

27/6 un 501 " " 199ème "

1/7 un 506 " " 237ème "

plus toute une série d'avions de transport des B.A. 2, 11, 14, 15, 16, 5.

ANNEXE A L'ANNÉE 10/6/42

K.G. 2/1	Catan et Italie (disparu depuis 27/6)
2/2	Kersux et Cognac
2/3	France
2/4	Allomagne N/o
3/3	Italie
3/2 4	Chievres
4/4	Avird
26/4	Nest
27/4	Region Berlin
30/4	Butigny (Bretigny)
40/2	Ouz et France (?)
40/3	Bordeaux et France
40/4	Orléans Bricy
53/4	Ansbach
54/1	Catan
54/2	Italie ?
54/4	Catan et Foggia
55/4	
77/2	France et Belgique (réapparu Sicile
77/3	France ? (fin juin
77/4	Bourges
100/3	Chartres ?

K.Gr.106/t H	Bourge ?
106/K	Rennes ?
106/L	France
406/H	Italie
406/K	Orbsettella ??

K.GR.606 Catan	Catan (disparu depuis le 30/6)
806	

LG. 1/2	Athènes et Catan	) semble en Grèce en juillet
1/3	Grèce ?	
1/4	Grèce ? et Italie ?	

AG Ob. D.L./C	Catan
L/L	Catan et Tripoli
L/M	Sud Italie

AG 121/H	Catan
122/H	---
122/K	Trapani
122/M L	

AG 123/H	France
1/1	R.O.B. (début juin)
1/2	St. Trond ?
1/3	Trante ?
1/4	Stuttgart
2/1	Catan
2/2	Belgique
2/3	

AG 124/H Sicile semble passé particulièrement en Libye depuis fin mai

AG 125/H avoir disparu depuis Malaga

-2

26/A

Tripoli

TO 1
TO 34 esc. Tripoli
éléments des esc. MTDU en Sicile
début juilletGroup 1 KOX (?)
II Baustheim (?)
III Bery en Bac

Unité 3E/U

Orléans Bricey

--- 8H/L

Orly

Bateaux vus au Cap Bon du 29/6 au 13/7 (très sûr)

Passage habituel des petits bateaux

MAGGIO (IPVK)

APRILE (IKBY)

LUPA

VINICOLO

le 10/7 un torpilleur et deux vedettes italiennes
- route sud

1. vapeur italien (IRKU)

1 torpilleur (ICRG) escortant un
pétrolier le FIOCI-FASSIO
le tout route sud

le 11/7 un vapeur (IRZG) route sud
le ERICE route nord

Sources Beppe

Activité port de Tripoli

le 14/5 2 bateaux citernes de 10,000 T et
3000 T ont débarqué du mazout au
môle Lottoflutto

le 3/6 un convoi escorté du VITTORIO VENETO,
du GIULIO, de 2 croiseurs de 3000 T et
de 4 contre-torpilleurs a amené 7 cargoes
de 12,000 à 3000 T

transportant entre autres! 60 chars
moyens et plusieurs cent-
aines de canons antichars

le 10/6 un croiseur type-TRENTO- a débarqué au
large de Tripoli 1500
de l'aviation italienne

le 14/6 2 cargoes de 2500 Tonnes ont embarqué
des vivres, des munitions et des
carburants en futs de Tripoli pour
Benghazi. Ils sont partis escortés
de 4 contre-torpilleurs.

Du 15 au 18 juin sont arrivées à Tripoli 3 cargoes
de 4 à 6000 T chargés de chars légers,
de munitions et de vivres.

le 16/6 arrivent 2 citernes de 15000 T
(MARTOVANI 7 et la REGUE ou EGUE - série
des FRATELLI MARTELLIO)
les 2 citernes sont reportées le 17 pour
une destination inconnue dans rien
à Benghazi à Tripoli

-2-

Le 28/6 deux citernes d'eau de 2500 T chaque, escortées de 2 croiseurs, ont touché Tripoli en route pour Tobruk.

La voilière VINICOLA I est parti le 5/6 de Tripoli pour Ras-Hilal (avec du vin) Il a suivi l'itinéraire suivant:

Tripoli-Sirte en longeant la côte
Sirte Ghemines en ligne droite
Ghemines - Ras-Hilal en longeant la côte

Le cargo SAN ANTONIO (ex-ANTON) a été torpillé le 24/6 devant Derna où il apportait de Tripoli des vivres, des armes, anti-chars et 4 chars.

le 3/7 avaient croisé au large de Zuara

2 croiseurs de 7,880 T
2 ----- 3,000 T
1 escadrille de contre-torpilleurs

le 4/7 sont arrivés à Tripoli

3 cargos 1-3000 T } avec des matériel-
2-1500 T }iaux de construction, des rails, du blé, des effets.

Ces bateaux se sont détachés d'un important convoi qui a continué sur Bengazi (sans doute avec l'escorte repérée la veille devant Zuara)

L'un de ces 2 cargos de 1500 T est reparti le 8/7 sur Bengazi avec des vivres et des canons de 130/42.
L'autre cargo de 1500 T a chargé des douilles et des futs vides pour l'Italie

Le 7/7 un navire citerne de 10,000 T venant d'Italie est reparti dans la nuit pour Bengazi.

2 navires de 10,000 T, le MINO BIXIO et le FABIO FALZI sont arrivés à vide de Bengazi.

Le 8/7 un cargo allemand vide arrivé de Bengazi.
L'activité du port de Tripoli a beaucoup diminué en juillet

A noter de l'ensemble de ces renseignements

- 1) La route de certains convois qui passent par Tripoli pour atteindre Benghazi.
 - 2) le déplacement de matériel Tripoli-Benghazi.
- Ces renseignements nous paraissent très cohérents et dignes d'attention mais, encore une fois, une appréciation de votre état d'esprit sur ces renseignements serait très précieuse.

Les prisonniers d'origine française, italienne ou allemande sont maltraités de façon inimaginable et roués de coups par les soldats rencontrés sur les routes. Certains ont été tués, d'autres morts de leurs blessures.

Il y aurait aussi des convois directs Sicile-Cyrénaïque, escortés par le LITTORIO, VITTORIA VENETO, CAVOUR

Toujours Source Beppe

Benghazi est très détruit. Les débarquements se font par chalands.

Le 10/6, trois sous-marins dans le port dont un allemand, chef de la flottille.

Les italiens ont créé un port de 7m 50 de profondeur à Ras-Hilal à 40 kms xxxxxxxx ouest de Derna

D'Appollonis à Derna nombreuses batteries côtières et troupes de G.A.F. par crainte débarquements (ceci vraisemblablement au début juin)
De Tripoli à Benghazi et Derna gros mouvement d'avion de transport avec des troupes, des vivres, les carburants, l'eau. Ces transports sont escortés par de la chasse)

Secteur Zuara - Très sûr

Passage habituels de remorqueurs, voir les petites carres.

A signaler le passage vers l'est les 13 et 14 juillet de 7 "semoventi" (sic) allemands portant les No. 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 356 (vedettes? chasses de s/marines? remorqueurs???)

Le 4 juillet arrêt des permissions par l'usine-Tripoli

Identifiés dans secteur Zuara

21 batteries Milmar (76/40)

batterie 75/27 du 280 re armamento

802, 821 823-et 835-batteries

Le 16/7 un bateau citerne a quitté Tripoli à 10H route sud

Source Beppe Le 10/7 sont arrivés devant Kalibia

1 cargo 3,500 T route sud

1 convoi composé d'un torpilleur et d'un pétrolier de 4,000 T (route sud)

le 22 juillet 1941

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Tunis, Tunisia
July 22, 1942

American Naval Attaché,
American Legation,
Tangier, Morocco.

Sir:

Reference is made to the code and explanations in French, of meteorological broadcasts of North Africa sent to your office with copy of despatch No.250 dated June 17, 1942.

There are enclosed two copies of supplementary code for the month of August 1942. It will be noted that the figures in the horizontal code are changed four times a day. The first column after the date represents the hour and the first line, for example, is used between midnight and 5:59 A.M. G.M.T., the second line serves from 6:00 A.M. until 11:59 A.M., etc.

A change has been made in the usual indicator groups at the beginning and end of the message (see Paragraph I "Formes des Messages" of despatch No.250). Instead of beginning with three groups of 5 X's each, the message now begins with one group of 5 X's, a second with one X three numbers and X, and the third with a group of 5 X's.

The figures in the middle group are made up as follows:

The first figure represents the number of the group in the horizontal code chosen for starting. The last two figures represent the number chosen from the vertical code for starting. For example:

On August 1, the third group of horizontal is taken, and the ninth number in the vertical code.

This. . . .

2

This would give X 309 X. For coding and decoding purposes, therefore, these lines begin 25362 and 766917 respectively. One begins with these figures, proceeds to end of line and then starts back at the beginning of the line.

Very truly yours,

H. A. Doolittle
American Consul

Enclosures:

2 copies of code as stated

TABLE 100E

SECRET

1	67564	46576	68917	21314	51686
2	76857	56747	46573	36574	34253
3	67463	36576	57696	47515	57685
4	56453	67654	54322	47553	46573
5	65768	68796	45463	36472	26475
6	54635	36473	57686	57463	35243
7	67586	57685	46355	36574	37586
8	65342	26574	47586	57686	46573
9	78878	78786	78756	46575	57674
10	54635	36574	26574	36452	26574
11	78695	46574	47583	26574	35462
12	67564	47581	35342	26574	46352
13	76876	77875	64557	49129	27465
14	56453	36472	26475	46372	26581
15	76586	57684	35462	27 465	57685
16	54635	36574	47586	46573	36462
17	54321	97847	67564	7 4657	35761
18	67654	87465	46574	35243	35462
19	76542	75666	46311	21855	15761
20	19871	87165	51312	21415	51687
21	54756	57686	46573	36472	27564
22	78675	46573	36574	35242	26475
23	61912	31475	47563	36477	57684
24	67515	57684	48526	37683	26453
25	67564	35342	26574	35462	26574
26	68433	36475	57683	46574	45362
27	94455	27466	57611	68717	46573
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NUMERICAL CODES AMOUNT 1942

1	0	51204	46573	25362	47595	33462
	6	57646	25463	26574	27434	57696
	12	81090	57688	68797	46453	51029
	17	54439	26574	25473	26475	51606
2	0	67189	47564	35462	26475	57616
	6	61050	58686	67685	26473	26575
	12	67853	54940	26473	25354	46575
	17	56454	25494	50603	50606	57685
3	0	78181	68796	26473	26505	43463
	6	65453	26574	57686	57616	56454
	12	67810	46352	27585	59607	57585
	17	54342	27565	57696	57616	68576
4	0	69010	09846	47505	67 583	26477
	6	56453	26573	46574	46494	57606
	12	67586	46452	26475	51066	58616
	17	54342	27516	47505	92024	47583
5	0	58105	57615	45352	29040	51606
	6	43322	28050	41506	2637 4	26390
	12	78100	80174	47574	25303	47585
	17	67465	36353	57616	57686	41055
6	0	78190	78475	25362	21059	46575
	6	53622	41050	58676	46577	46272
	12	67190	47577	59066	57682	41055
	17	56352	21045	50607	50607	30405
7	0	78102	47526	57583	69026	47563
	6	26463	27 516	48586	51066	47266
	12	60809	35453	27515	51696	56463
	17	56453	26575	58607	57626	56466

-2-

8	0	69040	57616	50463	27366	50607
	6	54623	47577	51066	50600	70685
	12	76564	71055	46352	26574	40506
	17	61505	46475	46366	27513	49050
9	0	47515	57382	27495	47514	24590
	6	71090	53422	67465	35463	21040
	12	75626	46563	35462	26466	59150
	17	54243	41050	58696	46474	35442
10	0	81040	58615	46372	26477	51066
	6	56263	47516	47586	41050	57686
	12	67101	67109	46352	26475	51067
	17	46563	26477	37516	47586	46263
11	0	638 67586	46362	41050	57684	35463
	6	78190	35402	48166	57901	24353
	12	59090	46575	59067	58192	30405
	17	76465	25352	46595	41050	57686
12	0	54636	26475	51607	46595	35452
	6	67586	46575	41506	57686	56464
	12	71090	47585	24342	41506	57 588
	17	57611	50607	67516	46574	35462
13	0	782 78216	46456	57686	56463	25342
	6	54646	57616	57961	25364	46572
	12	81056	38475	35243	41506	45243
	17	54657	57685	45453	24352	41506
14	0	50607	78585	57564	24342	28151
	6	10440	27515	57100	50402	40507
	12	81396	29354	21050	68676	46463
	17	10000	20401	44443	21311	46374

-1-

15	0	69011	45262	41040	50807	57526
	6	47512	67213	47516	47563	26514
	12	59106	40506	79603	40303	29500
	17	90506	47253	57463	21040	50607
16	0	47505	57572	46462	41506	51 57511
	6	47572	41506	57585	26473	41506
	12	58616	60706	46462	46211	40596
	17	47515	50607	46266	40506	49515
17	0	67212	47514	58615	35252	26472
	6	10605	77594	27 514	27 590	26590
	12	47514	27511	59606	47362	41059
	17	49050	57615	25490	49585	89797
18	0	41059	56263	41059	46572	41029
	6	58108	67190	26574	51617	49120
	12	69102	45362	26591	57612	89212
	17	46572	21506	50607	51607	98282
19	0	67514	45243	41059	81212	46573
	6	56462	21405	50607	70802	59020
	12	71605	47582	50499	51477	45352
	17	4657 2	51607	46563	26573	58616
19	0	67514	45243	41059	81212	46573
	6	56462	21405	50607	70802	59020
	12	71605	47582	50499	51477	45352
	17	46572	51607	46563	26573	58616
20	0	71605	26473	36646	41514	51516
	6	51612	41516	51614	41214	59600
	12	10407	40507	20507	20506	36473
	17	46572	41516	51614	41214	59600

22	0	92040	51611	27511	46352	41055
	6	64757	68586	46463	27511	46463
	12	81403	21103	57685	41352	41009
	17	57611	35352	40586	47595	51211
22	0	71306	66453	27511	41059	46572
	6	46511	35253	41306	46573	21055
	12	56253	51300	61727	51617	41576
	17	61203	46572	46362	41503	27511
23	0	67511	26472	41306	98273	48574
	6	81511	26473	27516	49186	41516
	12	58615	41516	51607	28959	47562
	17	61203	46574	27151	58617	81434
24	0	81511	41513	21516	68511	46453
	6	57615	26475	58617	41516	47727
	12	81306	46473	26473	51617	57589
	17	75111	26473	27516	59617	60502
25	0	67151	46573	47515	50615	26332
	6	65312	41505	50607	78132	41576
	12	75512	41516	57685	46352	41900
	17	81046	47586	46352	27516	49105
26	0	76152	47564	51607	47563	26475
	6	78511	47585	61503	27582	46473
	12	53433	41059	57685	46362	41505
	17	71605	57564	46577	51607	15342
27	0	81115	57466	41516	51617	49505
	6	90105	65746	46572	41596	59104
	12	77636	46512	61517	58375	47562
	17	78511	51607	46462	47581	41506

28	0	62401	46572	41506	46450	57564
	6	64535	21415	58676	47577	58869
	12	73756	46574	23415	46352	36454
	17	76410	59616	51617	47277	41516
29	0	81605	46573	26514	51607	46577
	6	64756	35243	41506	57686	57685
	12	64775	57615	41588	67576	46362
	17	76453	21506	57684	46362	41516
30	0	90463	54620	41506	47277	41514
	6	65743	41506	57601	46253	41312
	12	81605	46253	41516	51617	49589
	17	91415	26473	41577	51616	46473
31	0	76453	21405	6874	51511	71717
	6	81504	35452	65744	46513	51516
	12	65145	51687	68516	50663	21405
	17	71504	26413	57576	41506	46572

July 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

for Mr. Murphy and Colonel W. A. May, from Vice Consul King.

An Al contact reports as follows:

At a recent meeting of a section of the S.O.L. (Service d'Ordre de la Legion) in Rabat, the man sent to address them was very much embarrassed because he was obliged to explain to the meeting that the Germans had never promised to liberate prisoners in exchange for workmen. He said that Laval had merely stated that he hoped that the flow of French workers to Germany might persuade the Germans to liberate some prisoners. In any case, he went on to explain, if the Germans did liberate French prisoners, it would be on the basis of 4 prisoners for 10 workmen.

The leader of the section thereupon rose and resigned his leadership and membership in the Legion. He was followed up in his resignation by 17 out of the 53 members of the section. The next day, however, they received what amounted to an order from General Leugère, Chief of the S.O.L., to withdraw their resignations, and the leader was instructed to make a speech saying that he had not understood the matter fully when he resigned.

There is also a certain growing feeling in the Legion that the commanders of the S.O.L. should be the first ones to volunteer for service in the Legion Tricolore on the Russian front. Up to the time of writing, there has been no ugly rush on the part of the S.O.L. to form themselves into a spearhead to point out the road to glory.

Another contact, Al, confirms the foregoing but tells of three members of the S.O.L. in Rabat:

Dr. LELOUTRE (one of the S.O.L. commanders)
Dr. Pages
Dr. Marney

who have actually volunteered to join the Legion Tricolore. It may be added that these men are confronted with a certain amount of personal and domestic troubles, but even so, it is doubted whether they will get any further than the station.

David W. King
David W. King.

MEMORANDUM

For Mr. Murphy and Colonel W. A. Eddy.

An AI contact reports that German specialists are working on the construction of a submarine base in the little island called Isla de Peregil (or Perexhil) west of Punta Leone on the Spanish Moroccan coast west of Ceuta.

The Italians have installed a vice-consulate at Melilla with two military attachés, Commandantes MONDINI and MORCONI, who are in close contact with Commandante MENOR, Chief of the Spanish Intelligence Service at Melilla.

Until recently there were two native employees named Menberak (Ebarak ?) at the Riff Hotel in Tangier. The proprietor dismissed them and they were immediately engaged by the German Consulate. The proprietor of the hotel is said to be anti-German.

A high ranking official of the Japanese Legation in Lisbon, Omdaria SHIGEKYOSHI, recently came from Lisbon to Tangier. He was in Casablanca on the 14th of July, went next day to Marrakesh, where he had a long conference in the MANOUNIA HOTEL with Major BOLTZE, and returned to Tangier on the 16th.

The following members of the German Armistice Commission in Algiers are said to have volunteered for service at the Russian front: Hans SCHWARTZMANN, Hans (or Henz) KEHR, and Willy MAHEL. SONNENTOL, stationed in Morocco, is said also to have volunteered and to be leaving shortly for the Army.

David W. King
David W. King.

Not in Tangier

Arrived Tangier July 9 from Lisbon
from Portuguese Embassy

July 23, 1948.

M E M O R A N D U M

for Mr. Murphy and Colonel W. A. Eddy, from Vice Consul King.

An AI contact (official) reports that the canning factory HUPAN at Fedala is canning corned beef in 500-gramme cans sent them by the Germans. The cans bear no indication of origin, merely the words "BOEUF ASSAISONNE - 500 GRAMMES" marked in red on the can. This stuff is shipped to France from Casablanca, not Fedala.

The cold storage dépôt at Casablanca is full of mutton carcasses (10,000) and has asked the Fedala cold storage dépôt to take some of them. Meanwhile brokers are busy buying up meat throughout Morocco for refrigeration purposes. These carcasses are destined for shipment to France.

Apparently the canning at Fedala is not progressing altogether efficiently, as my contact saw the tins mentioned above when a foreman brought in a batch of them to the manager, pointing out that the meat had gone bad and that the tins were ready to burst. Let us hope for the worst and pray for ptomaine.

David W. King
David W. King

July 1951

M E M O R A N D U M

for General Charles JOHNSON and Colonel W. A. BUNT.

Latest items of battle order.

2 battalions of the 6th Regiment of Tirailleurs Marocains have been moved from Casablanca to the Fedala district:

- 1 is stationed at Port-Blondin
- 1 " " in Fedala itself, in sheds.

1 platoon of the 3rd Spahis from Meknes has been moved to the woods North east of Fedala, near the railroad. (This platoon should include about 50 men).

There are also some elements of artillery, making a total of 1,000 men in the Fedala district.

The bombardment group of Rabat is at Salé. The pursuit group is still at Rabat but out of the 30 planes only 20 can fly. They are working on the aviation field at Salé and have built a fourth hangar.

The contact, Al, who brought in this information says that he can find no trace of any shell factory at Fez.

David W. King
David W. King.

July 24, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

for Colonel W. A. Eddy from Vice Consul King.

Wiesbaden has notified the German Armistice Commission here that two Axis ships loaded with German arms and ammunition will arrive at Fedala shortly. These ships may fly the French flag and are starting from an Atlantic port in occupied France. Source A1 and intercepted German cable from Wiesbaden.

Intercepted message referred to in previous cable was also German message from Wiesbaden to Commission here.

D. W. King.

*Forwarded to Opanan by despatch.
FVK*

M E M O R A N D U M

for Colonel W. A. Eddy, from Vice Consul King.

Fire on board the JEAN BART.

An AI contact reports that there was a fire on board the JEAN BART during the night of Monday and/or Tuesday. The fire broke out in the ammunition magazines. One man was killed, several wounded. It was necessary to flood the magazines, and today another AI contact reports that the anti-aircraft ammunition is being taken off the JEAN BART and loaded on to trucks. The causes of the fire are unknown, but are attributed to negligence, not sabotage. An enquiry is being made - in the utmost secrecy.

On July 23rd, at 7 p.m., the destroyer MALIN (X 82) sister ship of LE TERRIBLE, came in from Dakar and is berthed at berth N (see port sketches).

Near the JEAN BART the Navy are unpacking 160 new submarine batteries which have arrived from France.

D. W. King
D. W. King.

MEMORANDUM

for Mr. Murphy, Colonel W. A. Eddy and Colonel Charles Johnson,
from Vice Consul King.

An AI contact reports that the Germans are extremely worried about a Spanish Loyalist movement in Spanish Morocco. Officers are Loyalists, soldiers communists, both elements against Franco et al. The Germans consider that this might be the beginning and place for a second front in Africa and/or Europe. If this movement gets under way they would have to intervene through the Pyrenees and Spanish Morocco.

See King
D. W. King.

Perona-bred

ADDITIONAL TABLES COVERING JULY 25 - AUGUST 10, 1942

25 juillet 1942

Heures GMT

de 0 H à 1 H

1 - 2

2 - 3

3 - 4

4 - 5

5 - 6

6 - 7

7 - 8

8 - 9

9-10

10-11

11-12

12-13

13-14

14-15

15-16

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22-23

23-24

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
411	428	212	348	295	607	659	662	889	054
514	350	830	839	209	234	509	970	023	902
074	877	597	169	683	017	565	507	719	208
957	917	528	401	783	560	857	473	773	366
874	434	098	086	210	117	828	307	388	822
672			834						
82	788	339	82	524	590	543	166	493	749
247	351	239	522	248	465	344	492	340	867
285	950	571	771	362	553	363	544	690	647
503	184	077	761	168	766	733	180	770	981
276	078	329	475	753	710	931	055	642	195
429	367	368	925	688	214	806	577	742	643
133	678	053	044	708	564	767	725	537	197
334	487	292	101	580	609	153	213	170	706
890	901	287	521	490	701	573	393	452	979
371	386	920	913	316	592	131	026	768	665
330	513	617	909	790	684	093	011	832	139
751	379	625	963	357	076	567	266	058	270
156	533	022	341	569	146	724	460	182	064
812	045	789	051	692	193	671	655	966	278
092	549	786	155	039	095	192	576	807	343
689	495	604	105	730	387	757	974	163	488
530	621	048	403	125	071	019	079	423	324
08	854	637	502	035	651	898	641	435	505
384	586	552	255	233	585	929	225	802	325

26 juillet 1942

Heures GMT

0 h à 1 h

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23-24

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

601 068 118 304 681 612 918 653 419 167

863 610 430 421 140 253 774 961 151 868

085 919 703 650 518 754 545 029 903 479

891 424 679 272 016 939 352 046 851 129

837 157 606 632 591 982 402 427 769 836

279 451 622 299 228 664 332 416 626 342

315 510 899 797 865 141 791 489 374 150

599 448 956 171 069 256 574 477 273 259

732 589 716 498 211 381 527 525 227 258

586 455 442 302 431 781 550 638 581 202

955 041 217 243 206 161 327 987 847 611

835 548 933 189 980 718 123 364 130 232

317 288 286 453 321 969 396 723 501 024

094 743 034 916 941 712 347 312 741 345

804 088 301 983 517 223 083 928 145 284

391 756 099 831 420 338 313 296 778 265

458 930 504 977 346 799 895 696 535 056

515 595 572 269 924 726 201 894 615 496

798 907 207887 323 126 634 383 951 566

714 644 425 866 237 202 042 973 945 494

699 704 114 728 896 472 122 333 108 923

952 722 310 785 848 147 111 762 605 013

884 306 882 447 468 252 476 065 685 936

177 840 709 188 291 356 355 474 831 947

27 juillet 1942

Heures GMT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 H R 1 H	448	685	836	626	129	896	653	147	781	065
1-2	805	136	291	510	3	60	534	479	769	949 364
2-3	466	123	222	656	976	382	063	359	508	895
3-4	383	7	96464	731	468	385	455	579	851	956
4-5	760	028	681	257	454	612	969	114	504	235
5-6	029	327	873	335	337	059	572	946	268	809
6-7	529	398	470	451	220	848	450	270	183	416
7-8	143	764	568	108	223	264	712	068	126	716
8-9	906	546	987	374	871	891	967	201	099	639
9-10	881	216	353	410	380	477	252	960	160	932
10-11	396	094	294	280	945	302	942	456	677	723
11-12	888	555	972	638	254	041	016	973	320	165
12-13	526	740	738	581	687	515	623	739	837	746
13-14	852	531	648	803	545	356	118	267	726	875 072
14-15	879	317	308	940	850	720	273	275	489	277
15-16	336	481	849	965	271	829	377	594	352	116
16-17	903	596	605	886	892	779	061	772	591	863
17-18	961	908	861	640	603	525	282	631	601	633
18-19	172	088	031	338	124	480	787	441	912	102
19-20	754	835	817	052	370	548	018	474	755	394
20-21	157	878	826	227	774	842	715	152	459	323
21-22 22	799	173	424	288	261	283	727	226	161	798
22-23	497	743	841	792	714	082	718	301	674	279
23-24	583	883	103	780	478	666	228	281	038	865

28 juillet 1942

Heures GMT

0 h à 1 h

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11-12

12-13

13-14

14-15

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22-23

23-24

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 h à 1 h	540	349	057	168	266	170	218	240	4	67 248
1-2	749	670	898	036	435	564	682	556	457	362
2-3	966	026	105	763	488	771	680	187	191	576
3-4	492	131	125	392	146	514	598	915	859	071
4-5	757	767	617	520	233	957	067	649	149	255
5-6	560	733	386	693	909	830	190	015	091	403
6-7	490	348	784	142	077	509	319	512	120	768
7-8	522	339	138	643	904	340	239	158	833	055
8-9	786	113	507	393	180	166	776	444	484	913
9-10	367	408	112	153	210	964	758	669	794	943
10-11	384	440	877	086	316	736	241	630	854	175
11-12	958	432	064	503	334	818	305	311	156	814
12-13	523	249	655	511	628	469	290	433	658	856
13-14	244	867	724	618	022	066	934	801	037	186
14-15	418	413	730	537	901	106	524	047	483	765
15-16	412	646	552	475	184	911	822	176	144	844
16-17	329	289	309	678	672	864	452	832	667	164
17-18	421	389	629	635	465	365	641	577	405	559
18-19	054	318	231	657	423	181	925	573	486	062
19-20	607	407	326	734	671	570	533	790	808	713
20-21	839	663	246	310	567	363	092	789	614	876
21-22	874	825	322	314	137	590	324	287	676	426
22-23	742	159	436	750	463	665	343	950	128	366
23-24	460	097	076	860	926	505	979	285	748	487

29 juillet 1942

Heures GMT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 h à 1 h	204	472	151	937	527	167	427	262	347	419
1-2	615	299	119	237	430	632	207	361	046	421
2-3	346	711	27	2	535	624	188	923	321	589 939
3-4	696	296	578	189	174	217	778	024	304	263
4-5	815	551	259	122	042	699	634	134	458	243
5-6	709	198	376	253	141	595	034	284	721	145
6-7	446	952	355	5	36	517	447	115	868	936 550
7-8	251	406	919	293	333	777	933	941	232	982
8-9	516	775	033	043	741	954	664	083	286	593
9-10	928	566	661	722	476	245	983	930	785	870
10-11	847	893	196	703	442	735	574	491	162	947
11-12	443	399	096	905	150	482	391	554	916	797
12-13	211	695	882	212	404	838	897	342	425	611
13-14	650	918	242	654	884	111	951	303	819	265
14-15	127	431	485	608	729	049	793	315	547	907
15-16	845	705	104	762	704	582	013	140	084	697
16-17	924	025	759	073	501	921	984	075	588	171
17-18	494	312	962	562	298	602	955	840	894	085
18-19	250	402	154	069	599	378	306	645	453	948
19-20	399	561	206	310	313	258	420	518	224	732
20-21	862	694	381	606	256	858	056	791	728	498
21-22	866	332	831	610	887	087	202	679	269	436
22-23	177	622	496	816	756	345	395	644	375	977
23-24	532	980	081	012	804	130	875	109	586	110

30 Jul 11st

INTURES GMT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 h & 1 h	981	414	139	439	971	802	834	372	619	471
1-2	344	542	761	597	499	565	107	828	783	373
2-3	609	953	571	788	587	401	238	093	307	820
3-4	101	132	917	133	297	770	445	621	011	752
4-5	683	205	692	331	938	213	135	558	701	745
5-6	208	846	035	824	813	708	922	417	247	616
6-7	690	686	079	437	823	292	169	944	513	538
7-8	182	415	278	411	358	27	6	098	539	163
8-9	569	747	195	691	719	325	017	737	388	717
9-10	330	7	07209	557	078	019	473	975	229	397
10-11	585	449	027	959	673	357	544	462	185	698
11-12	502	121	563	880	885	051	058	197	409	706
12-13	584	821	230	652	021	637	684	647	541	642
13-14	689	910	328	422	461	495	580	970	095	528
14-15	379	354	438	773	215	032	795	592	553	806
15-16	428	688	627	857	521	053	782	710	044	753
16-17	843	155	519	234	039	351	274	117	625	341
17-18	914	530	935	434	929	807	014	350	371	812
18-19	968	636	855	225	193	974	811	659	702	963
19-20	369	178	869	387	023	651	148	543	978	604
20-21	260	853	179	920	662	048	660	902	927	089
21-22	219	889	199	203	295	744	549	493	575	890
22-23	192	725	985	390	766	751	675	931	620	074
23-24	045	214	506	872	986	221	668	368	827	194

31 juillet

HEURES GMT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 h à 1 h	372	148	015	178	914	968	668	014	691	675
1-2	414	630	113	107	415	985	444	512	520	187
2-3	660	876	978	445	811	693	135	438	297	194
3-4	149	238	747	686	765	484	810	437	953	824
4-5	311	676	844	614	541	506	833	132	486	801
5-6	164	859	717	142	538	106	440	62	7	938 944
6-7	462	433	619	794	635	915	205	734	820	128
7-8	426	322	407	649	246	736	745	825	469	372
8-9	934	707	539	657	244	808	176	523	557	511
9-10	120	397	748	057	911	326	669	231	744	542
10-11	570	540	926	843	408	616	922	066	047	636
11-12	860	467	417	613	221	680	904	776	959	943
12-13	091	449	289	646	846	218	369	813	432	229
13-14	199	490	827	027	309	240	158	752	618	373
14-15	290	349	418	186	241	682	409	628	927	652
15-16	436	737	563	864	036	097	818	910	405	138
16-17	318	439	274	037	314	658	137	328	587	392
17-18	179	389	463	437	964	413	020	663	880	958
18-19	975	121	305	159	986	629	175	758	667	598
19-20	181	191	869	750	215	558	422	559	471	249
20-21	461	782	365	856	971	855	067	331	575	230
21-22	713	203	021	483	795	853	144	935	784	702
22-23	821	499	062	219	814	673	260	823	556	354
23-24	698	412	319	885	358	190	032	185	763	519

1er août 1942

HEURES GMT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 h à 1 h	031	547	965	049	235	819	199	012	395	870
1-2	948	777	695	267	377	726	382	119	817	224
2-3	645	937	532	697	715	061	456	526	640	110
3-4	875	204	562	588	459	850	960	849	263	109
4-5	466	838	298	277	102	755	603	294	174	858
5-6	596	404	793	394	579	018	841	470	711	555
6-7	216	222	075	441	976	261	481	361	008	984
7-8	892	254	648	283	878	173	165	134	154	554
8-9	666	803	478	886	033	410	116	359	362	443
9-10	196	888	038	406	485	529	661	360	877	694
10-11	104	949	772	677	516	508	084	779	524	088
11-12	845	746	370	450	039	198	582	871	551	738
12-13	303	063	861	353	623	482	594	568	602	320
13-14	236	534	172	740	271	059	942	721	705	360
14-15	087	136	531	908	972	656	335	073	293	547
15-16	816	275	103	264	809	764	124	250	815	226
16-17	962	268	583	554	160	308	491	242	378	932
17-18	115	028	921	893	805	883	043	212	152	385
18-19	739	966	759	561	398	967	375	946	052	464
19-20	257	183	735	593	760	536	775	337	826	280
20-21	546	829	096	954	143	251	674	282	480	370
21-22	940	687	852	578	879	270	497	792	780	729
22-23	787	336	454	446	127	220	162	281	633	081
23-24	912	631	731	905	796	720	245	072	873	025

2 août 1942

Heures GMT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 h à 1 h	852	489	364	201	517	599	443	288	109	346
1-2	905	685	341	217	280	743	816	257	213	912
2-3	959	894	195	331	942	156	967	052	918	031
3-4	689	122	411	330	976	112	759	775	982	208
4-5	039	425	795	344	706	617	268	817	453	434
5-6	234	548	642	820	388	244	659	547	644	148
6-7	530	804	229	473	701	663	874	185	705	812
7-8	058	803	445	824	863	665	635	205	946	541
8-9	055	236	752	132	391	096	423	686	671	944
9-10	844	339	130	703	951	336	487	717	790	684
10-11	483	940	697	545	126	826	614	616	943	078
11-12	510	576	937	141	924	785	764	806	056	692
12-13	301	240	216	316	704	799	212	811	342	932
13-14	468	435	183	153	094	472	071	079	046	729
14-15	114	776	103	877	694	282	556	139	304	026
15-16	306	524	908	305	174	765	067	802	631	628
16-17	699	277	760	290	841	248	763	969	362	386
17-18	633	124	579	682	179	658	482	069	768	655
18-19	385	674	755	670	502	158	531	378	859	949
19-20	796	780	394	913	350	266	815	792	564	602
20-21	204	731	666	814	878	218	281	977	036	294
21-22	061	329	935	082	661	850	886	572	828	245
22-23	145	492	707	436	668	501	888	840	177	308
23-24	614	783	343	557	862	476	126	317	639	235

(5177)

3-1000

HEURES (GMT)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 h 1 h	399	929	672	212	016	105	927	750	934	739
1-2	283	074	831	971	711	324	715	870	066	383
2-3	480	367	928	488	310	921	405	532	471	032
3-4	292	818	019	214	668	649	265	111	338	022
4-5	667	741	586	134	860	718	653	161	657	116
5-6	167	781	931	432	855	409	395	613	490	589
6-7	962	224	965	910	939	681	950	485	585	369
7-8	196	470	514	904	380	093	279	1073	464	092
8-9	021	120	594	150	409	433	945	798	137	643
9-10	192	832	327	930	065	186	376	181	143	262
10-11	230	319	393	722	377	460	654	582	634	920
11-12	696	561	723	550	554	612	829	767	206	522
12-13	446	048	578	465	081	430	690	436	085	053
13-14	438	320	581	549	972	794	176	539	985	276
14-15	168	424	778	669	441	095	562	162	915	125
15-16	182	725	191	884	727	267	954	293	961	275
16-17	142	064	439	766	789	772	847	512	983	861
17-18	043	615	467	337	721	745	708	540	076	761
18-19	709	044	359	118	619	933	227	241	264	825
19-20	353	922	964	693	361	396	698	466	835	975
20-21	253	869	226	187	664	645	948	448	108	248 749
21-22	887	274	896	018	953	087	068	978	854	233
22-23	773	738	687	017	889	178	575	620	464	215
23-24	830	963	322	146	151	429	592	237	119	906

4 août 1942

HEURES GMT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0h à 1 h	733	958	677	173	649	021	857	209	846	101
1-2	128	196	656	683	360	594	901	172	746	170
2-3	832	773	491	383	260	838	523	955	793	590
3-4	022	821	390	726	214	271	150	099	450	979
4-5	413	827	032	887	766	582	903	269	353	505
5-6	465	295	328	835	968	134	272	712	890	192
6-7	231	627	880	110	986	738	171	327	931	045
7-8	206	533	610	897	221	037	274	253	985	092
8-9	550	285	455	043	368	630	662	419	433	097
9-10	845	322	716	143	549	340	178	432	825	570
10-11	772	460	672	337	409	393	718	190	643	076
11-12	011	496	747	879	938	264	980	392	421	343
12-13	024	696	637	028	609	497	262	767	068	230
13-14	928	223	108	115	164	186	083	503	586	963
14-15	638	601	634	757	808	484	396	794	975	978
15-16	016	612	831	142	926	830	527	015	276	415
16-17	451	983	681	745	436	933	227	144	051	019
17-18	936	728	118	513	389	313	202	085	673	652
18-19	446	722	087	896	698	723	022	430	182	506
19-20	687	293	927	930	770	961	226	283	910	575
20-21	557	292	522	480	788	749	984	588	121	856
21-22	438	093	309	162	401	514	399	965	647	915
22-23	215	053	289	578	463	904	267	906	095	964
23-24	761	929	592	861	233	168	645	275	539	125

5 août 1942

FIGURES CMT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
9 h à 1 h	556	282	391	153	752	524	624	412	131	113
1-2	046	551	633	398	154	559	288	695	149	754
2-3	697	674	819	270	987	872	816	447	461	417
3-4	755	062	326	568	544	885	692	648	626	919
4-5	475	342	169	782	881	678	212	807	437	286
5-6	543	235	595	418	823	914	472	219	502	157
6-7	625	486	160	420	916	525	658	494	174	456
7-8	370	103	646	898	511	364	878	917	704	232
8-9	784	124	740	710	565	341	913	042	057	082
9-10	287	769	183	308	858	795	538	039	563	422
10-11	519	373	240	199	775	774	623	812	765	839
11-12	048	133	510	159	244	175	047	918	435	956
12-13	842	148	796	250	824	894	966	052	255	603
13-14	579	547	675	597	339	689	660	617	23	762
14-15	731	759	363	478	234	628	952	932	147	325
15-16	165	665	751	481	969	031	397	949	077	166
16-17	303	094	805	882	056	213	804	886	891	542
17-18	493	476	584	810	686	517	828	158	713	806
18-19	535	453	330	977	817	473	378	366	596	943
19-20	293	268	229	117	663	537	944	593	850	112
20-21	035	863	188	629	132	902	717	912	859	703
21-22	249	729	498	895	216	651	326	156	981	803
22-23	960	705	571	247	483	640	388	924	925	365
23-24	487	811	941	680	618	8564	8824442062	545	694	545
									063	

6 août 1942

HEURES GMT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 h à 1 h	849	315	440	369	589	606	518	332	866	333
1-2	779	354	426	428	653	939	140	296	348	298
2-3	620	027	577	569	574	321	211	860	667	870
3-4	974	462	106	855	650	381	265	742	876	116
4-5	691	561	534	089	622	923	868	222	676	809
5-6	725	375	444	613	224	605	741	038	921	074
6-7	688	073	066	553	033	424	416	284	319	668
7-8	748	871	509	970	254	836	352	167	818	357
8-9	950	359	138	922	379	847	256	581	320	098
9-10	734	470	869	587	243	781	302	427	382	585
10-11	715	619	834	238	431	041	777	865	377	297
11-12	466	471	7	08	312	791	104	018	889	532 953
12-13	246	261	813	945	151	892	406	504	875	690
13-14	750	441	351	065	145	084	376	237	529	225
14-15	407	485	467	355	566	972	380	111	554	180
15-16	957	721	833	338	971	583	251	615	242	367
16-17	669	361	405	034	323	787	954	778	873	735
17-18	711	279	181	507	848	739	962	081	220	454
18-19	012	657	146	023	709	161	540	621	409	730
19-20	526	536	120	044	798	137	488	429	324	064
20-21	884	883	241	163	102	867	191	490	789	093
21-22	310	059	632	197	404	403	395	552	314	736
22-23	448	508	664	014	439	854	727	187	105	864
23-24	119	659	934	017	829	520	562	464	512	176

7 Sept 1942

EXURES GMT

0 h & 1 h

1-2

2-3

3-4

4-5

5-6

6-7

7-8

8-9

9-10

10-11

11-12

12-13

13-14

14-15

15-16

16-17

17-18

18-19

19-20

20-21

21-22

22-23

23-24

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 h & 1 h	217	054	139	408	358	920	317	281	036	737
1-2	443	756	706	608	822	141	907	294	776	528
2-3	670	499	195	753	372	130	350	661	335	198
3-4	666	459	425	402	273	940	394	862	801	909
4-5	699	521	058	123	078	771	908	743	075	155
5-6	611	853	248	911	671	555	445	434	371	258
6-7	263	311	179	580	257	714	602	946	720	345
7-8	049	790	290	088	280	347	362	635	207	384
8-9	607	967	114	785	331	598	616	071	452	135
9-10	374	516	474	841	393	751	266	682	122	210
10-11	815	410	477	888	203	252	245	277	055	560
11-12	501	307	318	7	68387	642	386	679	301	457
12-13	707	614	305	304	558	530	802	189	495	573
13-14	334	482	760	096	013	935	531	744	127	644
14-15	349	840	937	126	184	783	346	442	604	205
15-16	085	218	026	236	072	061	185	067	239	820
16-17	948	758	423	201	228	655	344	792	259	548
17-18	194	636	780	109	107	336	851	541	799	576
18-19	458	702	204	208	639	844	515	631	306	468
19-20	797	367	905	976	572	177	091	951	877	899
20-21	786	847	764	136	069	591	837	685	329	316
21-22	641	738	411	843	982	814	278	959	852	029
22-23	079	719	599	492	942	449	479	414	4	89 299
23-24	763	129	701	385	874	291	356	724	659	684

8 août 1942

HEURES CEST
0 h à 1 h

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	719	917	732	228	544	494	458	957	474	259
1-2	042	372	797	851	678	345	516	198	219	129
2-3	987	318	914	374	607	909	154	478	885	194
3-4	525	054	155	477	428	822	623	618	358	117
4-5	258	159	199	881	475	135	805	408	384	807
5-6	273	334	193	535	573	762	303	646	629	872
6-7	442	786	744	941	047	420	740	247	370	925
7-8	756	366	782	608	584	189	371	598	160	365
8-9	593	641	625	481	751	498	495	131	075	412
9-10	198	511	823	325	493	049	920	784	063	347
10-11	250	249	035	461	893	568	663	113	774	895
11-12	551	203	916	563	720	680	263	758	611	899
12-13	907	349	252	543	072	898	515	210	801	387
13-14	397	166	882	753	152	966	188	184	546	636
14-15	580	567	952	702	457	537	291	559	270	449
15-16	422	810	769	660	149	287	837	175	335	505
16-17	437	373	232	410	057	724	363	675	858	414
17-18	597	307	626	595	571	560	326	147	542	538
18-19	311	839	402	207	169	077	127	714	499	981
19-20	452	713	299	891	417	239	648	842	754	558
20-21	911	048	286	919	002	737	459	555	679	255
21-22	596	853	082	107	519	710	456	819	157	901
22-23	640	651	356	479	521	504	956	695	013	771
23-24	960	132	123	029	278	528	447	948	973	086

9 août 1942

HEURES GMT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 H à 1 H	533	923	343	047	497	676	880	7799	211	809
1-2	284	045	856	728	455	518	444	355	50	9 098
2-3	733	083	677	610	038	101	875	747	332	102
3-4	903	986	938	056	333	890	787	845	027	833
4-5	857	015	389	821	382	099	507	757	688	834
5-6	097	419	202	4	51	038	627	209	144	970 261
6-7	980	590	037	440	0406231	260	421	846	407	
7-8	716	513	484	866	321	601	897	190	172	462
8-9	958	328	163	352	431	746	621	170	272	849
9-10	173	392	736	033	569	712	504	450	968	979
10-11	879	609	632	748	197	171	416	901	298	838
11-12	360	011	536	730	566	368	836	115	296	491
12-13	496	164	734	225	813	285	864	673	315	128
13-14	223	221	770	867	37	5	051	145	083	534 269
14-15	936	974	309	788	622	426	034	110	256	630
15-16	606	104	742	028	87	3	791	295	351	892 726
16p17	574	254	427	289	865	246	6	05	140	463 243
17-18	041	650	379	557	735	526	691	357	637	023
18p19	587	428	238	413	302	552	323	529	390	5 05
19-20	883	106	827	652	871	348	059	220	570	271
20-21	012	876	024	121	577	955	014	848	415	340
21-22	868	180	527	553	251	503	583	312	5	06 808
22-23	089	314	662	297	403	025	777	957	588	222
23-24	793	520	523	469	508	401	381	138	313	354

10 août 1942

HEURES GMT

0 h à 1 h	136 752 679 013 524 305 815 113 408 519
1-2	966 423 737 280 039 183 054 663 481 543
2-3	796 805 720 410 969 169 147 075 498 258
3-4	797 148 878 478 806 917 563 189 443 661
4-5	905 453 308 457 785 250 447 479 521 714
5-6	228 886 579 602 301 287 816 069 572 437
6-7	660 112 397 598 604 158 689 948 959 047
7-8	759 388 918 257 877 617 193 528 029 244
8-9	616 644 943 607 783 318 571 210 362 234
9-10	374 371 199 894 707 208 651 820 977 486
10-11	072 872 731 213 703 278 156 799 863 475
11-12	442 595 596 729 803 122 166 245 036 476
12-13	205 510 648 960 035 203 077 273 345 769
13-14	682 560 559 434 568 114 474 412 495 754
14-15	530 573 179 753 046 384 330 398 331 232
15-16	699 304 614 414 422 801 804 674 058 762
16-17	126 086 349 946 175 071 538 317 633 255
17-18	758 288 458 822 626 248 902 207 159 052
18-19	516 819 639 266 807 756 912 127 15 3 624
19-20	671 697 837 366 692 565 350 635 160 525
20-21	790 740 ⁹³⁵ 824 776 ⁹¹⁶ 824 597 2131 204 133 775
21-22	751 882 817 907 641 584 139 307 094 782
22-23	201 850 580 411 899 842 459 660 920 240
23-24	515 973 096 346 135 088 611 828 555 342

Casablanca, Morocco, July 27, 1942

From: U.S. Naval Attaché, Tangier, Morocco
 To: Director of Naval Intelligence,
 Navy Department, Washington, D.C.
 Subject: Interview with Admiral d'Harcourt, Commanding
 the French Fleet at Casablanca.

I have the honor to report a thirty-five minute interview which I had with Admiral d'Harcourt from 11:30 to 12:05 this date.

1. Keeping an appointment made for me by T. Russell, American Consul General at Casablanca, I reported to the Admiralty at 11:25 a.m. this date and was immediately taken in to a private interview with Admiral d'Harcourt. I told him of my recent visit to Washington where I was on temporary duty with the Navy Department for three weeks during the month of June. I also told him that remembering his great interest, I had brought him, with the compliments of the Director of Naval Intelligence, the most recent issue of the "Proceedings of the U.S. Navy Institute". In giving the Admiral these copies, I called his attention to articles of unusual interest such as those describing the Naval cadets' training program, the Japanese designs on the South Pacific, and the statistical analysis of the submarine sinkings along the Atlantic coast. Admiral d'Harcourt expressed deep gratitude for this opportunity, so long missing, to keep in touch with thinking and planning in U.S. Naval circles where he was for years a very friendly guest. In addition, I gave the Admiral seven copies of the magazine "Time", calling his attention to accounts of the battle of Midway and of Coral Island.

2. Asking me to sit down and remain for a chat, the Admiral, who seemed in a very friendly mood, inquired about news of the U.S. Navy. I told him something of the activity at Washington as I had seen it and expressed my special pleasure at the recent appointment of Admiral Leahy as personal advisor of President Roosevelt on war strategy. Admiral d'Harcourt expressed emphatic satisfaction at this appointment, saying that Admiral Leahy, as soon as any other American, had a sympathetic understanding of the problems which faced the French Nation and expressed the hope that this appointment might prolong the friendship between the two Nations and prevent misunderstanding.

3. Knowing the Admiral's keen interest in Naval strategy, I asked him for his opinion first on the less controversial issues of naval warfare in the Pacific. Knowing in previous conversations that the Admiral had no sentimental or official commitments with the Japanese, for ten or fifteen minutes he spoke about naval problems in the Pacific, stating his conviction that the Japanese had over-estimated their power, and required a decisive

forest in the Midway battle, would not be strong enough to invade Australia, and would not be able to maintain their foothold in the Aleutian Islands against a U.S. Naval expedition which he felt sure would soon be successful in isolating the few Japanese outposts in the Aleutian Islands. Admiral d'Harcourt said it was his opinion that the Japanese would concentrate upon the defeat of China to prevent the establishment of U.S. air bases near Japan, but that beyond this the Japanese might expect no further successes. The Admiral did, however, say that he thought the Axis had won an important bloodless victory in diverting so many U.S. troops and ships to Australia where they can hardly threaten the Axis for offensive purposes as if they had been sent to the British Isles. The Admiral obviously enjoyed holding forth on naval strategy in a field where he had no conflict of loyalties and one in which he was able to express, without reservation, his pro-American feelings.

4. The problem of the Pacific having been apparently covered to his satisfaction, I asked him point-blank whether he thought the French Fleet at Alexandria might soon be the cause of an incident which would make a breach between the Americans and the French. On a previous occasion, he and I had discussed the predicament of Admiral Godfrey, Commander of the Squadron at Alexandria, whose friendship I had made there last August. Admiral d'Harcourt said he wished to speak very plainly and emphatically in giving it as his considered opinion that the destruction of these ships would make an irreparable breach in the sympathy of the French Navy and a large part of the French people for the Allies. He made the following points which he repeated lest he be misunderstood:

The French Fleet at Alexandria constitutes no threat to the Allies, not only because of the German promise not to seize them, but because no French crew would ever permit a French naval vessel to be operated by the Germans, if the integrity of the French Navy is respected by the British and the Americans. In spite of Mers-el-Kebir, French Naval orders still stand to scuttle any ship rather than to permit it to be operated for or by the Axis. Therefore, the Allies have no reason to refuse to permit the ships at Alexandria to remain under French command. On the other hand, to destroy these ships might have consequences impossible to control. Furthermore, Admiral d'Harcourt told me what I did not know before, that Admiral Godfrey and his officers and men will remain on board the ships if they are to be destroyed by the British, making it necessary to kill Frenchmen as well as to destroy French property. He further gave me as his conviction that to permit the return of these ships to a French port, such as Bizerta or Toulon, would create a wave of sympathy and admiration for the Allies so valuable to our side as to constitute a stroke of timely statesmanship. I asked him whether I might report these statements of his to the Navy Department and he answered, "Yes, you may do

no, but of course they are only my personal opinions shared by the fellow-officers I know."

3. I told the Admiral that I felt Americans saw a difference between the French Fleet stationed at Casablanca, wholly under control of the French authorities and therefore dominated by the Germans, and on the other hand, the French Fleet at Alexandria which, having been under British control for two years, might be regarded by the Germans, if they conquered Alexandria, as prizes captured from the enemy in time of war. The Admiral repeated his statement that no French crew would permit one of their naval vessels to fall into the hands of the Germans and then he made what I thought was a rather remarkable statement: "I can understand Madagascar. While there was, of course, official protest about the British attack on Madagascar, I and my fellow naval officers understand that international law does not exist as formerly and that the grim necessities of the British in the Indian Ocean made it very important that they secure Madagascar with its fine docks and harbors to insure their Empire routes from South Africa to the Middle East and India. He said, 'these scars will heal. We understand the necessities of war, including the necessity of killing thousands of friends if an act of aggression cannot be avoided, but we do not believe that the Fleet in Alexandria is indispensable to the British or to an Allied victory. We French will forgive any act which the Allies may be obliged to take in the pursuit of victory, but we cannot forgive a wanton and unnecessary attack upon French life and property.'"

4. At the end of thirty-five minutes, I rose and thanked the Admiral for talking to me so cordially and frankly and I also thanked him for the permission to transmit the summary of his personal convictions to the Navy Department. I told him that I brought expressions of highest regard from the Director of Naval Intelligence at Washington and from the Chargé d'Affaires of the Legation in Tangier. He asked me to return his best wishes and greetings to them, and invited me to call whenever I should be in Casablanca.

Respectfully submitted,

N.A. Eddy
Lt. Colonel, U.S.M.C.

Copies to:

Mr. J.R. Childs, Chargé d'Affaires, American Legation, Tangier.

Colonel Wm. J. Donovan, Director Strategic Services, Washington, D.C.

2. Leslie Russell, American Consul General, Casablanca.

July 29, 1942.

M E M O R A N D U M

for Mr. Murphy and Colonel Eddy from Vice Consul King.

Sentiments of upper officials in Rabat.

Members of "Pilla" group report as follows:

In general, all officials of superior rank in Rabat are ostensibly "collaborationist" in their attitude. Before the Russian resistance became a certainty, most of them appeared to be more or less convinced that "collaboration" was their only hope. At present, many of the same group openly admit pro-British or at least anti-German sentiments - but do not translate their sentiments into action. The general impression is that, while hoping for an Allied victory they intend to maintain their present attitude until their hopes are realized or at least until the United Nations land forces in Morocco.

Exceptions to these are the Director of "Ravitaillement" (Sausage des Forges) and some of his staff; Bourcelin, Procurer at the Court of First Instance at Rabat; Gault, Director of Health Services; the Director of Industrial Production and his assistant, Du Vivier and Kieselé) and most of the Cabinet Diplomatique. All of these are known to be pro-United Nations.

On the other side, M. Tron, Director of Finances and protégé of Camille Chautemps, is reputed to be pro-German, while M. Sanviti, Justice of the Peace at Rabat, is a member of the S.O.L. and openly professes his pro-German sentiments.

A fairly large number of physicians are on the pro-German side and active in promoting the S.O.L. With two or three exceptions, the lawyers are lukewarm, while the staff of the Department of Education and teaching staff in the various colleges are too timid to express any but orthodox pro-Pétain sentiments.

W. W. King
W. W. King

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Reports from F. P. HOLCOMB.

(Letter of transmittal attached to
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LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHE

August 2, 1942. Tangier, Morocco.

Colonel W. J. Donovan,
Director of Strategic Services,
24th and B. Street,
WASHINGTON D.C.

Tab m

Dear Colonel Donovan,

I have the honour to transmit the following
enclosures :-

- (a) Two large envelopes addressed to Chile and
Argentina, which I should be grateful
if someone in your office would be good
enough to mail. This request is on
behalf of Mr. Doolittle, American Consul,
Tunis, who accepted the envelopes and
offered this service to the senders who
are among our most valued agents and
helpers in Tunisia.
- (b) A request from Mr. Murphy, Counsel of Embassy,
Algiers, to supply copies of certain publi-
cations to the Directors of the Musée National
des Beaux-Arts.
- (c) Clipping from Journal de Geneve, Switzerland,
July 11, 1942, questioning the "political
motives back of your presence in Europe".
- (d) Spare copy of the Order of Battle for three depart-
ments of Algeria as of April 15, 1942.
- (e) Copies of several miscellaneous reports from Vice
Consul King at Casablanca dated July 23, 23,
24 and 29, 1942.

not attached
Also.

Respectfully submitted,

W. A. R. L. H. B. Y.

CONFIDENTIAL

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHE

Tangier, Morocco.

August 20th, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Director of Strategic Services,
24th & E Streets, N. W.,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Tab IV

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I have the honor to enclose the following for the
information of your Intelligence Section:

- Enclosures (A) Copy of a report in French regarding the Italian Marine, Italian Aviation and the German Aviation. (Dated August 5, 1942) Eight pages.
- (B) Copy of a report dated August 6th, 1942, in French, on the Italian Aviation and Marine.
- (C) Copy of a confidential intelligence Report No. TR. 177-42, of August 11, 1942, giving a summary of Spanish forces in the LARACHE area. (3 pages)
- (D) Copy of a confidential intelligence Report No. TR. 184-42, of August 13th, 1942, regarding the recent resentment of the Grand Vizier in Tetuan to certain Dahira the Spanish have sought to put into effect. (2 pages)
- (E) Copy of a ten-page report dated August 15, 1942, regarding the battle order of French Morocco, revised as of August 15, 1942.

Respectfully submitted;

P. P. Holcomb
P. P. Holcomb
Captain, USMC.

Enclosures:

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHE

Tangier, Morocco.
25 August, 1942.

Colonel William J. Donovan.
Director of Strategic Services,
24th and "E" Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:


Tab V

I have the honor to enclose the following for the
information of your Intelligence Section:

Enclosures:

- (A) Essay "The Fight Against Submarines by Launch Carrying Flying Boats (Hydravins Porte-Vedettes", forwarded by Vice Consul Knox; source not disclosed.
- (B) Essay "Aviation and Offensive Operations - Simultaneous Experiments", forwarded by Vice Consul Knox; source not disclosed.
- (C) Report "Les Stocks d'Essence et d'Alcool" dated 20 August, 1942.
- (D) Report "Le Port D'Alger", dated 20 August, 1942.
- (E) Report "I.T. Des Statistiques, Arrondissement Mineralogique du Maroc", dated 13 August, 1942.

Respectfully submitted:


F. P. HOLCOMB.
Captain, U.S.M.C.R.

Enclosures: 5.



SECRETLEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

August 19, 1948.

MEMORANDUM TO LT. COL. M. E. GOODWELL: by GHA.

RE: RIFIAN TRIBE OF GZENNAYA (FRENCH ZONE).

From interviews with several Rifians of the tribe of Gzennaya, who are old friends and whose opinions are highly valued, the following conclusions have been drawn:

The Gzennaya tribal area is in a state of calm, but underneath the fundamental dislike of the French is still strong. The Gzennaya would enthusiastically support the Americans or British against the French or Germans if they were assisted in strong force and given arms. They would also fight for the French against Spanish or Germans.

The following is personal opinion: in the event of a Spanish or German invasion not resisted by the French, the Gzennaya would remain passive. It is in the Rifian tradition to support an occupying force, and the Germans could count on some degree of support if they were to occupy the country in strength. While the Gzennaya are primarily out for themselves, they tend to be pro-American and pro-British. They cannot, however, be expected to take any unsupported action.

The administration of the area, both French and native, is satisfactory at present. The native leader of the Gzennaya is well known to GHA and myself, and also to our informants. We were unable to see him, under satisfactory circumstances, on this trip. Food conditions in the Gzennaya are adequate, but there is a severe shortage of cotton goods.





LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

August 19, 1946

Lt. Col. M. P. Goodfellow,
Office of Strategic Services,
3 Building,
25th and E Streets,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Goodfellow:

Enclosed is a report on an interview in Fez with the leader of the Nationalists. This is the only report on this interview submitted anywhere and no one here except Gordon Browne knows that I saw him.

We also met some of old Riflian friends in Fez; Gordon is writing you a memorandum on what we learned from them. We have submitted a report on the Fez trip covering other aspects to Mr. Childs who will undoubtedly pass it on in due time to the State Department. None of the Moslems would invite us to their houses, excusing themselves on the grounds that it would be unwise for the French to find out about such visits; we could see openly only merchandise in their shops, and then under the guise of making purchases. We were tailed everywhere but managed, we trust, to give our appendages the slip when necessary.

The military information which we cabled Monday left just a few hours before the incoming message warning us of the code being compromised; with a slight delay, it could have been sent safely through other channels. We are awaiting a reply to my 01135 sent yesterday in order to take appropriate action. Our behavior in the future will largely depend on whether or not our messages have been read.

We will be very pleased to see Col. Wady when he returns.

With kindest regards,

William S. Coon

P.S. Also many thanks to Miss Lockery for helping my wife get some mail to me.

August 20: Have received message 2 and replied. I think the reason why my #1 was garbled was that a split a word wrong in the version in the code room; two S's and a Q instead of the reverse.

SECRET

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

August 19, 1942

INTERVIEW WITH SI HAMID MEKKWA IN FEZ, AUGUST 11, 1942.

On August 11th CSC interviewed Si Hamid Mekkwa in Fez at a secret rendez-vous. Si Hamid Mekkwa is acting head of the Nationalist Party in Fez.

Extent of Party: Si Hamid stated that most of the people of Morocco (meaning Moslems) are with him and his party. Then the time should come they would all act together. This seems a slightly rosy view of the situation; undoubtedly the party is strong in the cities and among some of the Arabic speaking rural tribes, but it unlikely that it has the strength or unity which Si Hamid stated. Still it is the one great Moslem political organization in Morocco and merits attention.

Aims of Party: Moroccan unity with an emphasis on religion; he wants no regional self government, stating that "Morocco is a small country"; he dislikes intensely the Berber desire granting the Berber tribes regional self government by the tribal council system of representation; a purely democratic system. He seemed rather lofty toward the Berbers; he could see no difference between them and other Moroccans, and considered the fact that the Berbers have languages of their own unimportant. "Almost all can speak Arabic," he stated: it was a like an 18th century English aristocrat writing about Irish peasantry, and about equally convincing.

Religious Brotherhoods: Since the Nationalists are religious in character and puritans of Islam, they frown on the religious brotherhoods, such as the Aissawa, just as a Beacon Street preacher might not appreciate the Holy Rollers. He stated that his party wished to cleanse Islam of such heresies. The practical aspect of this is that the brotherhoods, which are powerful organizations, cannot be reached through this party.

France: The French have been very hard on the Moroccans and very unfair, and if they are to remain in Morocco they must modify their attitude. They must grant the Moroccans equality with the Christians in every respect; political equality and equality of opportunity for education. Some French are fine, but most of them are bad fellows; they vary greatly, and are on the whole unpardonable. For the moment, however, there is not much that the Moroccans can do about it.

Spain: The Spaniards are much worse than the French. They want to make Morocco a Catholic country. The French at least have not interfered with religion (actually, there is no evidence that the Spaniards have either. This Catholic country idea seems to be based on one of Franco's speeches). If the Spaniards invade the French Zone, the Nationalists will help the French resist them, PROVIDING THE FRENCH GRANT PROPER CONCESSIONS TO THE NATIONALISTS FIRST.

GERMANY: The Germans are very bad people. They have tried to get in touch with Si Hamid, but he has refused to see them or communicate with them. Abd el Khabib Torres of Tetuan, and the others who play with the Germans there, are not Nationalists; they are out of the party. If the Germans enter Morocco the Nationalists will support the French against them, under the

same conditions as with Spain. However, they would probably support the French against the Germans even without concessions. The reason for this is that the Germans and Spaniards would both be harder on the Moroccans than the French who, God knows, are hard enough.


AMERICA: The Moroccans prefer Americans to all other Christians and would like our help in restoring justice in their country after the war, if we win. The ideas expressed in President Roosevelt's Flag Day speech are very fine, but, Si Hamid smiled benignly as if we were a bunch of idealistic children. "It is too late; America cannot win. The Germans will have beaten the Russians before you can get there. You started too late." Si Hamid was well informed from a French point of view about world affairs and took a very gloomy view of the future. I did not pursue the subject of the possibility of American troops in Morocco with him, but gathered that while all soldiers are objectionable ours would be less so than most.

The SULTAN: When I asked him: "Do the members of your party wish to keep the present Sultan or get a new one?" he looked at me as if I had asked an intimate question about his private life and replied: "I cannot answer that, it is too intimate a question". The Sultan is a religious symbol to men like Si Hamid who talk about him with bated breath. However, he then made the following statement: "The present Sultan V'S on our side, but the French have held him incommunicado for two years and we have no way of finding out at present how he stands."

Resistance: The Nationalists have no arms and are not fighters. If occasion arises they will resist by civil disobedience, Gandhi style, and by the force of their religious sanctity. No military assistance could be expected from them.

Allal el Fasi: The true head of the party is the sainted Allal el Fasi, who was exiled to Gabon by the French in, I believe, 1937. Allal el Fasi is a much more democratic and less pious or stuffy man than Si Hamid, with much more popular appeal: his followers almost literally worship him, and his name is a very powerful symbol in Morocco. The Nationalists have not heard a word from Allal for two years; hence my cable of August 16 asking for information. Si Hamid assured me, and this confirms what Ahmed Belafre told me in Tangier, that if we get news of Allal and hand it over to them, there will be much rejoicing (if the news is good) and they will be extremely grateful to our nation. However, what is much more important is: TO FIND ALLAL EL FASI AND TAKE HIM TO ENGLAND OR AMERICA, preferably to America. If the Moroccans knew he was in America a great tide of pro-American emotion would sweep the country. If we could have him broadcast from the USA or over the BBC or preferably from Gibraltar, the whole country would arise at his bidding.

CONCLUSION: Si Hamid is a highly honorable, snooty Fezzi with much religious sanctity, but without the appealing type of personality which Allal apparently has. Si Hamid undoubtedly speaks for his group, but overemphasizes the religious side of their program due to his personal bias. These people have much power in Morocco, and many followers in cities and lowland tribes. We cannot count on them for military support, but if need should arise we could count on them to (a) sit tight and do nothing if this seems best, and to leave the French alone if we ask (b) to put up civil disobedience and general disorder if we ask. We can get them to do these things IF WE



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHE

August 3, 1942. Tangier, Morocco.

Colonel W. J. Donovan,
Director of Strategic Services,
24th and E. Street,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Colonel Donovan,

In accordance with orders received through the Marine Corps I returned from Algiers by the first available plane to Tangier, and am leaving the day after tomorrow for Gibraltar to fly to London. I shall not at this time attempt to report on my trip except to mention three items :-

- (1) I refer you to the confidential despatch from Mr. Robert D. Murphy to Mr. Atherton of the State Department, dated July 6, 1942. This statement is of the utmost urgency and more recent conversations and events have only tended to confirm its significance which I hope can be urged upon the War Department. I had a personal conversation with the General mentioned in Paragraphs 4 to 7 inclusive of this confidential despatch.
- (2) The organisation of resistance in Algeria is obviously so full and complete that we have no reason to delay the establishment of a route for supplies. It was proposed to me in Algiers, Mr. Murphy concurring, that a small shipment be made now not only as a token of good faith, but to establish the route and procedure for larger shipments later. There will be no problem at all about reception of the merchandise since our partners practically control the Province of Oran, as well as other sections of the coast. All they ask is an early delivery to reassure both sides that the traffic can flow. When in Gibraltar day after tomorrow I shall request the Governor and Colonel Brien Clarke of S.O.E. to release this small shipment as early as possible. It was my understanding when I talked with you last that London and Washington had agreed to establish a store of small arms at Gibraltar to be held for our S.O.E. programme in French North Africa. I sincerely hope I shall be successful at Gibraltar in arranging for this small token shipment

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHE

Tangier, Morocco.

-2-

at a very early date. The request is as follows:-

8000 mitraillettes (2000 coups par piece)
3000 R.G. (200 coups par piece)
2000 Grenades
200 Silencieux (200 coups par piece)

- (3) I enclose herewith list of our principal S.O. and S.I. agents in French Morocco with biographical data identifying their professional connections and their opportunities to be of use to our cause. Proper names referring to the same persons by number will follow later in a separate pouch. This list is of course most secret but I thought it best to have it compiled for your secret files in the event that anything should happen to the few in the field who now have this information. We are working to complete the arrangements for agents, liaison through W/T and courier services to operate beyond the date when Americans might be excluded from French North Africa. I have already sent a similar list for Tunisia and shall do the same for Algeria.

Respectfully yours,

W. A. EDDY.

PART III.

(STRICTLY SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL).

In order to reduce the risk of this list falling into indiscreet or dangerous hands, I shall give only the "noms de guerre" of my contacts, with numbers. Later I may place a list of corresponding numbers and real names in your hands.

PORT LYAUTEY "Gabby" (1) former District Controller (Commissioner) of Port Lyautey and surrounding district, now owner of an extensive colonist farm at Sidi Slimane, which property is traversed by two important bridges and also contains fields which could be used as emergency landing fields. Controls group of resolute Frenchmen in neighborhood, totalling about 40 men and large number of native laborers for use in emergency. Owing to his former official position, has considerable influence with European and native officials and residents in Port Lyautey, Sidi Slimane and surrounding districts. Has considerable influence at Residency where he has friends of long standing, some of whom are secretly affiliated to Freemasonry. Is a ranking Freemason. Is in charge of "Cheesecake" and his group.

"Cheesecake" (2) Very enthusiastic and energetic official in charge of town and its district. In an emergency would be able to cut communications with coast defences, barracks, etc., block resistance to a considerable extent, and arrange air landings. Would be helpful in arranging clearance through Customs and town of material landed in port. Could mobilize several hundred native laborers and a large group of Frenchmen for assistance in an emergency. Owing to his official position, is obliged to maintain great discretion, but has managed to have himself appointed Chief of the Service for Resisting Parachutists, with the right to travel anywhere. "Cheesecake" s group includes most of the Post Office employees, most of the railway station employees, most of the Customs men and port employees at Port Lyautey. In an emergency, his adherents would take care of those employees or officials who were not.

Both these groups need arms. Will furnish list of requirements later.

"Cheesestraw" (3) Cheesecake's brother-in-law, is a Government official with considerable investigatory rights in the matter of food supplies, Customs, etc., and whose functions call for much travel throughout the country. He has been very useful in supplying military and other information.

Communications between Gabby, Cheesecake and ourselves have hitherto been made through the Seasquid and by direct contact whenever these men come to Casablanca. Another method of communication is being arranged.

In addition to Gabby's and Cheesecake's groups, there is

at Port Lyautey a fairly large Degaulist group who are desirous of linking up with our people. "Fountainpen", (4) a professional man, is in charge of this group. I am considering putting him in touch with Gabby, and arranging for liaison and cooperation between the two leaders. The groups themselves to ignore this junction, and later on, linking up all three with the Rabat groups. These junctions would mean in each case that the leaders only would contact each other, and as far as possible the different groups would ignore each other's existence.

RABAT "Tillie" (5) a professional man and landowner, long-established in the country. Owns large property bordering on the sea in the neighborhood of Rabat. Member of the Council of Government and of various other official organizations. Personally known to General Negues and other Residency officials. Air Pilot. Controls a group of about 30 adherents including a number of officials in Rabat. Group very recently organized and is likely to increase, bar accidents. Works in cooperation with a group of Degaulists numbering between 100 and 110, headed by "Charlotte" a useful information and liaison worker. This group is endeavoring to train squads of young men for work as guides, control or destruction agents, as indicated in Chapter I (B) of this memorandum.

"Pinky's" (7) group at Rabat. This is a group of some 300 determined men, ex-officers and Government officials. It was organized by Pinky, who is already known to you. As he is more or less of a professional, they should be fairly well trained. They are under the nominal leadership of Commandant J. Pinky is the controlling spirit. They were placed at the disposal of R. H. and U.C. but due to the high-handed methods, amounting to insubordination, of Raoul, Lelong's adjutant, they refused to be under the orders of Lelong and U.C. and asked to come under American control.

Both these groups need arms and toys.

SABAHLANCA. There are a few remnants of the "M." (General) group, but nine or ten of them have been arrested in the FOURIER MOULIOT business. The General is in hiding, waiting his chance to get out and all those who are not arrested are lying low for the moment. A list of the chief survivors follows:

"Marius" (9) Aged about 40, small, energetic, intelligent man. Official doctor of the Municipal Services in charge of the anti-venereal dispensary. Maintains relations with Police Commissaire Bourrel and Inspector Tallier, on fairly good terms with Municipal authorities. Is now in Vichy and may be arrested on his return or at least interrogated in connection with the FOURIER MOULIOT affair. Member of Legion, but does not frequent it. Catholic tendency. Financial means limited; his car was purchased by the Legion, leaving him the use of it so as to profit by his doctor's services, ration and distribution card which permits him to bring his family and others. For the purpose of bringing all together, still in his car. Been continued. is frequently due to neglect all other

the attachments of the group. Very reliable.

"J. J." (10) Aged about 40. General practitioner. Ex-Freemason. Opinions fairly well known, but has not been disturbed. Serious, reliable, discreet. Powerful acquaintances in Freemason group. Caution on for Marquis in the latter's absence. Better off financially than Marquis.

"J. J." (11) Aged 38, reserve lieutenant. Left France in 1945 to join Free French, very useful worker in group. Intelligent, serious, willing, but nervous. Worked for a year in Naval engineering establishment in Casablanca, now works in vulcanizing establishment. Close friend of Commandant B. of 3rd Bureau, who appears to have encouraged him.

Will be useful once he has recovered his morale which has been badly shaken by the Fortin Moullet affair, during which he has arrested and released. Speaks excellent English.

"Benedict" (12) Aged 35. Pilot officer Air Force, demobilized. Engineer of Arts and Crafts school. Worked on board JEAN BART, now engineer in private firm. Had been charged by police to watch the General but never gave the latter away. Recently married Mlle. G. who was grilled for 16 hours in the Fortin Moullet affair (without giving anything away) and since then has been less useful. Earnest, but lacking in scope.

"Colin" (13) Between 30 and 35 years of age. Employed at Aviation workshops. Energetic, active, earnest, many contacts and entree at airfields and workshops. Was useful for information but recently has been spotted and now is under suspicion. Is not too discreet.

"Agnes" (14) Aged 35. Chief telephone fitter at Post Office. Ex-Freemason. Sincere, brave, earnest and discreet, but limited in scope, requires direction, lacks initiative.

"Charles" (15) Aged 35. Chief electrician at Banque d'Etat. Sincere, reliable, willing but timid. Capable of rendering useful service in the technical office and wireless Bureau.

"Robert" (16) Young officer of Engineers, aged 28 or 30. Not employed in Post Supply Service. Willing, brave, but extremely indiscreet, too fond of women and drink, always short of money. Useful only for rough work, which he is always willing to do.

This is a small select group, too valuable for the information they provide to be incorporated in any further plan or to make on any other basis. It is a group of men, I believe, who are not to be trusted. The group of people who are really trustworthy is very small. They are the only ones who are not to be trusted.

and "Gangling Pissis Dog" (19). They also have a small but sure group of assistants in the port, and also have with them the only man I know in Casablanca to do photographic work.

Railroad group. Pinkeye has another group in Casablanca. This is headed by "Quicklunch" (20), proprietor of the railroad station restaurant. It includes some 100 railroad employees and workers, including track men, brake men, engineers, etc., even some of the railway police. These men need arms and toys, but these should only be given them at the last minute, as like most strong-arm squads, they are apt to be impetuous.

Independent Degaulist group. There are various independent Degaulist groups in Casablanca which are not under our control but which are willing to cooperate with us. It is my intention to get in contact with these groups through the chiefs of the same movement in Rabat, but not to try to merge them.

Remains of Uncle Charlie's group. Colonel Lelong had collected some 400 people here, according to figures given by him. Many of these were members of our own groups whom he had contacted, also quite a few Degaulists whom we had not yet touched, but he also collected a lot of hotheads, chatterboxes and jerry-gobblers. I have taken back our own men, and am letting the rest disperse and quiet down, because of the hash and commotion which Colonel Lelong created.

Tweedledum and Tweedledee. This is a very serious group headed by the two brothers Tweedledum and Tweedledee (21 and 22) and mostly made up of able business men like the two brothers, discreet officials and a few high-ranking army officers. They also have certain contacts in the Navy. It is this group that is arranging the importation of arms, etc., also the ones who put in a request for communications material to be landed with the connivance of the Post Office authorities through the Customs at Port Lyautey. They are men who have really a deep-rooted hatred of the Germans for adequate personal reasons, and they even have offered to pay for such material as we can provide. It is difficult to say how many there are in this group, or to give more detailed information in regard to the members or even to give the name of the superior Army officer under whose secret official authority they are working.

Spanish Republican Group. This group is known under various names - FRENTE POPULAR, FRENTE DE LA LIBERTAD or FRENTE NACIONAL PARA LA INDEPENDENCIA DE ESPAÑA. It is formed of survivors of the Spanish Socialist and Communist Parties who fled to North Africa after the Francoist victory in Spain. Its aim is the liberation of Spain from Francoist dictatorship and the destruction of fascism, and it considers cooperation with the United Nations as helpful to that purpose. This group is scattered all over North Africa. They state that while not all Republicans are members of their Party, they can count on general Republican support should need arise. These follow figures given by them:

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CONSTANTINE 400 Republicans, of whom 152 belong to the Party, working in Constantine, Bizerte and Tunis.

ALGIER 552 Republicans, of whom 155 are members of the Party, working in Algiers, Blida and Boufari.

ORAN 150 Republicans, of whom 61 belong to the Party, working in Sidi Bel Abbes and Oran.

CASABLANCA 190 Republicans, of whom 60 belong to the Party and work in Casablanca, Meknes, Fez and Rabat.

COLOMB BEGUAR 1,500 Republicans, of whom 352 belong to the Party (mostly working on the Transsaharian).

BOU AREA 1,300 Republicans, of whom 310 belong to the Party (mostly working on the Transsaharian).

Over and above this number 90 are reported to be in prison in Oran, 100 in prison in Algiers, and 22 in prison in Port Lyautey and Casablanca.

(The "Republicans" mentioned above are Spanish Republican refugees, most of whom came here from France in 1940 after serving in the French forces. Apart from these there is of course a very large local Spanish population of pro-Republican sympathies).

400 of the "Republicans" listed above are reported to be returning voluntarily to Spain, where the FRENCH POPULAR is being secretly rebuilt. Their local leader has asked for those remaining in Morocco identity cards for key men to work in Casablanca, and a Spanish passport for one man who is to ensure liaison between North African groups and Spain. These men are pretty hard material; they would be useful for strong-arm or sabotage work if the need arose. In the meantime, they appear to be doing mostly anti-Fascist propaganda.

Serious Army group. There is a group of serious Army men headed by our old friend the Footslogger (23) who is now a major. This is an extremely able and discreet crowd. They were or less broke off contact after the unfortunate Gunner (24) affair, but my friend the Penguin (25) tells me that they are about ripe to make contact again through a trustworthy civilian "Hindfold" (26). Before the contact can be re-established, however, it would be necessary for me to restore their confidence by getting the Penguin out. Footslogger commands a battalion of Tlemcen Harcoiss in a coastal sector and has more or less guaranteed their cooperation if any landing parties took place in that sector, provided we give him 48 hours' notice. This group must be handled with discretion but it is really one of the worthwhile nuclei in Morocco.

The Penguin is arranging to put me in contact with another group in the Aviation. They are not in contact with

any

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any other group in North Africa, but are in key positions at the airfield here and should occasion arise could be depended on to play hob with the whole installation. Naturally we should have some toys ready to give them. The chief of this group, the man who will be my contact after Penguin leaves, will be called "Spanner" (27).

Other groups. Last of all, there is a small efficient group of the remnants of the old French S. R. It will be recalled that according to the terms of the Armistice in 1940, the French military and naval intelligence services were disbanded. Some of these men left France and came to Morocco where they formed a secret intelligence service. Some of them actually managed things so as to come out in the service of and with the authority of the Vichy government and they have been working here for us since then under that cover. The head of the Sûreté here is one of them, the "Hedgehog" (28). He is obliged to steer a somewhat strait and narrow course although his sympathies are with us. The prime movers in this group are "Meccano" (29) "Pinkeye" (7) "Pump" (30), and a man they call the "Patron" (31). Besides this, they naturally have various underlings in the Police and Sûreté at their disposal but have to use them with due discretion.

They have men in Rabat, Casablanca, Saffi, Agadir, Marrakesh, Meknes and Fez, and probably elsewhere. They also have the Police Commissaire of the Port of Casablanca and various members of the Port Police at their disposal. These men are probably the finest suicide group for the purpose of information and communication should we have to get out of Morocco. Only yesterday they came to see me and asked if I could provide them with wireless emission and receiving sets and radio receiving sets. It seems to me that it is this group that would really constitute the link between North Africa and the United Nations should we have to leave. They are old hands in the game, very leath to tip their hand, but once you have their confidence they will go all out. It has taken me 14 months to arrive at the point where they have decided to talk to me directly. Heretofore it has been through a trusted chief and liaison man and one head of a service but who is not a chief of the group.

Some time in the near future I expect to have a list of toys, chocolates and other things which they would like to have for resistance in case of emergency.

These men are working for bare expenses and they ask but one thing, that when the day of victory comes their services will be acknowledged by the fighting French and Allied Nations. In doing the work which they have done and are still doing they are taking risks as great as any man in the front line, but they also know that if the tide turns in our favor, de Gaulle will be mobbed by men who have done nothing and who will claim to have performed miracles.

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NOTE: (1) Brief summary of report containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

An informant of Vice Consul Reid has reported that one of his contacts has given him information to the effect that within the next six months the French expect an exodus of at least 50,000 native workers destined to work in Germany. The plan calls for getting 1,000 or more men across the Spanish-Moroccan border in the vicinity of Arbaoun and Alnazar Quebir three times a

It appears that the German and Spanish authorities at Oran are expected to lend a hand in getting these Arabs to Costa, which will be an embarkation point for Bordeaux, Marseille and Spanish ports, and it is further understood that the Spanish authorities would lend a hand to see these persons sent through Spain. Another route will be into Algeria to one of the ports where these Arabs will be taken on board coastal steamers as supplementary crews. They are counting on swelling the regular crew lists by 100 to 200 on each sailing. The same method is intended to be worked from Casablanca, using steamers that make the run between Casablanca and Bordeaux.

Reid's informant states that the greatest fear shared by certain individuals on this procedure is that these native workers at the end of a few months or a year will be returned to their own country and might act as a dangerous fifth column element throughout the Arab speaking populations.


PREPARED AND FORWARDED BY -

F. P. HOLCOMB.
Captain, USMC.

Cost for Historic Service:

[illegible]

A B C D E F X										Man- graph	Archives	Budget	Gen'l. Board	Sec. of Inv'ts.
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2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 223														



Adresse de l'habitant de l'habitat :
 Téléphone :

L'arrivée de l'Amiral Denbair en France, sous l'attention de certains milieux hostiles à la cause de la guerre d'Indochine, a été l'occasion pour la personnalité américaine d'exprimer ses sentiments. En son honneur, le général de Gaulle a reçu l'Amiral Denbair à l'Élysée, le 1er février 1954. L'Amiral Denbair a été reçu par le général de Gaulle, le 1er février 1954. L'Amiral Denbair a été reçu par le général de Gaulle, le 1er février 1954. L'Amiral Denbair a été reçu par le général de Gaulle, le 1er février 1954.

NO. 100
MAIL

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Algiers, Algeria, June 11, 1942

SUBJECT: Order of Battle for 3 Departments of Algeria
as of April 15, 1942.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose what the French term the "Order of Battle" for the three departments of Algeria, the actual technical name in French being "TABLEAU DU STATIONNEMENT DES TROUPES DE LA 19eme ARMEE".

As the serial number (copy number) is 41000, it was secured from a confidential source by Vice Consul Boyd and Mack, in fact the original was from the files of the 19th Corps Area Headquarters archives.

Previous battle orders have been sent forward from various sources, but it is thought that the copy of the official, one, under date of November 15, 1941, brought forward by Official Supplement No. 1, of January 15, 1942, and by No. 2, of April 15, 1942, might prove of interest to the Department as well as to other Departments of the Government concerned with the national war effort.

Respectfully yours,

Robert D. Murphy
Counselor of Embassy

(d)

For/18

File No. 820

Enclosure: Battle Orders for 3 Departments of Algeria
in original French.

Comme: Unintelligible to the Department

1 copy to Tanager

1 copy to 17/18/19

Enclosure: No. 1 of Official Supplement No. 2 of Jan. 15, 1942
Enclosure: No. 2 of Official Supplement No. 2 of April 15, 1942

15^e REGION
 15^e REGION
 15^e REGION
 15^e REGION

EMBAIE N° 1 TO DESPATCH
 15-1-42 of June 11, 1942
 15-1-42 of June 11, 1942
 GENERAL ALGERIA, ALGERIA

T A B L E A U
du stationnement des Troupes de la
15^e Région

Mis à jour le 15 Novembre 1941

Mis à jour le 15 Janvier 1942 (Rectificatif N° 1 du 15-1-42)

Mis à jour le 15 Avril 1942 (Rectificatif N° 2 du 15-4-42)

Mis à jour le (Rectificatif N° du

Annuaire

ALGER, le 12 Novembre 1941

Le Général de Corps d'Armée **ROULTE**
Commandant la 19^e Région

A.M.M. :

- Les Généraux Cdt les Divisions Territoriales d'ALGER - ORAN - CONSTANTINE.
 - Le Général Cdt la CAVALERIE d'ALGERIE
 - Le Général Cdt l'ARTILLERIE de la 19^e Région
 - Le Général Cdt le GENIE de la 19^e Région
 - Le Colonel Cdt le TRAIN de la 19^e Région
 - Le Général Direct. Sup. des BATIMENTS de la 19^e Région
 - Le Colonel Cdt la 7^e Légion de GARDE
 - Le Lt-Colonel Cdt le GROUPEMENT de MAT/411
 - Le Lt-Colonel Cdt la 19^e Légion de Gendarmerie
 - L'Intendant Général Dir. de l'INTENDANCE de la 19^e Région.
 - Le Vétérinaire Général Insp. Dir. du Sec de SANTÉ de la 19^e Rég.
 - Le Vétérinaire Lt-Colonel Dir. du Sec VÉTÉRINAIRE de la 19^e Reg.
 - L'Inspecteur Cdt le 4^e Arr. de GENDARMERIE
 - Les Commandants Militaires des Territoires d'AIN-DEFRA à COLONE-BECHAR - de CHANDALA à LAGHOAT - de TOUCOUCURT à TOUCOUCURT - des OASIS à QUAROLA
 - Le Général de Division adjoint au Général Cdt la 19^e Région - Chef d'Etat-Major - 3/ Chef d'Etat-Major (3 ex.) - Cabinet du Général - 1^{er} Bureau (10 ex.) - 2^e Bureau - B.M.A. - Chiffre 3^e Bureau (5 ex.) - 4^e Bureau (5 ex.) Personnel A.M.M. - Transports - Inspection des Territoires du Sud - Section Armistice.
- E.M. 19^e Région.
- M. le Général Cdt en Chef Délégué Général du Gouvernement en Afrique Française (3 exemplaires)
 - M. le Gouverneur Général de l'Algérie:
 - Cabinet Militaire -
 - Direction Générale des Affaires Indigènes et des Territoires du Sud -
 - M. le Général Cdt Supérieur de l'Air en A.F.N.
 - M. le Général Cdt l'Air en Algérie.
 - M. le Colonel Chef de la Délégation des Services de l'Armistice en A.F.N. (3 exemplaires)
 - Transports A.F.N.

BONNETEAU D'ENVOI

Désignation des pièces

Nombre

Observations

TABLIEAULe stationnement des Troupes de la 19^e Région à la date du 15 Novembre 1941

Ce tableau annule tous les documents similaires antérieurs qui seront incinérés.

Les modifications de stationnement continueront à faire l'objet d'un rectificatif d'ensemble qui sera adressé le 15 de chaque mois(1).

A ce sujet, il est précisé aux divisions et territoires que la Note du 15/11/41 reste toujours en vigueur.

2.2. ALGER

Unit	Garrison Principal	Détachements
A/- INFANTRIE		
1^{re} Brigade d'Infanterie		
Etat-Major	ALGER	
1^{er} R.T.A.		
R.M. - C.R. et C.D.	ALGER	
1 ^{er} Bataillon	FORT-NATIONAL	
2 ^{er} Bataillon	ALGER	TIZI-OUZOU (4 ^o Cie)
2^{er} R.T.A.		
R.M. - C.R. et C.D.	ALGER	
1 ^{er} Bataillon	ALGER	Camp du Lido (7 ^o Cie)
2 ^{er} Bataillon	ALGER	Sidi-Ferruch (8 ^o Cie)
3^{re} Brigade d'Infanterie		
Etat-Major	BLIDA	
1^{er} R.T.A.		
R.M. - C.R. et C.D.	BLIDA	
1 ^{er} Bataillon	CHERCHELL	KOLBA (4 ^o Cie)
2 ^{er} Bataillon	BLIDA	BOCHAR (8 ^o Cie)
3 ^{er} Bataillon	DELLYS	DRA-EL-MIZAN (10 ^o Cie)
2^{er} R.T.A.		
R.M. - C.R. et C.D.	MILIANA	
1 ^{er} Bataillon	MILIANA	
2 ^{er} Bataillon	TENES	
3 ^{er} Bataillon	ORLEANSVILLE	
B/- CAVALERIE		
1^{re} Brigade de Cavalerie		
Etat-Major	MEDRA	
1^{er} R.T.A.		
R.M. et R.A.	MEDRA	
1 ^{er} Groupe à cheval (1)	LAMOUAT	
2 ^{er} Groupe à cheval (2)	MEDRA	
3 ^{er} Groupe à cheval	MEDRA	
2^{er} R.T.A.		
R.M. et R.A.	ALGER	
1 ^{er} Gr. à cheval (Mousquetaires)	ALGER	
2 ^{er} Groupe à cheval	MALOU-CA-RET	
3^{er} R.T.A.		
R.M. et R.A.	ALGER	
1 ^{er} Gr. à cheval	ALGER	
2 ^{er} Groupe à cheval	MALOU-CA-RET	
4^{er} R.T.A.		
R.M. et R.A.	ALGER	
1 ^{er} Gr. à cheval	ALGER	
2 ^{er} Groupe à cheval	MALOU-CA-RET	

Unit	Command	Detachments
3/- ALGER-ORAN		
- 1^{er} Groupe -		
1 ^{er} et 2 ^{es}	ALGER	
3 ^e Groupe (75 Cycles)	MAISON-CARRÉE	
4 ^e Groupe (75 Auto)	ALGER	
5 ^e Groupe (82/75 de Montagne)	AUMALE	
4/- LEBLE		
- 1^{er} Cône -		
1 ^{er} et 2 ^{es}	Hussein-Dey	
3 ^e et 4 ^e Bataillon (S.M.)	Hussein-Dey	
5 ^e Bataillon (Transmissions)	Hussein-Dey	
Groupe de Sapeurs de chemin de fer	Hussein-Dey	
5/- TRAIN		
- 2^{es} Escadron de Train -		
Etat-Major	ALGER	
Compagnie Hippo 1/27	ALGER	
Compagnie Auto 101/27	ALGER	
6/- GARDIE		
- 7^e Légion de Garde -		
Etat-Major	ALGER	
- 2^e Groupement -		
Etat-Major	ALGER	
- 3^e Groupe d'Escadrons -		
Etat-Major	ALGER	
1 ^{er} Escadron Moto	ALGER	
2 ^e Escadron à pied	ALGER	
- 4^e Groupe d'Escadrons -		
1 ^{er} Escadron à cheval	MAISON-CARRÉE	
2 ^e Escadron à pied	MAISON-CARRÉE	
	TIET-OTZOU	DELLYS (1 peloton)
7/- GENDARMERIE DE L.A.T./AII		
- 1^{er} Groupement de Gendarmes de L.A.T./AII		
Etat-Major	ALGER	
1 ^{er} et 2 ^e G ^{es} AII	ALGER	
3 ^e et 4 ^e G ^{es} AII	ALGER	BONE, ORAN (Dépôt)

UNITE

principale

détachements

ANNEXE A DET III (suite)Section II/III -

201 ^e Major	ALGER
151 ^e Batterie	ALGER
152 ^e Batterie	ALGER
153 ^e Batterie	HUSSEIN-DEY
31 ^e Batterie	JOINVILLE
32 ^e Batterie	MAISON-CARRÉE
54 ^e Batterie	ALGER
Batterie mixte (projecteurs)	ALGER

II - DIVERS

1 ^{er} - <u>Regia de Cavalerie</u>	HUSSEIN-DEY
2 ^{es} - <u>Centre des Transmissions</u>	DOUERA
3 ^{es} - <u>Carde des Dunes Algériennes</u>	
- 115 ^e Cie du 2 ^e R.T.M.	MAISON-BLANCHE
- 115 ^e Cie du 4 ^e R.T.M.	BLIDA
4 ^{es} - <u>Platz des Isolés</u>	ALGER

OBSERVATIONS

(1) - Voir Territoires du Sud

(2) - 1 Peloton détaché à l'Escorte du Gouverneur Général à ALGER.

S.S. 1. 1964

Unit	Carriera principale	Detachamenti
1° Reggimento		
Reggimento d'Infanteria		
Sott. Major	ORAN	
2° Reggimento		
Sott. Major C.R. et C.D.	ORAN	
1° Battaglione	ORAN	
2° Battaglione	ORAN	AIN-TEMOUCHENT (5° Cie)
3° Reggimento		
Sott. Major C.R. et C.D.	MOSTAGANEM	
1° Battaglione	MOSTAGANEM	
2° Battaglione	TIAN ET	(AFLOU (6° Cie)
3° Battaglione	ORAN	FRANDA (7° Cie)
		ARZEW (10° Cie)
Reggimento d'Infanteria		
Sott. Major	TLEMCEM	
4° Reggimento		
Sott. Major C.R. et C.D.	TLEMCEM	
1° Battaglione	TLEMCEM	SEBKOU (4° Cie)
2° Battaglione	TLEMCEM	MARNIA (5° Cie)
3° Battaglione	MARNIA	
5° Reggimento		
Sott. Major C.R.	SIDI-BOU-ABBES	GERVILLE
	LE KENEDER	
	SIDI-BOU-ABBES	GUANGIA (1° Cie Portée)
4° Battaglione (1)	AIN-SETRA	COLOMB-BEGHAN (10° Cie)
Reggimento per l'Algeria		
Reggimento (D.C.R.K.)		
Sott. Major	SIDI-BOU-ABBES	
Reggimento per l'Algeria		
Sott. Major	SIDI-BOU-ABBES	
1° Battaglione	SIDI-BOU-ABBES	BENEDU, ARZEW
2° Battaglione	SIDI-BOU-ABBES	ORAN (Detachamenti)
3° Battaglione (1)	COLOMB-BEGHAN	
Reggimento per l'Algeria		
Sott. Major	SIDI-BOU-ABBES	
1° Battaglione	SIDI-BOU-ABBES	

UNITS

principale

Detachements

1^{er} Bataillon F.V. MASCARA Aïn El Hadjar (Detach.)
 2^{ème} Bataillon des Cadres MASCARA
 3^{ème} Bataillon des Cadres SIDI-BEL-ABBES

B/ - CAVALERIE

- 1^{er} Escadron de Cavalerie

Chef d'Escadron MASCARA
 1^{er} Groupe (découverte) ORAN
 2^{ème} Groupe (portés) ORAN
 3^{ème} Groupe (chars) ORAN

MISSERONIN (3^{ème} Escadr.)- 2^{ème} B.C.A.

Chef de B.C.A. MASCARA
 1^{er} et 2^{ème} Groupes (portés) MASCARA

- 3^{ème} B.C.A.

Chef de B.C.A. TLEMCEM
 1^{er} Groupe à cheval TLEMCEM
 2^{ème} Groupe à cheval TIANET
 3^{ème} Groupe à cheval (1) COLOMB-BICHAN

BELIZANE (4^{ème} Escadr.)
 BENI-OUNIF (6^{ème} Escadr.)

C/ - ARTILLERIE

- 1^{er} B.A.A.

Chef d'Escadron et B.A. ORAN
 1^{er} Groupe (75 Hippo) ORAN
 2^{ème} Groupe (75 Auto) ORAN
 3^{ème} Groupe (106/155) ORAN

- 2^{ème} B.A.A.

Chef d'Escadron et B.A. TLEMCEM
 1^{er} Groupe (75 Auto) SIDI-BEL-ABBES
 2^{ème} Groupe (75 Auto) MASCARA
 3^{ème} Groupe (88/75 Montagne) TLEMCEM

SEBDOU (8^{ème} Batterie)

D/ - GENIE

- 1^{er} Bataillon de Genie

1^{er} Bataillon (Transmissions) ORAN (13^{ème} Cie)

E/ - TRAIN

- 1^{er} Bataillon de Train

Chef d'Escadron ORAN
 1^{er} Groupe (1/25) ORAN
 2^{ème} Groupe (106/155) ORAN

7/ - SAHRA

- 1^{er} Groupement -

1^{er} Major

ORAN

- 2^e Groupe d'Escadrons -

1^{er} Major

ORAN

1^{er} Escadron à cheval

ORAN

2^e Escadron à pied

ORAN

- 3^e Groupe d'Escadrons -

1^{er} Major

TELEMONT

3^e Escadron moto

TELEMONT

4^e Escadron à pied

MOSTAGANEM

SID-BEL-ABBES (1 Pol.)

8/ - GROUPEMENT DE D.A.I./411

- Groupe I/411 -

1^{er} Major

BOUISSEVILLE

124^e Batterie

BOUISSEVILLE

125^e Batterie

AIN-EL-TURCK

126^e Batterie

MERS EL KEBIR

127^e Batterie

BEL HORIZON

- Groupe II/411 -

1^{er} Major

ORAN (Gambetta)

31^e Batterie

VALMY

32^e Batterie

LA SENIA

107^e Batterie

ORAN (Cannastel)

108^e Batterie

ORAN (Gambetta)

9/ - DIVERSE -

- 1^{er} Garde des Bases Africaines

112^e Cie du 4^e R.T.M.

ORAN

112^e Cie du 7^e R.T.M.

TAFARACUI

Patrouille de Chasse F.T.

TAFARACUI

- 2^e Mitr. des Indes -

ORAN

OBSERVATIONS

(1) Voir Territoires du Sud

RECAPITULATION

UNITE	Corps principal	Detachements
1. - ALGERIE		
a. ALGERIE		
Chef de Corps	CONSTANTINE	
b. R.T.A.		
R.A. - C.R. et C.D.	BONE- BOUKHA TENESEA ROME	
1 ^{er} Bataillon		BOUK-AHRAS (5^o Cie) TOUGGOURT-EL-OUED (7^o Cie) LA CAILLE (12^o Cie)
2 ^e Bataillon		
3 ^e Bataillon		
c. R.T.S.		
R.A. - C.R. et C.D.	PHILIPPEVILLE PHILIPPEVILLE CONSTANTINE	
1 ^{er} Bataillon		
2 ^e Bataillon		
d. ALGERIE		
Chef de Corps	SETIF	
e. R.T.A.		
R.A. - C.R. et C.D.	SETIF SETIF BOUGIE SETIF	
1 ^{er} Bataillon		BORDJ-BOU-ARRERIDJ (4^o C 9
2 ^e Bataillon		AXECU (12^o Cie)
3 ^e Bataillon		
f. ALGERIE		
R.A. - C.R. et C.D.	CONSTANTINE CONSTANTINE SETIF	
1 ^{er} Bataillon		TELEROMA (3^o Cie)
2 ^e Bataillon		BISERA (8^o Cie) BORDJ-SAADA (9^o Cie) (3)
g. ALGERIE		
h. ALGERIE		
Chef de Corps	BATNA	
i. R.T.A.		
R.A. et C.R.	CONSTANTINE CONSTANTINE CONSTANTINE	
1 ^{er} Bataillon (R.A. et C.R.)		
2 ^e Bataillon (R.A. et C.R.)		

100

UNITS

Services
principale

Détachements

4. SOUTIEN LOGISTIQUE

- Travaux IV/611

Major
1500 Batterie
1500 Batterie
1500 Batterie
1500 Batterie
1500 Batterie
1500 Batterie

BONE
BONE
BONE
BONE
TELERGMA
PHILIPPEVILLE

4. CIVILES -

1° Service des Travaux d'Entretien

2° Compagnie du 1 R.T.M.

SETIF

3° Service des Travaux F.T.

BONE

2° Service des Travaux

PHILIPPEVILLE

BONE (Annexe)

OBSERVATIONS

(1) Voir Territoires du Sud.

(2) Detachement de Travaillants militaires (N.B.I.L. rattaché au 3° (Laurier)).

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IV - TERRITOIRE DU SUD -1° - TERRITOIRE D'AIN-SERFACommandement : COLOMB-BECHAN

UNITÉ	Carrière principale	DETACHEMENTS
A/ - INFANTERIE -		
- 1° R.E.L. -		
2° Bataillon	AIN-SERFA	OUAROLA (1° Cie portée) COLOMB-BECHAN (100 Cie)
- R.C.R.L.		
Bataillon de passage		COLOMB-BECHAN (Cie de discipline)
B/ - CAVALERIE -		
- 2° R.E.L. -		
2° Groupe à cheval	COLOMB-BECHAN	BNNI-OUNIF - 5° Escadron-
C/ - UNITÉ NAVIGANTES -		
- <u>Groupes des Compagnies Sahariennes de l'Air</u>		
Major et Cie Commandement	COLOMB-BECHAN	
Cie Saharienne du Touat	ADRAR -	REGGAN
Cie Saharienne de la MOURA	TINDOUF	
Cie Portée de la Légion	TINDOUF	
Détachement Auto	TINDOUF	

- 11 -

2° Territoire des OAHISCommandement : OUAROLA

UNITS	Garrison principale	DETACHEMENTS
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A/ - INFANTERIE1° R.E.I. -

1er Bataillon

OUAROLA (1° Cie portée)

B/ - UNITS SAHARIENNES -- Groupe des Compagnies Sahariennes d'Infanterie -

E.M. et Cie de Commandement

OUAROLA

Cie Saharienne portée (mixte)

OUAROLA

FORT LALLEMAND-1 Sect.)

Cie Saharienne du Tidikelt

IN-SALAH

Cie Saharienne des Ajjers

FORT-POLIGNAC

Cie Saharienne du Hoggar

DJANET

FORT OARDEL
IN ESSANE

1° Batterie Saharienne portée

OUAROLA

2° Batterie Saharienne portée

FORT FLATTERS

Comp d'El-Qued (1)

FORT SAINT

MARAKSEN

REMARKS :

(1) - Voir Territoire de TONGOURT.

- 12 -

3° Territoire de TOUGGOURTCommandement : TOUGGOURT

UNITS	Garrison principale	DETACHEMENTS
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A/ - INFANTERIE

- 5° R.T.A.

2ème Bataillon

TOUGGOURT - EL OUED
(1 Cie - 7° Cie)**B/ - FORMATIONS
SAHARIENNES**

Gom 4° EL OUED

FORT SAINT

MARKESEN

4° Territoire de GHARDAIACommandement : LACHOUAT

UNITS	Garrison principale	DETACHEMENTS
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A/ - CAVALERIE

- 1° R.T.A.

1° Groupe à cheval

LACHOUAT

DJMLFA (1 escadron)

[illegible]

REGION

ALGER, 15 15 Avril 1942.

RE.T. MAJOR

1er Bureau
N° 1945 O/IENCLOSURE N° 3
N° 1945 O/I
FROM ALGER
CENTRALTRES SECRET
CONFIDENTIALRECTIFICATIF N° 2 au Tableau de
stationnement des troupes de la 19^e REGION
à la date du 15 November 1941 envoyé sous le
N° 1945 O/I

Page I.-

A/- INFANTERIE

- 1^{er} R.T.A. -1^{er} Bataillon : supprimer dans la 3^e colonne: KOLEA (4^e Cie)2^e Bataillon : ajouter dans la 3^e colonne après BOGHAR (6^e Cie)
: provisoirement.- après 1^{er} R.T.A. (sans changement) ajouter:
1/2- 2^e Brigade Algérienne

E.M. - OR - CD -	:	KOLEA	:
1 ^{er} Bataillon	:	ORLEANSVILLE	:
2 ^e Bataillon	:	LACHOUAT	:
3 ^e Bataillon	:	KOLEA	:
	:	TENES (2 ^e Cie)	:
	:	BOGHAR (1 ^e Cie)	:

B/- CAVALERIE

- 1^{er} R.T.A. 2^e Groupe à cheval. Lire dans 3^e colonne:- THWINT-EL-HAAD 2^e Esc. au lieu de
THWINT-EL-HAAD 2^e escadron.- 2^e R.T.A. 2^e Groupe à cheval (sans changement), ajouter:- 6^e Groupe autonome de C.A. : MAISON-CARRÉE :

Page II.-

C/- ARTILLERIE

- 1^{er} R.T.A. après 2^e Groupe (65/75 de Montbrun) (sans changement),
ajouter:- 2^e R.T.A. 2^e Batterie : MAISON-CARRÉE :

- 2 -

Part 1/- suite**1/- CHIFFRE**

- après 1^{er} ordre (sans changement) ajouter:
- 2nd Groupe de transmissions: HUSSEIN-DEY

2/- BATAIL

- 2nd Escadron de Train

- en face de Compagnie Hippo 1/27, ajouter dans la 2nd colonne:

: HOSMAN (1 ad-
: Cacherment, Hippo
:

3/- GARDE

- 1^{er} Groupe d'Escadrons: 2nd Escadron à pied.

- ajouter, dans la 3rd colonne, après DELLYS (1 peloton) le renvoi (a) situé au bas de la page 2.

(a), Transfert ' HUSSEIN en cours (le III/1er R.T.A., stationné à DELLYS, ayant besoin de locaux, étant devenu autonome au point de vue administratif)

Part 2/-**1/- DIVERSE**

- Après 2nd Centre des Transmissions, (sans changement)

au lieu de:

- 2nd Centre des Batailles Officielles

- 115th Cie du 2nd R.T.M. : MAISON-BLANCHE

- 115th Cie du 3rd R.T.M. : ELIDA

lire:

- 2nd Centre des Batailles Officielles

115th Cie

: MAISON-BLANCHE

115th Cie

: ELIDA

- Après 3rd Centre des Batailles, sans changement, ajouter:

- 2nd Centre des Batailles

115th Cie

: MAISON (Bataille-
: MAISON)

- 3 -

1/ - Brigade d'Infanterie- Brigade- au face de 1^{er} Bataillon, ajouter dans la 3^e colonne:

:	:	ARZEN 1 ^{er} Cie (10)
:	:	:

- Brigade- après 1^{er} Bataillon (sans changement)

- au lieu de:

2 ^o Bataillon	:	TIARET	:	AFLOU (6 ^o Cie)
3 ^o Bataillon	:	GRAN	:	FRANHA (7 ^o Cie)
			:	ARZEN (10 ^o Cie)

- Lire:

2 ^o Bataillon	:	TIARET	:	AFLOU (8 ^o Cie)
	:		:	FRANHA (8 ^o Cie)
3 Bataillon (b)	:	GRAN (LA JENIA)	:	ARZEN (10 ^o Cie)
	:		:	AMSI MOUHA
			:	(11 ^o Cie)
			:	KHABOHA (15 ^o Cie)

- Brigade d'Infanterie- Brigade

- après R.M. et G.H. (sans changement)

- au lieu de:

*****	:	LS KOUZOU	:	GEORVILLE
*****	:	HEDE DEL AMEN	:	
	:		:	
2 ^o Bataillon (1)	:	ACH HAFRA	:	OUARHA 1 ^o Cie
	:		:	portée
	:		:	COLONN BUDIAN
	:		:	(10 ^o Cie)

- Lire:

2 ^o Bataillon	:	LS KOUZOU	:	Georville
	:		:	(10 ^o Cie)
	:		:	OUARHA (1 ^o Cie)
	:		:	portée
	:		:	portée
2 ^o Bataillon (1)	:	ACH HAFRA	:	Colonel BUDIAN
	:		:	(10 ^o Cie)

Page 1a - suite

(après Bataillon d'Instruction, Cie d'Instruction des spécialistes sans changement, ajouter les renvois:

a) autorisés par la C.I.A. - mouvement en cours.

b) stationnement autorisé par la C.I.A.

(Ex. Str. et 2 Cies: BELIZANE
1 Cie : AMEK MOUNGA
1 Cie : ZERBORA

Page 2a -

V/- CAVALERIE - 2^e Brigade de Cavalerie

- 2^e R.A.A.

- en face de 2^e groupe à cheval, ajouter dans la 3^e colonne, après (4^e Escadron) le renvoi: (a)

C/- ARTILLERIE

- après 65^e R.A.A. (sans changement), ajouter:

- C.A.A.M.L.
I^{re} et II^e Batterie : ORAN :

- au bas de la page 5 ajouter le renvoi (a) :

(a) Stationnement autorisé par la C.I.A.: SAIDA (4^e Escadron mouvement subordonné au départ de SAIDA du 1^{er} Groupe de Travailleurs Etrangers (en cours de transfert à GERVILLE)

Page 3a -

H/- RAYERS -

- au lieu de:

1^{re} Corps des Bases Africaines

III^e Cie du 6^e R.T.M. : ORAN :
III^e Cie du 7^e R.T.M. : TAFARAGUI :

- Lire:

1^{re} Corps de Défense de Terrain

I^{re} Cie : ORAN :
II^e Cie : TAFARAGUI :

Annex A. suite

- après le Dépt des Indes, sans changement, ajouter:
- 10/- Les B.E.L. de Cte

Quin

Annex B.

1/- INFANTERIE

- 1^{re} Brigade d'Infanterie.
- à la suite immédiate du titre 10^e R.T.C. ajouter:
- (cf. page 7 bis)
- 2^e Brigade d'Infanterie.
- à la suite immédiate du titre 2^e Zouaves, ajouter:
- (cf. page 7 bis)
- après 3^e Zouaves - 2^e Bataillon, ajouter le (1)
- à la fin de la page 7, ajouter:
- (I) 1^{er} B.T.T. (cf. page 7 bis)

R.M. CR - CD -
1^{er} Bataillon

2^e Bataillon

PHILIPPEVILLE
BOMBA

PHILIPPEVILLE
(1^{er} Bataillon)
BOUGIE (5 Cie)

- à ajouter la page 7 bis.

Page 7 bis.

- Projets de stationnement (soumis à la C.I.A.)

1^{er} Bataillon: (203 - O/I du 21 février 1942)

- 1^{er} B.T.C. R.M. - CR - CD - PHILIPPEVILLE
1^{er} Bataillon

(PHILIPPEVILLE
(GOLLO (1 Cie) (refusé par
la Délégation
italienne)

2^e Bataillon

(PHILIPPEVILLE
(CONSTANTINE
(1 Cie) (...id...)

- 3^e Zouaves R.M. - CR - CD -
1^{er} Bataillon
2^e Bataillon

CONSTANTINE
CONSTANTINE
(GOLLO (2 Cie)
CONSTANTINE
(1 Cie)
(BOMBA (1 Cie)

..!

- 6 -

Page 2 bis - suite

- 10e R.T.T. S.M. - CH - CD - : CONSTANTINE

1er Bataillon

: (ACME (3 Cie)

: CONSTANTINE (1 Cie -
provisoirement)

2e Bataillon

: (SMEP (1 Cie)

: BOUSIA (1 Cie)

: THERIAUX (1 Cie)

: Constantine (1 Cie)

- 2e Projet : (P45 - ST/I-S du 10 Avril 1948) (en cas de rejet
du 1er projet)

- 3e Zouaves. S.M. - CH - CD -

1er Bataillon

2e Bataillon

: CONSTANTINE

: BOUSIA

: (SMEP (1 Cie)

: (SMEP (1 Cie)

: (SMEP (1 Cie)

- 10e R.T.T. S.M. - CH - CD -

1er Bataillon

2e Bataillon

: (SMEP (1 Cie)

: BOUSIA

: (SMEP (1 Cie)

: (SMEP (1 Cie)

: (SMEP (1 Cie)

: (SMEP (1 Cie)

Page 3.-

3e R.S.M. (sans changement)

- après 3e Groupe à cheval ajouter :

- 10e R.S.M.

: THERIAUX

: BOUSIA

(1 escadron)

G/ - ARTILLERIE.

6 22e Bataillon

- après 3e Groupe (66/73 Montagne) (sans changement),
ajouter

- 2e Bataillon. 2e Batterie

: CONSTANTINE

R/ TRAIN

- après 22e Escadron du Train, Cie Auto 101/25 (sans

changement)
ajouter :

- 22e Escadron Auto du Train,

(a)

22e 101 Cie - 102 Cie

: CONSTANTINE

- à la fin de la page 4, ajouter le renvoi (a)

- 7 -

B/- DEFENSE

- au lieu de :

- La Compagnie des Bases Aériennes :
112e Cie du 1er R.T.M. : SETIF

Lire :

- La Cie de Défense de terrain :
10e Cie : SETIF

- après le dépôt des Isolés (sans changement), ajouter :

3e/- 1er B.P.I. 3 e Cie : CONSTANTINE

Page 10.-

A/- INFANTERIE

- 1er B.P.I. 3e Bataillon : QUANG LA
supprimer à la 3e colonne : (101e portée)

C/- UNITES SAHARIENNES

- Cie Saharienne du T.O.U.T : AGGAG
supprimer à la 3e colonne

Page 11.-

A/- INFANTERIE- 1er B.P.I.

au lieu de :

1er Bataillon : QUANG LA
 : (1 Cie portée)

Lire :

3e Bataillon : QUANG LA
 : (1 Cie portée)
 : (portée)
 : FORT-LALLEMAND
 : (1 section)

.. /

Page 11 - 1111

B/ UNITES SAHARIENNES.

- Unité Saharienne Portes (mixte)

au lieu de :

lire :

: GUAROLA : PORT-LAILLEMAND
: (I section)

: GUAROLA : PORT-FLATTORE
: (I section)

Page 12 -

B/- FORMATIONS SAHARIENNES

- Comp 4^e El-GUEN

au lieu de :

lire :

: PORT-SANTE: MAROC CH

: GUAROLA : PORT FLATTORE

- FORMATION DE GATEAIA

APRES A/- CAVALERIE, (sans changement), ajouter:

B/- INFANTERIE

20^e 1/2 Brigade

Algérienne, 2^e Bataillon : LACROIX : P.L. 7 Cie
: à PORT-FLATTORE

Le Général ROELT, Commandant la 10^e REGION

L. O. Le Chef d'Etat-Major

(Signed "de Pontifres" and sealed
with 10^e Region official seal).

ORIGINAL
Les Mous en sous du
Bordereau No. 1048

(This copy marked "B.M." in red pencil)

July 23, 1942.

M E M O R A N D U M

for Mr. Murphy and Colonel W. A. Eddy, from Vice Consul King.

An AI contact (official) reports that the canning factory SEFAL at Fedala is canning corned beef in 300-grammes cans sent them by the Germans. The cans bear no indication of origin, merely the words "BOEUF ASSAISONNE - 300 GRAMMES" marked in red on the can. This stuff is shipped to France from Casablanca, not Fedala.

The cold storage dépôt at Casablanca is full of mutton carcasses (10,000) and has asked the Fedala cold storage dépôt to take some of them. Meanwhile brokers are busy buying up meat throughout Morocco for refrigeration purposes. These carcasses are destined for shipment to France.

Apparently the canning at Fedala is not progressing altogether efficiently, as my contact saw the tins mentioned above when a foreman brought in a batch of them to the manager, pointing out that the meat had gone bad and that the tins were ready to burst. Let us hope for the worst and pray for ptomaine.

David W. King
David W. King.

July 23, 1948.

MEMORANDUM

For Mr. Murphy and Colonel W. A. Hady, from Vice Consul King.

An AI contact reports as follows:

At a recent meeting of a section of the S.O.L. (Service d'Ordre de la Legion) in Rabat, the man sent to address them was very much embarrassed because he was obliged to explain to the meeting that the Germans had never promised to liberate prisoners in exchange for workmen. He said that Laval had merely stated that he hoped that the flow of French workers to Germany might persuade the Germans to liberate some prisoners. In any case, he went on to explain, if the Germans did liberate French prisoners, it would be on the basis of 4 prisoners for 10 workmen.

The leader of the section thereupon rose and resigned his leadership and membership in the Legion. He was followed up in his resignation by 17 out of the 53 members of the section. The next day, however, they received what amounted to an order from General Fougere, Chief of the S.O.L., to withdraw their resignations, and the leader was instructed to make a speech saying that he had not understood the matter fully when he resigned.

There is also a certain growing feeling in the Legion that the commanders of the S.O.L. should be the first ones to volunteer for service in the Legion Tricolore on the Russian front. Up to the time of writing, there has been no ugly rush on the part of the S.O.L. to form themselves into a spearhead to point out the road to glory.

Another contact, AI, confirms the foregoing but tells of three members of the S.O.L. in Rabat:

Dr. LELOUTRE (one of the S.O.L. commanders)
Dr. Fages
Dr. Marney

who have actually volunteered to join the Legion Tricolore. It may be added that these men are confronted with a certain amount of personal and domestic troubles, but even so, it is doubted whether they will get any further than the station.

David W. King
David W. King.

July 24, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

For Colonel W. A. Eady, from Vice Consul King.

Fire on board the JEAN BART.

An AI contact reports that there was a fire on board the JEAN BART during the night of Monday and/or Tuesday. The fire broke out in the ammunition magazines. One man was killed, several wounded. It was necessary to flood the magazines, and today another AI contact reports that the anti-aircraft ammunition is being taken off the JEAN BART and loaded on to trucks. The causes of the fire are unknown, but are attributed to negligence, not sabotage. An enquiry is being made - in the utmost secrecy.

On July 23rd, at 7 p.m., the destroyer MALIN (X 82) sister ship of LE TERRIBLE, came in from Dakar and is berthed at berth N (see port sketches).

Near the JEAN BART the Navy are unpacking 160 new submarine batteries which have arrived from France.

D. W. King
D. W. King

July 29, 1941.

M E M O R A N D U M

for Mr. Murphy and Colonel Eddy from Vice Consul King.

Sentiments of upper officials in Rabat.

Members of "Pills" group report as follows:

In general, all officials of superior rank in Rabat are ostensibly "collaborationist" in their attitude. Before the Russian resistance became a certainty, most of them appeared to be more or less convinced that "collaboration" was their only hope. At present, many of the same group openly admit pro-British or at least anti-German sentiments - but do not translate their sentiments into action. The general impression is that, while hoping for an Allied victory they intend to maintain their present attitude until their hopes are realized or at least until the United Nations land forces in Morocco.

Exceptions to these are the Director of "Ravitaillement" (Sausage des Forges) and some of his staff; Bourcelin, Procureur at the Court of First Instance at Rabat; Gault, Director of Health Services; the Director of Industrial Production and his assistant, Du Vivier and Kieselé) and most of the Cabinet Diplomatique. All of these are known to be pro-United Nations.

On the other side, M. Tron, Director of Finances and Procureur of Camille Chautemps, is reputed to be pro-German, while M. Sanviti, Justice of the Peace at Rabat, is a member of the S.O.L. and openly professes his pro-German sentiments.

A fairly large number of physicians are on the pro-German side and active in promoting the S.O.L. With two or three exceptions, the lawyers are lukewarm, while the staff of the Department of Education and teaching staff in the various colleges are too timid to express any but orthodox pro-Pétain sentiments.

See Henry
D. W. King.



Colonel d'Avon
 12-11-41
 12-11-41

MARINE ITALIENNE (sources Beppe)

Le vapeur "Virenze" a été coulé en Méditerranée en décembre 1940.

Le vapeur "Galio" a été coulé, date et lieu indéterminés.

Depuis début 1942 l'Italie a sorti aux 18,000 tonnes type "Nino Bixio". Ce sont des sortes de croiseurs auxiliaires avec de l'armement anti-aérien (100, 120, 150 mm), des mitrailleuses de 13,2 et 8 pièces de 152 pour tirer sur objectifs navals. Ces bâtiments ont une sorte de centrale de tir et disposent d'appareils à tubes. Deux sont récemment sortis de Gênes.

Il y a pénurie en Italie de bons équipages et état-major pour les sous-marins.

Le sous-marin "Glauco" (type "Otaria") a été coulé en Méditerranée à date et lieu indéterminés.

Trois à quatre petits navires et des voiliers arrivent chaque semaine à Bengazi. La plupart des bâtiments vont directement à Bengazi en passant au large de Tripoli et en longeant les côtes tunisiennes à grande distance.

est

Le 17 juillet un cargo de 1500 tonnes/parti de Tripoli pour Bengazi.

Le 14 juillet le voilier à moteur "Italia" de 500 tonnes est parti de Tripoli pour Bengazi Tobrouk avec des bombes avion.

Le 18 juillet arrivait à Tripoli venant de Sicile un cargo avec des bombes et des vivres.

Le 21 juillet deux cargos allemands de 8,000 tonnes ont été chargés à Tripoli en matériel et des vivres pour Tobrouk.

Le 19 juillet "l'Atilio Bixio" et le "Fabio Filzi" sont arrivés à Bengazi.

Le 21 juillet trois voiliers à moteur avec des bombes d'avion sont partis de Tripoli à Bengazi.

Le 20 juillet le bateau citeras "Aneo" est parti de Tripoli pour Bengazi.

Tout ce qui précède est sources "Beppe". Je rappelle encore une fois que Beppe est un marin italien d'origine israélienne, ancien sous-marinier de la flotte italienne. Il est ici depuis deux ou trois ans ayant été expulsé de France comme non arabe. Je le connais personnellement quoi que n'ayant plus de relations directes avec lui en ce moment. J'ai eu affaire à lui dès 1940 et je le considérais comme très sérieux. Il connaît évidemment très bien la question marine et il a gardé beaucoup de relations (ou il s'en crée) dans les bureaux militaires. J'ai toujours eu l'impression que ses renseignements étaient sérieux et quelques renseignements que j'ai pu faire ont toujours été bons. Je ne suis pas sûr de dire d'autre sur sa sincérité. C'est au contraire à vous avec à vous de donner votre opinion sur la source Beppe. Personnellement, je suis favorable.

(A)

- 2 -

Renseignements sur la Lybie obtenus par des expulsés juifs et indigènes:

A Tripoli il y a d'importants dépôts d'essence souterrains dans la zone de la Porte Mallaha. Ces dépôts sont très vulnérables mais n'ont jamais été atteints.

Il y aurait une escadrille de Messerschmidts à Castel Benito (Suis sceptique peut-être s'agit-il d'un renseignement datant un peu et dans ce cas peut-être de la chasse de nuit).

Le 1er juillet une cinquantaine de bombardiers américains gros modèle ont bombardé Bengazi. Les témoins disent "bombardement sans discernement".

Au cours de la visite qu'a faite à Tripoli Mussolini il a réuni les chefs arabes et il leur aurait remis l'épée de l'Islam !!! et des fonds pour aller en Egypte comme représentants de Mussolini Protecteur de l'Islam. Le tout a été repris trois jours après sans leur donner d'explication. Les allemands seraient tout à fait opposés à cette politique.

A Tripoli il y a un bateau à 3 cheminées coulé à 300 mètres hors du port.

Les réservoirs de pétrole de Feschum ont été souvent visés mais jamais atteints.

Au début juillet à Bengazi au cours d'une attaque aérienne un bateau chargé de munitions a explosé 3 autres ancrés à proximité coulèrent.

Note - Les renseignements qui précèdent sont très sujet à caution. Ils viennent de gens incompetents et qui ont tendance à donner du renseignement sensationnel pour se faire bien voir à leur arrivée.

AVIATION ITALIENNE (renseignements très sûrs)

Le 26 juillet le Cant Z.501, matricule 35267 de la 184ème escadrille a améri à Souss.

Le 26 juillet le Cant Z.501, matricule 35423 de la 197ème escadrille a améri dans le Golfe de Tanis et non à Hammamet comme indiqué dans papier précédent. Il était en mission de protection d'un convoi zone des Kerkehahs et venait de Marsala Stagnione.

L'aéroport 259 égale Venise ou environs (à confirmer)

Identifiés de façon très sûre: la 225ème escadrille de transport qui venait de la Base Z.A.T. ensuite transitaient par Venise (aéroport 259) puis est parti pour la Russie vers le 14 juillet.

Renseignements sur l'Italie de source africaine mais ne devant pas être considérés comme absolument sûrs:

Aucun avion de chasse en service en Italie ne dépasse 500 km/h. res heures.

- 5 -

Renseignements sur l'Italie de source sérieuse mais ne devant pas être considérés comme absolument sûrs:

Les usines Machi à Turin produisent 40 appareils par mois et s'équipent pour en faire 80. Ils étudient un dérivé du MQ.202.

L'usine Piaggio à Finale Marina occupe 25,000 ouvriers. Elle sort une quinzaine d'appareils par mois qui sont soit des Cant 506 soit des F.100.

70 % des effectifs italiens en Sicile seraient atteints de malarie!!!

L'armée italienne comprendrait à l'heure actuelle:

40 divisions entre continent et sud-est européen

5 divisions en Sardaigne

10 divisions en Sicile

Elle comprendrait en outre:

4 divisions cuirassiers dont 2 en Afrique.

L'aviation italienne stationnée à Alessandrie et à Novi Ligure est partie en presque totalité pour l'Afrique du Nord - Egypte depuis le 18 juillet.

Fiat étudierait un nouvel appareil qui entrerait prochainement en service. Il s'agit d'un chasseur ayant l'aspect du Re.2001 muni du moteur Fiat 1300 CV. Les performances sont comparables à celles du Dewoitine 520. L'armement comprend 1 canon et 2 mitrailleuses de 12,7 dans les ailes.

SECTEUR TRIPOLI-FRONTIERE TUNISIENNE

Les renseignements portés dans cette rubrique sont absolument sûrs.

Le 68ème groupe observation aérienne était à Zuara le 25 juillet.

La 24ème escadrille O.A. en 709 le 25 juillet.

Les barges à moteur "Agate Madre, Adolinda et Santa Maria II" sont entrées à Zuara le 24 juillet. Le même jour le dragueur de mines "Santa Lucia" en sort et le 27 juillet le voilier à moteur "Marsag" y entrait. On signale un important mouvement de petits navires passant devant Zuara se dirigeant vers l'est avec souvent escorte de torpilleurs.

Le 28 juillet deux convois de "semovent" allemands sont passés devant Zuara, route est; l'un des convois était de 3 unités.

Le torpilleur Orión était dans la région de Zuara le 29 juillet.

Le navire frigorifique "Eda" est passé à Tripoli et il contient la presque totalité du ravitaillement en viande de la région.

La 148ème escadrille est toujours à Pisida mais elle a un détachement à Marsala. Ses effectifs le 19 juillet étaient de 4 501 dont 3 efficaces et 5 502 dont 4 efficaces.

PROFILS TRIPOLI - FRONTIERE TUNISIENNE (suite)

Total à la date du 26 juillet l'état des appareils de la 145ème escadrille:

Cant Z.501	matricule	portant le	No.
"	"	35544	1
"	"	35590	3
"	"	35590	7
"	"	35598	12
Cant Z.501	"	45398	10
"	"	35596	11
"	"	45447	13
"	"	45332	14

Sont détachés à Manelao:

Cant Z.501	matricule	portant le	No.
"	"	35614	3
"	"	35604	4
"	"	35619	6
"	"	35620	9

Le 20 juillet un pétrolier de moyen tonnage et un torpilleur type "Maetta" passent devant Zuara route est.

Le 21 juillet un cargo devant Zuara route ouest.

Le Général BASTICO a fait une circulaire accordant des prolongations de 30 jours aux permissions agricoles.

Le 25 juillet un torpilleur type "Pigaso" et un bateau citerne devant Zuara route ouest.

Le 27 juillet un torpilleur type "Proclona" et un cargo, route est.

Le 28 juillet deux bateaux date et type indéterminés route est.

Le Cant Z.501 matricule 35844 est arrivé le 23 juillet à Pisida venant de Marsala Stagnione.

Le 24 juillet un torpilleur et un cargo devant Zuara route est.

La 145ème escadrille a touché le Cant Z.501 35523.

Dans la nuit du 25 au 26 juillet un petit cargo, un remorqueur et un voilier à moteur sont partis de Tripoli, route ouest, vitesse 3 nœuds le long de la côte.

Dans la même nuit un torpilleur, un bateau citerne et un cargo ont également quitté Tripoli route ouest à 7 nœuds. Ces bateaux longent la côte au moins jusqu'à Zuara.

Enfin, toujours dans la même nuit un petit bateau citerne a quitté Zuara pour Tripoli.

55

Argent d'infanterie CAMERON Joseph Gordon de Scherles autricale 1913

Sergent d'artillerie HARRIS John Dixon de Dixon, matricule 43104
Soldat d'aviation HARTNETT Frederick de William, matricule 43080
fin 1930

Elle ont probablement été repris dans les environs de Sidi Bilal. Il y a eu
peut-être plusieurs évènements.

Dans la nuit du 30 au 31 juillet un cargo et une camionnière passèrent sur la route est.

Note * Tout ce qui précède sous la rubrique "secteur Trioli - Frontière Quinianna" doit être considéré comme absolument certain.

www.pearsoned.com.au

Les travaux de fortification à la frontière tunisienne ont été interrompus. Aucun renfort important n'est parvenu à Tripoli du 16 juillet au 21 juillet. Les troupes italiennes sont dirigées vers l'Egypte pour compenser les pertes dans la zone d'Alamein.

[illegible]

- Le 13 juillet vapeur "Laren" route nord allant à Tunis
voilier à 2 mâts "Benoe", un voilier à 2 mâts "Glorio" route
le 14 juillet remorqueur italien NUI route sud
le 16 juillet croiseur inconnu à 3 cheminées venant de l'ouest et allant à
(anglais ?)
le 18 juillet torpilleur type "Pegaso" avec lettres indication OD route sud
puis prend la route sud après avoir rattrapé un vapeur.
le 19 juillet vapeur IARD route nord
le 22 juillet vapeur "Paolino", torpilleur OD route sud
vapeur "Fortunato" venant d'ouest prend route sud
le 23 juillet vapeur "Laren" venant de Tunis route sud
vapeur "Strucchia" venant de l'ouest puis route sud
2 vedettes rapides matricules 865 et 876 route nord
vapeur "Lupo" route nord allant à Tunis
le 25 juillet torpilleur IRIN route nord
vapeur "Jagello" venant de Tunis route sud
le 26 juillet vapeur "Fortunato" route nord allant à Tunis
un vapeur et un torpilleur type "Epica" (Orione, route nord)

Le livre "Delivery Orders for Major Vennela" a été envoyé sur le "H. 100".
Il est entre les mains de la Marine Française. Prudence.

RELATION ALLEMANDE (vires sûrs)

Indicatifs aviation allemande depuis le 1er avril 1942:

1. Alliances et pays occupés:

BAO	région Köln	PTC	Copenhague (?)
FAR	Slovaquie	RFA	Stampes
FAT	région München	RFC	Metz Trescar
JAR	" Bremen	RFD	région St. Pol a Ternoise
MAC	Chateau d'Am	RFT	Romilly
MAL	Rennes	RFM	St. André de l'Eure
RAM	Leen (?)	RFF	Amsterdam (?)
RAS	Nancy-Essey	SFV	région Twente
RAN	région Teix		
RAX	Villacoublay-Sud	FHW	Pologne
SAH	Budapest (?)	KHC	région Budweis
WAI	Norvège	KHL	" Nurnberg
		KHX	" Prag
FCO	région Krakau	MHC	Melun
FCR	Wildpack-Werder	MHF	Hollande nord
GGW	Ingolstadt	MHL	Karlsbad (?)
HSH	Rhoten	MHN	Schwabisch Hall (?)
JCA	région München	NHW	Wiesbaden
KCA	Stuttgart	OHG	région Lille
MCH	St. Trond Brustheim	OHY	Tours
NCH	Evreux	PHC	Vannes
POB	Chivres		
POC	Belgique	HLB	Berlin-Tempelhof
POG	Pourges	HLG	région Belgrade
POK	Gyransturt	HLU	Breslau Gandau
POO	Hantes	RLX	Bruxelles*Evere
POH	Mardembourg	OLN	Koln
TOF	Kiel	CLP	Pillau
		FLR	Villacoublay (Gonio)
AVB	Ausbach	FLRB	Brignogan (Gonio)
BDP	Kols	FLRC	Jobourg (Gonio)
BFC	Freiburg in Brisgau (?)	FLRL	Dieppe (?) (Gonio)
CFV	Konigsberg-Deven	FLZ	Villacoublay
CFE	Frankfort sur Main	KLA	Zeller (?)
CFR	Neuburg Donau	KLF	Konigsberg
NFA	région München	KLV	Aalborg
KTC	région Lechfeld (?)	KLX	Klagenfurt
KTF	Staken	MLP	Rennes
KTB	région Stuttgart	NLA	Hannover
KVF	Fritzier	NLR	région Rennes
KVV	région München	PLU	Munchen Riem
KVL	" Thora	PLUH	Nurnberg
KVD	Dijon	PLUS	Stuttgart Bollingen
KVM	Toulous-Pan (?)	RLN	Bremen
KFA	Belgique	RLM	Norvège
KVI	Belgique Lille	RLB	région Gensl
KVK	Berlin	RLZ	Trag Rucny
KVN	Genève	SLX	Skoplje (?)
KVF	Leen-Guyver	SLG	Oslo

ANNEXE ALLEMANDE (très rare) (suite)

Indicative aviation allemande depuis le 1er avril 1942: (suite)

1. Allemagne et pays occupés (suite)

ALE Kent
 ULN Krefeld
 VIO Belgique
 WLO Wien-Aspern
 WLN Werschen
 ZLN St. Dizier
 ELY Landport (Genie)
 ELVA Calais (Genie)
 ELVH Hamsthelm (Genie)
 ELVI Weisingen (Genie)

BOP Brandenbourg Briest
 FOP Gablingen
 FOR Giebalstätt
 GGO région Passau
 HOF Luxembourg
 LOL région Wien
 NOG Belgique
 NXP Avord
 NQJ Cambrai
 NOK Chartres
 NOR Montdidier
 NOV Normandie
 NXX région Le Havre
 POD Dinard (2)
 PCM Orly
 POP St. Dizier
 POL Normandie
 ROL Belgique
 RCW région Stuttgart
 WIF Rastenburg

HAY région Cottbus
 JJA " Ulm
 JJC " München
 JJO " Flensburg
 HRT " Stralsund
 HRI Brandebourg
 GWF Alsace
 OJA Alsace (Genie)
 OJA Bruch
 OJA Bruch
 FGO La Bourges
 FEL Weisensried
 FGO Weisensried (2)
 FGO région Garmisch
 FGO Rastenburg
 GND Garmisch

BUT région Garmisch
 GUY Wunsdorf
 NCV Herby a. Eder
 NUX Bayern Garmisch
 NUY St. Quentin
 FUN Norvège
 SUC Scandinavie
 STY Prusse
 TTY Arys Rostken

2. BasFin Méditerranéen :

HAX Italie
 FAP Grèce
 HAX Lecce
 JAD Rome
 MAP Rome Litterio
 ACP région Parme
 ECT Catane
 FCB Italie
 GOY région Naples
 LOD Cyrénaique
 AFD région Catane
 CHX Salonique
 FHO Trapani
 GHP Genoa
 JHM Treviso (?)
 KUD Crotone ? Reggio ?
 GCV Grèce
 OLY Sofia
 PLN Catane Genie
 PLNA Trapani Genie
 PLNO Cap Passero Genie
 PLNO Lecce (?)
 PLNO Pantelleria Genie
 PLNO Misurata Genie
 PLNO région Athènes Genie
 PLNO Crotone Genie

AVIATION ALLEMANDE (suite 2)

Indicatifs aviation Allemande depuis le 1er avril 1942: (suite 2)

2. Bassin Méditerranéen (suite):

AOB	Tunis
OOO	El Djol
POF	Région Derna
BOB	Bengasi Buge
BNY	Région Rome
BUM	Sicile
BNU	Région Brindisi

6/8/42

TRANSLATION

August 5, 1942

ITALIAN NAVY (source, Beppo)

The steamship "Firenze" was sunk in the Mediterranean in December 1940.

The steamship "Celio" was sunk, place and time uncertain.

Since the beginning of 1942 Italy has launched six 12,000 ton ships of the "Nino Bixio" type. These are a sort of auxiliary cruiser with anti-aircraft armament (100/42, machine guns of 13,2; and two pieces of 152 for shooting at naval objectives). These ships have a sort of central turret (centrale de tir) and possess listening apparatus. Two recently were launched at Genoa.

In Italy there is a lack of good crews and general staff for submarines.

The submarine "Glaucio" ("Otarla" class) was sunk in the Mediterranean at an undetermined date.

Three to four small ships and sailing vessels arrive each week at Tripoli. The majority of the ships go directly to Benghazi by passing off shore from Tripoli and following the the Tunisian coast at a great distance.

July 17 a 16000 tons freighter left Tripoli for Benghazi.

July 14 the 500 ton motor sailing ship "Italia" left Tripoli for Tobruk with airplane bombs on board.

July 15 a cargo ship with 1500 tons of meat arrived at Tripoli from Sicily.

July 21 two 2000 ton German cargo ships loaded on at Tripoli materiel and provisions for Tobruk.

July 19 the "Atilio Bixio" and the "Fabio Filzi" arrived at Benghazi.

- 2 -

July 21 three motored sailing vessels loaded with airplane bombs left Tripoli for Bengazi.

July 20 the water-boat "Eneo" left Tripoli for Bengazi.

All the preceding is from the Beppo source. I recall once more that Beppo is of Jewish origin, a former submarine man in the Italian Fleet. He has been here for about two or three years; he was expelled from the fleet as being non-Aryan. I know him personally, even though I don't have any direct contact with him at the present time. I have had dealings with him since 1940 and I believe him to be very serious. He evidently knows well the Italian Navy situation and he has kept many contacts (which he maintains) on the ships which touch here. I have always had the impression that his information was careful, and the few verifications which I have been able to make have always been good. I can tell you nothing else about his sincerity. On the contrary, it is up to you, who have other sources, to give me your opinion on the Beppo source. Personally, very favorable opinion.

No. 29

Date Aug. 6, 1944

AVIATION ITALIENNE (renseignement sérieux mais valeur exacte non connue)

Un nouveau chasseur, le ME.209 va sortir, muni d'un moteur Fiat, de 4 mitrailleuses de 12,7, et d'un canon de 20. Transporte 4,000 cartouches et 450 obus; vitesse 610/20 Kms/heure. Serait moins maniable que le ME.202.

Le dernier numéro matricule sorti en ME.202 est le No. 9255.

MARINE (très sûr)

Le 30 juillet un cargo de 15,000 tonnes a une cheminée, chargé de tanks et de canons sur le pont est passé au Cap Ben, route sud, escorté de 2 torpilleurs.

le 6.8.42

(B)

BOX-100

Monograph Index Guide No. 008-00

(To be read with SUPPLEMENT below the O. I. Index title.)
(Make separate report for each title.)Front. El Naval Alvarado at Tangier Date August 11, 1942
(Title, front, unit, address, office, relation, or person)Reference British
(Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc., if applicable)Source Observation Evaluation "H"
(As official, personal observation, publications, press, correspondence with identity when practicable, etc.)Subject SPANISH MOROCCO TROOPS LARACHE AREA
(Main title as per index guide) (Subtitle) (Main separate report for each title)

BRIEF (This section should contain summary of report, containing subjects succinctly stated) includes important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

The following summary of Spanish forces in the LARACHE area, as of June 1941, is of British origin. There have been no outstanding changes since June, although gradual increase of troops has been noted. The total of 17,000 (2,800 Larache; 6,000 Alcazarquivir; 8,000 Arcilla) indicates that rumors, prevalent in May, of large troop concentrations were without foundation. The troops now at LARACHE appear to be there for the purpose of completing a division in that sector. The present division of 17,000, understrength for a Spanish infantry division, covers the whole LARACHE, ALCAZARQUIVIR and ARCILLA sector.

More recent reports further tend to contradict earlier rumors of new fortifications between LARACHE and ALCAZAR. Those that do exist are in the nature of frontier posts, light fortifications, and a few A. A. batteries belonging to the division. The troops in these areas fall far below the strength of those in the Tangier-Couta area, having incomplete and unkempt uniforms, and a bearing that does not suggest acquaintance with any military discipline.

LARACHE

Grupo Exploration	2,800
3rd Tercio Legion	2,250
Artillery	750
Mechanics	800
Auxiliary services &	
Air Force - approximately	1,500
Total..	7,800

ALCAZARQUIVIR

Regimiento 89	2,600
Artillery	600
Regulares No. 4	2,000
Auxiliary services	1,000
Total..	6,200

Classified By Declassify

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ADDENDUM

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

Main group

Artillery

Infantry

Cavalry

Air Force

Naval

Other

Total

U. S. Naval Attaché, Santiago, Morocco 9/11/42

ANCIEN

| | |
|---------------------|-------|
| Regulares No. 7 | 2,000 |
| Artillery | 250 |
| Infanteria Española | 350 |
| Auxiliary Services | 400 |
| Total.. | 3,000 |

Included in "Auxiliary Services" are transport, messenger, medical service, and Air Force - as these are divisional services, even if 2 or 3,000 men have been missed out of these calculations, even then this does not bring it up to a full Spanish division.

The Grupo de Exploracion de Caballeria de Regulares at Larache is commanded by the cavalry Colonel Don G. Longoria. The Grupo is composed of 4 Tabores, 3 armored trucks similar to light tanks with a machine gun in the turret.

The Grupo is also equipped with the following:

- 18 anti-tank guns of 8.50 cm
- 2 squadrons of machine guns
- 1 squadron of mortars
- 2 squadrons of horse with sabres

This is the old Grupo de Regulares de Caballeria No. 4, which has been motorized, and has trucks for transport, but owing to lack of petrol its mobility is considerably reduced.

The Ser Ferocis of the Legion at Larache is commanded by Lt. Col. Navon, and is composed of 3 banderas and H. G. The banderas are of 750 men each, although the basic strength of a bandera is 500, each one has been increased by a "Destruction" company of 250 men. These are equipped with tommy guns, hand grenades, dynamite, flame-throwers etc. Each bandera has a machine gun company, and each rifle company has 8 tommy guns, plus 4 anti-tank guns per bandera and a section of 6 mortars of 80 mm.

The artillery group at Larache is a mountain gun section, composed of 3 batteries, each battery with 4 Schneider 10.50 cm guns, and the mechanized elements for transport.

The Larache Mehalla is composed of 5 Tabores. Each Tabor has 4 "Mia" of 120 infantrymen, and 1 "Mia" of 150 cavalry.

The 89th Infantry Regiment at Alcazarquivir is commanded by Colonel Juarez, and is composed of 2 battalions. The regiment is mechanized, but is unable to go ahead with training owing to lack of petrol. There are 3 machine gun companies, with 10 sections machine guns per company, and 3 mortar companies of 120 mm each, with their gun carriages. The regiment has 70 lorries and trucks for transport. It is stated that the 120 mm mortars are the really useful fighting force in the unit.

0177-42

U. S. Naval Attache,

Tungler, Morocco.

9/15/45

The Grupo de Regulares de Infanteria No. 4 at Alcazarquivir is composed of 4 Tabores, each with 3 rifles and 1 machine gun company. Each Tabor has 750 men.

The artillery group at Alcazar is identical with the one at Larache, having 3 batteries of 4 guns of 10.50 cm.

Aumara is the Larache aerodrome, on the Larache-Alcazar road. One bandera of the 3er Tercio of the Legion is stationed there for aerodrome defence, but also is also used for frontier services, so that there is only one company of the bandera on the aerodrome. There are six A. A. guns of 10.50 cm on the aerodrome. Commandante Camalejo is in command of the station, and has a maximum of 200 air force personnel. There are only 4 aircraft at the aerodrome.

At Arcila there is only the Grupo de Regulares No. 7, a small detachment of Spanish infantry (approximately 350 men) and a field battery of 4 guns of 10.50 - apart from the usual auxiliary services.

Prepared and forwarded by:

F. P. Holcomb
F. P. Holcomb
Captain, USMC.

1990年12月15日

1995

11-11-11

THE

Monograph Index Guide No.

(Do not correspond with AUCISLOT given below. See O. N. I. Index Guide.
Make separate reports for each main title.)

U. S. Navy Attache at Tankier Date August 13th 1942

Reference: B Vice Consul King

(Direct fee, correspondence, previous related report, etc., if applicable)

CONFIDENTIAL

Evaluation

(An reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

by official, personal observation, publications, press, conversation with - identify

SPANISH MORDUCCO, TETUAN. Opposition to Spanish Administration

Clashed over the 1992

(Main title as per index guide)

(Hutches)

(Make separate report for each)

1955年10月1日

Summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.

Recent resentment of the Grand Vizier in Tetuan to certain
Desires the Spanish have sought to put into effect which would
compromise traditional inviolability of the Moorish home.

During the past ten days there has occurred a rift among the governing personalities of the Spanish Zone because of certain Dahirs that the Spanish would have inaugurated. It was the Khalifa who attempted to publish and enforce the following Dahirs:

- */-A tax of 40% on estates;
- b/-Grant of sufficient powers to the sanitary department to permit them to enter Moorish houses, without notification, in the event of disease and to impose sanitary measures;
- c/-Granting police power to enter and search Moslem houses without warning in suspicious cases.

The above Dahirs were the ones which gave offense. The story that all the Viziers resigned and that Khalifa went to Spain to appeal to Madrid has not been confirmed.

General Orgas, the High Commissioner, had sent the above Dahirs and others to the Grand Vizier for signature and seal. However, the latter had flatly refused to sign the Dahirs or to set the seal of the H. R. H. the Khalifa. It is reliably reported that the High Commissioner telephoned the Grand Vizier to make an appointment to discuss the matter. The interview was somewhat stormy as the Grand Vizier said that Dahirs were much worse than those published by the French on May 16, 1924, and that if he spent the rest of his life soliciting the pardon of God for the wrongs which this would work on the Moslem people in favor of Spain, God Almighty would not have time to pardon him, as he already carries on his shoulders the blood of more than 250,000 native soldiers dead in Spain.

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CONFIDENTIAL**- 2 -****IN 6166-42****U. S. Naval Attache****Tangier, Morocco****8/15/42**

Certain native government circles are speculating as to whether the Khalifa and his Mahkams may have been encouraged by the German representatives at Tangier and Tetuan.

Analysis Note:

Unless the story has wide distribution among already discontented native groups, it is not likely that anything serious will arise as the Spanish administration has been sympathetic to Moroccan susceptibilities and customs in the past.

Prepared and Forwarded by:

**F. P. Helcomb
Captain, USNOR.**

August 15, 1942.

~~TOP SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM

for Mr. Murphy, Colonel Eddy and Colonel Johnson from Vice Consul King.

BATTLE ORDER - MOROCCO

(Revised as of August 15, 1942.)

I. INFANTRY

| <u>Corps</u> | <u>Units</u> | <u>Stations</u> |
|---|---|------------------------------------|
| 1st Regiment Tirailleurs Marocains | Regimental Staff | Port Lyautey |
| | 1st battalion | " |
| | 2nd " | " |
| | 3rd " | 1st and 3rd com. |
| | | 3rd battalion at Arbacia; |
| (Group 12 25 m/m anti-tank guns attached to this regiment). | | 2nd and 4th com. at Souk el Arba. |
| | | 1st company of battalion at Skirra |
| | | |
| 2nd Regiment Tirailleurs Marocains | Regimental staff | Saffi |
| | Depot company | Marrakech |
| | 1st battalion | Saffi |
| | 3rd company of 2nd battalion | Saffi |
| | 1st, 2nd and 4th coys. of 2nd battalion | Mogador |
| | 3rd battalion | Agadir |
| | One company of this regiment called 103rd company coastal defence (Defense du Littoral) | Agadir |
| | One company called 104th company coastal defence | Saffi |

3rd

INFANTRY (contd.)

| Corps | Units | Stations |
|--|---|---|
| 3rd Regiment Tirailleurs Marocains | NOTE: The Moroccan Army List reports this regiment as dissolved. Actually, it exists in full strength in Algeria. | |
| 4th Regiment Tirailleurs Marocains | Staff of regiment and depot company
1st battalion
3rd " | Taza
"
" |
| (NOTE: This regiment has 8 companies per battalion). | | 4th company of 2nd battalion at Aknoul.
One company detached to Tizzi Ouzli.
One company at Mezguitem.
1st and 2nd companies of 2nd battalion at Boured.
One coy. at Bou Zineb.
2nd coy. of 2nd battalion at Taharsouk.
One coy. detached to Tamehecht. |
| 5th Regiment Tirailleurs Marocains | Regimental staff and depot company
1st battalion
3rd battalion (minus 2 coys at Taforalt) | Oujda
"
"
1 company at Aklim
1 " " Kasba bou Griba |
| | 2nd battalion (minus 3rd coy at one company at | Guercif
Camp Berteaux and Sakka) |
| | (Group 12 25 mm anti tank guns attached to this regiment) | |
| 6th Regiment Tirailleurs Marocains | Regimental staff and depot company
3rd battalion
2nd "
1st " | Casablanca
"
Fedala
Medouna |
| 7th Regiment Tirailleurs Marocains | Regimental staff and depot company
1st battalion (minus 4th company) | Sidi Bouknadel
Meknes
Les Chênes, Sald |
| | | 3rd |

INFANTRY (contd.)

| Corps | Units | Stations |
|---|---|------------------|
| 7th Regiment Tirailleurs Marocains (contd.) | 3rd battalion | Les Chênes, Salé |
| | 1st, 3rd and 4th coys. of 2nd battalion | Midelt |
| | 2nd coy. of 2nd battalion | El Hajeb |
| | Two companys of 2nd battalion native prisoners | " " |
| | 4th company 1st battalion | Azrou |
| 8th Regiment Tirailleurs Marocains (contd.) | Regimental staff and depot company | Meknes |
| | 1st battalion | " |
| | 2nd " | " |
| | 1st, 2nd and 3rd coys. of 3rd battalion | Ouezzane |
| | 4th coy. of 3rd battalion | Bou Nizer |
| | 1 company at Mekrisset | |
| | 1 company at Teroual | |
| 9th Regiment Etranger d'Infanterie | Regimental staff and depot company | Saffi |
| | 1st battalion minus 4th company | Agadir |
| | 1st, 2nd and 3rd coys. of 2nd battalion | Saffi |
| | 4th coy of 2nd battalion and 4th coy of 3rd battalion | Ait Melloul |
| | 1st, 2nd and 3rd coys of 3rd battalion | Ouarzazate |
| | 4th mechanized coy of 4th battalion | " |
| 3rd Regiment Etranger d'Infanterie | Regimental staff and post of command | Fez |
| | 3rd coy of 3rd battalion | Fez |
| | 1 battalion | Meknes |
| | 1st and 2nd coys of 3rd battalion | Ifrane |
| | 1st and 2nd coys of 2nd battalion | Khenifra |

INFANTRY (contd.)

| Corps | Units | Stations |
|--|--|------------------------------------|
| 3rd Regiment Etranger
d'Infanterie (contd.) | 2nd mounted company
3rd company of 2nd
battalion
Staff
1st coastal battery of
3rd Reg. Etr. (Group of 12 25 mm anti-tank
(8 75 m/m guns) guns attached to this reg.) | Midelt
Oued Zem
Port Lyautey |

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| Regiment d'Infanterie
Coloniale Marocaine | Regimental staff and depot
company
1st battalion
Company of Palace guard
2nd battalion
3rd " | Rabat
"
"
Casablanca
Mazagan. |
|--|---|---|

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| 6th Regiment Tirailleurs
Sénégalais | Regimental staff and
depot company
3rd battalion
1st battalion
2nd battalion
1 company
Section of 25 m/m anti-
tank guns
1 company | Casablanca
"
Marakech
Fez
Fedala
"
Mazagan |
|--|--|--|

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| 11th Regiment Tirailleurs
Algériens | Depot company
1st battalion (minus
4th company)
3rd battalion
4th company of 2nd
battalion
1 detached company
1st and 3rd coys of 2nd
battalion
2nd coy of 2nd battalion
4th coy of 1st battalion | Fez
"
"
Tercoudant
El Haddada
Rafsal
Tafrannt
Sefrou |
|--|---|---|

CAVALRY

II. CAVALRY

| Corps | Units | Stations |
|---|---|---|
| 1st Chasseurs d'Afrique | Regimental staff
Depot squadron
2 mechanized squadrons
1 squadron tanks
1 " motorized
machine guns | Rabat
"
"
"
" |
| 1st Spahis Marocains | Regimental staff
3 squadrons and
1st group
1 horse squadron
1 mechanized squadron | Rabat
"
Casablanca
" |
| 3rd Spahis Marocains | Staff
1 squadron horse
2nd squadron mechanized
Two mechanized squadrons | Rabat
"
"
Fedala |
| 4th Spahis Marocains | Regimental staff and 2
groups of squadrons
Post of command of
2 squadrons
1 squadron
1 " | Saffi
Tiznit
Ait Melloul
Marrakesh |
| 1st Regiment Etranger
de Cavalerie | Post of command
Regimental staff
3 groups of squadrons
1 mechanized "
1 " machine gun
squadron
Staff and commanding
post of group of
squadrons
2 horse squadrons | Oujda
Guersif
"
"
"
Fes
" |

Total One group = 3 squadrons. 1 squadron = 3 platoons.

III. ENGINEERS

III. ENGINEERS

| <u>Corps</u> | <u>Units</u> | <u>Stations</u> |
|-------------------------------------|---|----------------------------------|
| 31st Génie | 5th company field railways
4th battalion
1 section | Meknes
Port Lyautey
Fedala |
| 33rd Génie | 1st and 3rd companies of battalion of sappers
2nd coy of battalion " | Port Lyautey
Fez |
| 41st Génie | Regimental staff
2 telegraph companies
4th " company | Rabat
Meknes
Fez |
| 1st Battalion Pionniers Indochinois | 1 detachment | Rabat |

IV. TRAIN CORPS

| | | |
|------------|--|--------------------------------|
| 31st Train | HAS BEEN MERGED WITH 33rd TRAIN (below) | |
| 32nd Train | 101st company
2 sections automobiles
2nd company | Port Lyautey
Rabat
Rabat |
| 33rd Train | Regimental staff
1st company horse-drawn
101st company automobiles
1 detachment | Fez
Fez
Fez
Meknes |

V. DESERT PATROL COMPANIES

| | | |
|------------------------|----------------------|---------|
| Compagnies Sahariennes | 1 mechanized company | Tindouf |
| Compagnies du Sahara | 1 company | Tindouf |

VI.

VI. ARTILLERY

| Corps | Units | Stations |
|--|--|--|
| 63rd Artillerie Marocaine | Regimental staff
1 battery 75 m/m mechan-
ized
3 groups 75 m/m mountain
guns
1 group 75 m/m
2 groups 65 m/m and 75 m/m
mountain guns
4th group batteries 65 m/m
and 75 m/m | Fes
Fes
Fes
Oujda
Taza
Ouazzane |
| 64th Artillerie Marocaine | Regimental staff
1 group 75 m/m, horse-
drawn
2 groups motorized 75 m/m
1 group batteries 75 m/m | Meknes
"
"
Kasbah Tadla |
| Regiment d'Artillerie
Coloniale Africaine
(10th group) | Regimental staff
2 mechanized squadrons | Meknes
" |
| Regiment Artillerie
Coloniale Marocaine | Regimental staff
2nd groupe horse-drawn
batteries 155 m/m and
105 m/m
4th group mechanized
batteries 75 m/m

Independent detached
groups of batteries for
coastal and AA defence
called "Groupement cote
et D.C.A."
N.B. Guns believed to be of
75 m/m caliber - number unknown.
This group is supposed to be under
naval control, although administratively
under control of General commanding the
territory of Casablanca. | Casablanca
"
"
" |
| Regiment d'Artillerie
Coloniale | Staff | Casablanca
Ozerann 10/2 |

ARTILLERY (contd.)

| Corps | Units | Stations |
|---|---|-----------------|
| Regiment d'Artillerie Coloniale (contd.) | Commanding post of AA Group | Casablanca |
| | 1st group mechanized 7 m/m batteries | " |
| | 2nd group of 2 mixed batteries of 75 m/m and 32 m/m | " |
| 410th Defense centre Avions (D.C.A.) | Regimental staff | Rabat |
| | Group staff, | Casablanca |
| | 1st group, composed of battery No.181, and " No.182, both of 4 75 m/m guns each plus: | " |
| | battery No.183 composed of 2 75 m/m and 2 32 m/m guns | " |
| | 2nd group of 75 m/m batteries (12 guns in group) | Port Lyautey |
| | Staff of 2nd group batteries | Rabat |
| | 1 battery of 75 m/m | " |
| | 3 batteries mixed 75 m/m and 32 m/m | " |
| | 1 observation company | " |
| | 1 independant "groupement" (number of guns unknown) mechanized 75 m/m | " |

NOTE: A group = 3 batteries of 4 guns each. A "groupement" is a detached assembly of batteries or guns, usually independant, the number of which may vary. It may comprise guns of different caliber.

| | | |
|--|--------------------------------|--------|
| 410th Defense Artillerie du Territoire (D.A.T.) | 1 group of batteries of 75 m/m | Fedala |
|--|--------------------------------|--------|

VII. TERRITORIAL GROUPS

VIII. TERRITORIAL GROUPS

NOTE: The **LEGION DE LA GARDE** and **GARDE TERRITORIALE** both are composed of the former "Gardes Mobiles" (Moroccan constabulary, composed of white Frenchmen). The "Défense du Territoire" groups include anti-parachutist sections, etc. The following Territorial groups do not include "goums" or native militia, which are levied and discharged by the district officers of the Service of "Affaires Indigènes" according to the needs of the time. These "goums" include both mounted and foot groups.

| Corps | Units | Stations |
|------------------------------|---|-------------------------|
| Garde Territoriale | 8e mechanized squadron | Oujda |
| | 4th group and commanding post of 7th squadron | Fez |
| | Staff of 3rd group, | Meknes |
| | 1 mechanized squadron
1 motorcycle " | " |
| Legion de la Garde | 1st motorized group | Rabat |
| | Staff of motorized and horse groups | " |
| | 2nd group at Casablanca | |
| | 1 company
2 companies | Khouribgha
Marrakesh |
| Défense du Territoire | 1 company | Oujda (6th Region) |
| | 1 company | Fez (5th Region) |
| | 1 company | Meknes (4th Region) |
| | 1 company | Rabat (2nd Region) |
| | 1 company | Casablanca (1st Region) |

(3rd Region is at Port-Lyautey, effectives for that region not given).


NOTES

NOTES

The above is the battle order of the French Moroccan effectives as of August 15, 1942. In this memorandum I have given then in regimental order as it is somewhat easier to keep track of the various detached units in this way. At the same time it will be noticed that there have been practically no changes or weakening of effectives along the Spanish Moroccan frontier and at the stations of strategical reserves such as Fez, Meknes, Taza, Oujda and Ouezzane. A glance at the enclosed map will show that in spite of the hot weather two-thirds of the French effectives are stationed along the Spanish Moroccan frontier and one-third along the Atlantic coast, less strategical reserves in both cases mentioned above.

In addition to the effectives mentioned above, there are between 10,000 and 11,000 officers and men of the French Navy, depending upon the number of ships in port. Most of the coast defence batteries and all the lookout posts (search lights and sound-ranging ears) are manned by the Navy, also many of the anti-aircraft batteries, especially those of 90 m/m caliber.

David W. King.



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHE

Tangier

25 August, 1942.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Director of Strategic Services,
24th and "E" Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I have the honor to enclose the following for the
information of your Intelligence Section:

Enclosures:

- (A) Essay "The Fight Against Submarines by Launch Carrying Flying Boats (Hydravins Porte-Vedettes", forwarded by Vice Consul Knox; source not disclosed.
- (B) Essay "Aviation and Offensive Operations - Simultaneous Experiments", forwarded by Vice Consul Knox; source not disclosed.
- (C) Report "Les Stocks d'Essence et d'Alcool" dated 20 August, 1942.
- (D) Report "Le Port D'Alger", dated 20 August, 1942.
- (E) Report "I.T. Des Statistiques, Arrondissement Mineralogique du Maroc", dated 13 August, 1942.

Respectfully submitted:

F. P. HOLCOMB.
Captain, U.S.N.C.R.

Enclosures: 5.

NEW FIGHT AGAINST SUBMARINES BY LAUNCH CARRYING FLYING BOATS (HYDRATIONS FORTS-VERDITES)

1. The depth bomb (grenade), launched from a vessel against a submarine located by listening with the Andie (detector T), is a suitable weapon for the protection of maritime commerce against the menace of submarines. The only difficulty is the considerable number of escort vessels which are required for this purpose, if one wishes thus to guard in this manner against attack on very scattered lines of communication by numerous groups of submarines operating together. The requirements are no less than for the present program, where the number of ships against submarines appears to have to pass well over a thousand.

So long as the problem is limited to the protection of convoys passing in both directions destined for the British Isles, against attacks of isolated submarines, it was solvable by using as escort vessels, the special boats and destroyers from the British Navy.

The success of the protection having obliged the German Navy to change its tactics; the attack by entire squadrons of submarines permitted them to sink numerous vessels belonging to convoys of which the escort vessels were insufficient in number to sink even the escort vessels which themselves succumbed under the combined attacks of the

submarines.

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submarines, one of which torpedoed them during the time they chased the others. The defense consisted in increasing the number of escort vessels attached to each convoy.

The strength in escort vessels sufficient before the entry of the United States into the war, at the time when the American Navy could take the responsibility for the protection of convoys in the North Atlantic over the greater part of their voyage without having to defend their own maritime commerce, must be considerably augmented today, when the same tactics of attacking in groups is applied to their coast lines, to their lines in the Gulf of Mexico, and those in South America.

Is it, moreover, certain that once 1000 or 2000 submarines chasers have been constructed, which today are considered sufficient, that a modification of the German tactics would not require a new effort thus postponing for six months or a year further the date when they might consider themselves definitely safe from this menace?

It would be sufficient only for the German submarines to increase the strength of their formations, for example, from a number of ten to thirty, to be able to regain their superiority against an increased number of escort vessels.

The method of battle which we are proposing below, even if it requires at least several months to give into service, can then be judged interesting for such eventualities, all the more, since it can be adapted to an existing air equipment which does not require but very inexpensive naval equipment.

H. H.

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2. If the weapon used is the depth bomb, the principle itself of the proposed protection is different, not only from that of "patrolled routes" used at the beginning of the submarine war in 1914-1918 as well as from that of "escorted convoys". It consists of a "punitive expedition" aiming at the destruction of an important part of the attacking force before it could cause any serious damage.

The attack on a convoy is an operation which lasts during one entire night, often even during consecutive nights. Making contacts aims at diverting the attention of escort vessels; the attacks follow afterwards at intervals from one to several hours; they are repeated the following nights against the weakened or scattered convoy. In most areas it is impossible to re-enforce the naval escort even in several days, departing from the nearest bases; in the areas where such re-enforcement is possible (the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, ...) the effect cannot be felt, in any case, the first night.

Supposing it possible to transport by air boats of small tonnage destined to reinforce the naval escort, the rapidity of this transportation completely changes the elements of the problem.

The bases which are at their disposal are near enough so that in the average cases the first boats transported by air arrive one or two hours after the alert. This delay is sufficiently short not only to avoid the principal attack and

these

those which will follow but also to make contact with the greater part of the assailing force and hence, to oblige it to remain under the surface and to prevent it from fleeing or dispersing at a speed greater than its cruising speed under water, i.e. five or six knots.

But this is only the beginning of the counterattack. The patrol vessels of very small tonnage that one which will have been employed will be, as we are imagining them further on, supplied for air transport and will continue their "depth bombing". At the same time new reinforcements of patrol vessels will have arrived from bases further away, from 1500 to 2000 km. An important concentration of patrol vessels would permit of relays in the pursuit by "depth bombing" of each submarine, and also to wait, in many cases, the arrival of several escort vessels of heavier tonnage.

The two essential points of air transportation of naval equipment for anti-submarine fighting are thus, on one hand, instantaneousness, and on the other hand, the possibility of important concentrations. The latter phase has, at least, the same interest as the former. There are cases where the increase in number of naval bases and their nearness would permit the reinforcement in five or six hours of the escort of the convoy attacked by escort vessels of great speed sent out from these bases. Such is the case, for example, of all the area of the Antilles and of Central America. But should they have at their disposal the hundreds

- 5 -

of forty knots destroyers necessary and should they be distributed along the coasts of the United States and of Mexico, in the Bahamas, at Jamaica, at Porto Rico, and at Trinidad, it would be scarcely possible to concentrate in the most favorable circumstances ten or twenty for such counter-attack. Whereas in the same length of time but where it would be possible to effect almost instantaneous counter-attacks by the concentration of nearly the whole of the equipment assembled in that extended area; in the Caribbean Sea patrol vessels sent by flying boats from Jamaica could intervene within the hour and those coming from Florida or the Guianas could reinforce them in a few hours. The transportation of patrol vessels by the air route is not only the defense against the present concentrations of submarines but it is likewise the defense of all future concentrations worthy to be grouped by hundreds.

3. The possible realization of the linking of the patrol vessel and the flying boat depends upon the minimum tonnage which could be fixed for the patrol vessel. Even if it were considered that the tonnage of rapid patrolling vessels at present utilized for hunting submarines could not be decreased the problem could be susceptible of solution with present tonnages of heavy flying boats. The patrol vessels of 25 to 30 tons would form the central detachable fuselage of a flying boat with four motors of 2500 h.p/ of a mixed type of flying boat with a hull and one with pontoons, the tonnage of it including the patrol vessel would reach

sixty

sixty to 70 tons. The flying boat would be capable of taking off and flying without the patrol vessel; the latter would furnish the supplementary buoyancy necessary for taking off when it was attached below the plane. The load represented by a patrol vessel of 25 to 30 tons for a flying boat of 50 to 70 tons, total weight might seem high; but it will not be forgotten that it would be applied to a flying boat whose performance, from the point of view of range speed, loading and armament might be very modest. Such solution should certainly be kept in mind at the time when it should be found desirable to apply the launch carrying flying boat to the innumerable missions which could be confided to vessels of 25 to 30 tons, which might even aspire to the destruction by the most varied methods of every type of boat and not only of a submarine alone.

But such a solution has the grave defect of requiring the development of a new type of flying boat and hence is not applicable to the present war. What is required for the latter is the utilisation of types of flying boats in service at the present time or expected in the near future. One may pass ones calculations only on the employment of "Mare", of 80 tons, in case that an order for their manufacture on a large scale should be given. of Super-Blipper being A 314 of 38 tons, and, on flying boats of lower tonnage which may be taken into consideration such as machines of 20 or 30 tons of the type "Catalina", "Cerenade".

What

-4-

What is the minimum tonnage of patrol vessels which one might accept for combat against submarines? Observing that long voyages have been made, notably, the Trans-Atlantic cruising with demountable boats made of wood and rubberized canvas, weighing, without the crew, some thirty kgs. It is easy to believe that there is no need for several tons of tonnage in order to give the necessary seaworthiness. The requirements of speed which will be limited to surpassing the submarine while in a dive are very small; the defensive weapon would limit itself to one 20 mm cannon serviceable both against the submarine which would come to the surface and against aircraft. The weapon would be composed of a depth charge of the smallest type. Besides the armament there is needed aboard a listening device and a radio set; finally, the cruising range would be very limited and one would not normally require the return of the flying boats to their bases by their own power when service vessels of medium tonnage could bring them back. Under such conditions patrol boats of four to five tons total weight would appear sufficient. They could be carried two at a time preferably, or at least one, under the wing spread of most flying boats in service; the example of the Focke-Wulf, a symmetrical design of the Luftwaffe, shows that asymmetry of form is not a disqualifying feature.

The patrol vessel would be manifestly decked for seaworthiness; the deck would have exactly the form of the side of the wing (intrados de l'aile) at the point where it would be attached so as to fit tightly against the hull.

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and reduce interaction between it and the patrol vessel. Shapes for a patrol vessel would be studied so as to arrive at a compromise between the requirements of seaworthiness and aerodynamic resistance. The crew of the patrol vessel would consist of two men in the smallest and would be placed in the launch at the time of taking off; it would carry out the procedure of casting off after the landing of the flying boat on the water.

But between these two extremes of a normal patrol vessel for which a special flying boat would be constructed and the smallest type of patrol vessel which could be attached under the wings of any flying boat of 20 tons in service there are numerous intermediary solutions. It is not indispensable that the flying boat be transported under the wing fully loaded with its fuel and depth charges. These weights for a light patrol vessel would amount to about the same as the weight of the hull and the crew; that could be transported in the fuselage of the launch carrying plane itself to satisfy the requirements of the distribution. If the total weight would not be excessive or even in a second flying boat. In such cases without this flying boat being obliged to land the tanks of gasoline and the depth charges without fuses and provided with cork floats covered with a coat of luminous paint for night use would be thrown into the sea; it is by this same method that one could remove the supply of depth charges of patrol vessels which had run out of it. Such procedures would permit by means of ten motor flying boats of twenty tons such as the "Catalina" to transport patrol vessels of which the total weight with a full supply of gasoline and depth charges would reach 12 tons.

Thus, one could in many different ways transport light patrol vessels on the present flying boats.

4. One of the obvious measures of counter-attack, once an attack on a convoy is signalled is the sending of aerial patrols which oblige the submarines to remain below the surface by day or even on moonlit nights if the patrols are sufficiently near each other. Flying boats used for the transport of patrol vessels could manifestly fill this role as could likewise those which would be destined for their subsequent reprovisioning within the limit of their range of action.

AVIATION AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS -SIMULTANEOUS EXPERIMENTS-

1. Every important offensive operation of the kind that the Allies can undertake for the creation of a "second front" places the command in a dilemma: either to start the affair at the beginning on a large scale and expose oneself to a catastrophe in case of a set-back, or to set on foot only a limited operation with the idea of increasing it in case of success, and thus give warning to the defenders who would finally repel well enough attempts which, if launched simultaneously, would have succeeded. The choice is particularly delicate when one disposes only of troops not yet accustomed to war, and of a command which also needs some previous experience in order to perfect itself.

There is set forth below a principle for directing the operation which is applicable to the greater part of the operations conceivable and which offers the security of previous experimentation without giving the defense time to adapt itself. One should not, truly speaking, qualify the method of previous experiments; it is the case of actually continuing the experiments which will permit the stopping, developing, or transforming the operation undertaken according to the results which it gives.

2. When one disposes of enormous means such as those that America and Great Britain will be able to throw against

their

their adversaries on the Western front, any offensives should succeed. There is no strategic plan so naive or undertaken by tactical methods so poor, that one could not anticipate success from the moment that it is new. One can hardly expect an acknowledgment of lack of intellectual power on the part of the Allied Command such as not to be able to provide something new when any scenario or gag writer succeeds in providing it for the cinema public.

All the great German offensives of 1914-18, (no ever different had been the beliefs of their authors) at their beginnings, and have even obtained the desired results (Serbia, Rumania, Russia) with the exception of those which set on foot against the French-British front and that of Italy. embedded the same new idea. Why did the initial success of the latter transform itself into a setback? For the simple reason that their authors, insufficiently confident in the virtue of the novelty found themselves so surprised by the importance of initial success that they did not know how to exploit it, or they attempted it much too late. Von Moltke, from Charleroi to the Marne, was incapable of directing the armies which advanced much too fast for his commanding abilities. The success of the first days of the offensive against Verdun surprised Falkenhayn and the subordinate commanders to the point where they allowed the French command to reestablish a front there where, a few days earlier, there only were insignificant equipment and posts without garrisons. Similarly too, for the Austrian-German command a success of an extent so disproportionate to that weak strength

the Trentin which it should logically have completed. All the offensives of 1918 of Ludendorff on the western front had the same characteristics of an unhopd success in the first few days, such as a break in the Franco-English pivot at the beginning of the operation against Amiens, of the depth of the break-through on the Chemin-des-Dames and of a later exploitation much too late on the flanks of the pocket.

One will recall simply from this enumeration that in all the German operations, which had at least one new idea each time, either strategical or tactical, such as the wing manoeuver of Schlieffen, the attempt at "bleeding" the French army under the shower of the Falkenhayn's artillery, of the break-through of the Ludendorf type, the novel idea resulted in that which the most optimistic people could have hoped for. But the results obtained were only very insufficiently exploited.

The conduct of the operations, on the Allied side, confirms this conclusion, since the only new idea, that offensives successively reduplicated, each one being limited to the only beneficial opening phase at the beginning, had fully succeeded in 1918. If all the Allied offensives from August 1914 to the end of 1917 failed, it was because it was truly impossible to find in any of them the least shadow of a new idea.

The great superiority of German command in the war of 1918, over that of 1914-18, was precisely this intensive exploitation of the initial success without an interval or pause. Success during the greater part of the time in Poland, Germany, on the western front and in the Balkans, had certainly

surpassed the hopes of the German command. But the latter had never given his adversary the time to recover, and only in the U. R. S. S. that it found its equal.

The success of any new idea in military art is a very comforting conclusion for the future Anglo-American undertakings if the commands of the two countries at least wish to do their adversaries the honor of the new idea, which the Germans or Japanese abundantly lavished upon it during the time of their success.

3. Through being used, every new military idea becomes old and the adversary ends by finding a defense for it.

However, well organized were the offensives of the Ludendorff, the French command in the end found a defensive to counter it on the second line, which stopped the last one of these that of Champagne in July 1918. By succeeding in making break-throughs by means of armored divisions and assault squadrons, the German command of 1941-42 in the end saw the latter changed into battles of the type of Moscow of Voronezh. By repeatedly ^{ing} in one archipelago after another new embarkations each time successfully, the Japanese command were finally checked in the Coral sea or at Midway. This is the sign that it is time to look for something else.

If the entire new operation succeeds in the beginning and ends by encountering a defense in the end, it is of the highest interest for the prudent command to determine, in an exact manner as possible, the length of time during which the new ideas keep their efficacy.

On looking over the events, one is led to some optimism.

First of all each of the interested parties must make his own individual experiments. Even though an offensive of the type of Ludendorff might be tried successively against the Russians, Italians, English and French, without anyone doubting that he would be able to parry it, without having to change his methods, the breaking of the Polish front and the subsequent dislocation of the Polish armies taught nothing to the French command. The same adventure in France taught nothing to the Russian command. Unfortunately, this resource lacks in military action towards Germany whose Allies one has no interest to undertake to reduce one at a time.

But each command is itself a long time in understanding. Ludendorff took two years to understand the menace of the tank, the Franco-British army of 1918 took four months to find a defense for the attack of the Ludendorff type. It required several months for the St. Nazaire affair, in order that the German command of 1942 to decide for a defense on the western front, which would leave but little hope of success for future attempts of the commandos.

Maybe it would be careless to always count on this kind of lapse of time. In any case it is easy to have an idea of the minimum period of efficacy of a new idea: it is that which is required in assembling reports, of the discussion of the courses of the set-back, of the editing, of the distribution and putting into effect of regulations which should counter the new attacking method. Whatever may be the consideration of the chiefs and of those who execute orders in all cases, the

German military command, by its own means, is just as incapable as others of a rapid reply to a new means of attack; it will require at least a few days before understanding and weeks before reacting.

5. The great use of aviation as a means of transport opens in this connection possibilities, which up to the present have not been made use of. The airplane permits of experimentation on a small scale with a new method of attack, and to extend it, within a few days or even hours, to dimensions of an operation on a grand scale, alone capable in itself of deciding a war.

As a matter of fact, these possibilities are not entirely new and the speed of transportation by land and sea, motorized columns and speedy ships, have already brought to light important ones. But the airplane, by its very speed, and by that other just as important factor, which is its operating range, lends itself much better than the tank or the vedette to operations of this type.

The speed of transportation by air permits, within theaters of operations as extensive as Europe or Africa, to set down, in two or three hours, an expeditionary force in Norway or on the Basque coast in Tripolitania or the French Sudan, and expect report of the results obtained in a couple of hours, renewing the same operation five or six times in 24 hours. Not even this amount sets the limit for the repetitions realisable, nothing prevents one from having several air expeditions simultaneously, all taking off on an order given within the hour and getting for them at the

The present range of operation of transport by air (since this is only progress recently attained, the possibilities of which the materiel of 1939 was not adapted to) increases the distances of the expeditions leaving from the same base of departure. From any field in the British Isles one may just as well deliver troops in Norway as on the Basque coast, especially if one takes into consideration refueling in Scotland or in Cornwall; from Tobruk one may just as well set on foot an operation by air against the Rommel at Tobruk, against Tripolitania or against the French Sudan.

The most essential character of air land operations is to deposit the expeditionary force on the desired objective itself and not at a distance at which it must cover at the expense of overcoming the reaction of the defending forces. If one wishes to occupy Holland, one would not have to cross hundreds of kilometers of flooded territory but to land directly in the suburbs of Rotterdam. For all operations where the immediate success is not absolutely certain, this property may be put to profit by the quick setting up of a line of communications or of retreat: one should land not only on the final point of the expedition but also on the road which will serve to supply it or use it for its withdrawal. These landings can be simultaneous, or better still, successive and in rapid rhythm, of a manner to be able to interrupt or divert if something goes awry.

None of the possibilities which have just been set forth have been taken advantage of by the German command during the war. The speed of transport and the extreme rapidity of movement of their divisions by the landed troops had not been

used for the development of the operation according to the results obtained. Range of operation of undertakings has always been limited and finally the creation of lines of communications and of retreat which is an essential factor for the security of such undertakings and of the exploitations of the first successes has never been attempted. The German command has depended quite strongly on the certainty of the successes depending upon the slowness of the adversary's understanding and counter-movements on the part of the adversary but at the same time has limited to undertakings which cannot be considered as other than as the earliest steps in this field of air landings.

The opening phase of the Norwegian affair where landings were limited to the principal ports was thoroughly justified; one could count on the capitulation of the Norwegian Government without it being necessary to cover the Norwegian mountains with hundreds of thousands of parachutists. But, once the resistance of Norway made itself felt and the Franco-British landings were being openly prepared, it is not understood why air landings was not made use of for building lines of communication from Oslo toward the North Coast instead of the slow driving back of Norwegian resistance toward the North.

The landings at Amiens and Abbeville, widening the break in the French front on the Meuse in May 1940 was the operation which nearly approaches that which we are considering. They waited until the French front had given way before launching the parachutists; one is aware vaguely of the issue of constituting interrupted lines from Meuse to the North of the Meuse, similar to the speculator accustomed

to the speed of the progress of offensives of 1914-18, appeared like the very pattern of "Blitzkrieg". Could anyone have done better?

Certainly, and even while directing the operation with as much care as the German command did. The success of the break-through by means of tanks as that of the air landings was certain; nevertheless, they were obliged to confirm it and only follow it up after these first successes. But this could have been done much faster. The goal aimed at was the formation of the Southern hold of the fortifications which was intended to close upon the armies of Belgium by the occupation of the ports at Boulogne, Calais, and as far as Dunkirk. The occupation of these centers could have been obtained successively by air landings in less than 24 hours, once the break-through by tanks was assured.

The downfall met with serious resistance in view of the fact that the column of tanks sent from Abbeville toward Boulogne. After many days of waiting further found there two British battalions with an abundant anti-tank artillery which they had had time to expedite from England. The result would have been entirely different: it was the surrounding of the British expeditionary force and not the driving of it into the sea at Dunkirk, and it would have been a few days later, England falling before the German parachute.

6. There will be examined below several possible applications of the air landings in different operations, of which certain ones have been the object of previous studies.

The first is the occupation of French Africa and

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to Malta, passing by way of British Gambia and Nigeria... However positive one might be of the success of an operation by means of air landings over all the interior of territory struck at by dividing the defense forces into three parts: Dakar, Morocco and Egypt it is prudent to undertake such an operation according to a schedule which will assure the at every juncture the line of communication and retreat of the fighting troops.

This may be arrived at by launching the landing forces in a form of "columns" occupying successively the zone which is assigned to them and which may be limited or diverted if something should occur. Each element of the column is set down in the position which he must keep, he is passed by the elements of the column which has to occupy points further away. The whole group then becomes organized itself on the ground in a line which later the heavy materiel and supplies transported by plane would follow and which might in case of need serve as a line of retreat with the assistance moreover of air transport for evacuation if the latter should become necessary for evacuation. The order of departure of the elements of the expedition should be the same as that of the advancement for the column of short length, this would represent a reversed order for the columns of long length. For example, if one wishes to separate Algeria from Morocco by occupying the line of Fort Nemours, Oryda, Bou Arfa, Colomb-Béchar, one would send from Gibraltar, in such order, a series of detachments which would have as their destinations these different points. But, if one wished to launch from Nigeria,

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a point in the same direction by way of Hamey, Gao, Reggan, Adrav, Sidl del Abbis, it would be preferable to have leave first the detachments which have the most distant destination quite susceptible of being recalled if those whose destinations are nearer who have left later and landed earlier (?), should encounter difficulties.

The occupation of the Iberian Peninsula would be directed along the same lines. There again it would be advantageous to partition off the force of the defense by laying hands on the principal routes of penetration, in such a way as to rapidly occupy the center of the peninsula and the provinces where one would expect to find the least opposition (Catalogne and the Basque country) and to wait on the defensive side for a theoretical counter-attack by the forces which one had not considered useful (or prudent) to reduce at first.

These penetration routes would be occupied by successive air landings following one after another at intervals in a single night. One would not undertake, for example, to send up the classical way of penetration, in the valley of the Tago, a motorized column, which would have been landed at Lisbon.

One would, on the contrary, set down successively in the entire valley detachments from Lisbon to Toledo. If one encountered no resistance one could push the latter forward to Madrid; if one should be stopped, one could place as a limit to penetration the point where the halt took place, and turn it aside toward other objectives, because which were susceptible of being isolated.

For operations of the "army" (the "army" of the "army")

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could equally be directed advantageously along the same lines. The simplest conception consists in landing, at an immediate vicinity of the neutral frontier chosen, a detachment of troops which would organize itself on the defensive and would send out several "raids" for the purposes of destruction in their surrounding country. The result realized from the expedition, its security, and the distance toward which its destruction could be extended might be augmented by slicing them up into several parts.

One would begin by landing near the neutral frontier chosen, that part of the forces which one would consider necessary for handling it. If it does not meet with any serious opposition, an hour later, for example, one could land the first men of the "raids" in the way chosen about every fifteen kilometers. They will continue to prolong in the same way to about 50 or 100 kms the raids which are most successful. Economizing, therefore, on these raids half of the route to travel. They will only have to carry out the destruction and then to retreat, in the center of an occupied zone, instead of the risky operation which consists of destroying by crossing an alarmed country.

Finally, the operation, which consisted of a partial or complete occupation of Germany by stopping in the West on the Siegfried line and by pushing itself slowly Eastward after the complete destructions, may be directed in the same way. It has different operations which proceed in this way that it can evolve, depending on the reaction found, either to make a complete and definitive occupation or just to make a temporary one.

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and partly in the neighborhood of the Swiss frontier, these forces will not have to take the task of marching toward the interior of Germany but simply to organize a base with a field for flying, for gathering and reembarking again in case of an attack, the largest number possible of engaged forces. The penetration into Germany will be made, leaving from these bases by successive air disembarkments in different directions. They will advance there where they will meet with the least resistance and will organize themselves in such a way as to repulse any counter-attacks. The attempts of these groups which meet with serious opposition will be transformed into simple destruction raids.

Les Stocks d'Essence et d'Alcool

1. Ceux-ci sont très rares même chez les militaires qui touchent tous les mois une provision juste suffisante pour leurs besoins. Cette quantité est à prendre chez Shell ou à la Standard, ou aux Raffineries de Berre. Tous ces établissements se trouvent près du Champ de Courses du Caroubier, derrière Hussein Dey, le long de la route moutonnaire.
2. L'huile employée n'est plus de qualité, on n'en délivre plus, on se sert des huiles de vidanges régénérées. Il n'y a plus d'huile épaisse pour les ponts arrière.
3. La circulation militaire a restreint ses voitures :
 - 1° parcequ'on lui en a pris une grande partie, Commission allemande, de 4.000 la mois dernier, sans compter les 10.000 qui ont été livrées à Gabès 1 mois avant l'offensive Rommel et qui venaient de tous les points d'Algérie et de Tunisie;
 - 2° à cause de l'alcool - beaucoup de voitures roulaient encore à l'essence dernièrement, elles sont maintenant en voie de transformation à l'alcool, et la qualité allouée est nettement minime.
4. Il y a des camions et voitures particulières au parc du Génie à Hussein Dey, Caserne Lemerclier du 19^e Génie, camions, quelques Studebaker, dont deux avec remorques. Quelques Chevrolet, le reste Renault et Citroën. Il peut y avoir 25 camions et 10 voitures légères.
5. Il n'y a plus aucune pièce de rechange. Toutes les réparations aux voitures militaires doivent être faites par l'ESMA, contrôlées par le Matériel Régional Artillerie (MRA) Elles sont faites à l'Arсенal de Belcourt qui groupe 300 à 400 ouvriers, et s'occupent des réparations

| | |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------|
| Autos | 150 - 76/74 |
| Vélos | 10 |
| Motos | 10 démontées |
| Appareils optiques | |
| Appareils de tir | |
| Fusils | 2000 en réparation |
| Mitrailleuses, etc | |
| Canons, canons antichars, une dizaine | réparation. |

Les réparations sont lentes et mal faites, manque de pièces de rechange et mauvaise organisation du travail.
6. Il y a actuellement 150 voitures immobilisées dans le parc dont 76 irréparables, faute de pièces de rechange, les autres sont en voie de réparation, mais elles ne pourraient être prêtes que dans 15 jours. On ne sort actuellement qu'une voiture ou deux par jour, maximum 1, et toutes les voitures sortant de l'ESMA marchent au mélange essence/alcool.

chasseurs étant en face, terrain Hussein Day aménagé pour entraînement.

8. Le Garage Layaissa, fournit surtout des sidecars neufs. Arrivages assez fréquents, près de la rue Harface Vernot.
9. Les Garages Berliet - les camions transformation gazo.
 Peugeot - pas de camions
 Citroen - reste peu de camions
 Renault - reste très peu, peu de camions.
 Lassals - centre d'échange de camions milit.
10. Les hangars près du marché de Maison Carrée contenant auto-mitrailleuse et chars légers.
11. Les entrepôts Granvick - ne contiennent plus de voitures.
12. Le Garage de l'Harrach contient 12 camionnettes affectées aux réseaux Radioélectriques d'Algérie. Elles possèdent un équipement comportant des ensembles récepteurs-transmetteurs avec Pagnet 110 v-3500 T/m - démarrage par batterie de 24 volts (zinc, cadmium, nickel) 3 voitures standard téléphonique, der. ayant à bord une dérouleuse de câble. Ce sont ces voitures qui ont exécuté des exercices dans la région de Sidi Ferruch. D'après les compte-rendus individuels le résultat fut désastreux, les soldats manœuvrant ne montèrent même pas les antennes. Les moi-même inventariés ces voitures et deux seulement se sont trouvées utilisées, les autres ont rendu le matériel tel qu'elles avaient touché.
13. Le type et la quantité de voitures à Alger.
 Type - Renault - de 1000 à 3000 kgs
 Citroen de 1500 à 3000 kgs
 Laffly - voitures non acceptées par les Allemands
 Berliet - voitures prises
 Chevrolet type 18 - voitures prises
 Delahaye - voitures non acceptées par les Allemands
 International - voitures prises
 Ford - voitures prises

14. Il ressort de nos constatations que très peu de camions restent et ceux qui nous restent subiront la même sorte, les allemands se soucient peu de la défense de l'Algérie, la Lybie les intéresse plus de sorte qu'ils rafflent tout ce qu'ils peuvent même voitures de tourisme, il ne reste que des Citroens et Peugeot.

15. Les Garages ne peuvent réparer facilement, ils possèdent le matériel, mais aucune pièce de rechange. Avant de tenter quoique ce soit il faut se renseigner au Service de la Pince détachée (Pente et Mines Eld Bouain, près du Commissariat Central) qui voit ses stocks, vise un bon n° il y a lieu, l'envoie au garagiste intéressé. Ce bon n'est visé que si on a fait la déclaration sur les pièces et charbon. La réparation est pi ces fait, que les voitures en panne ne restent plus longtemps.

16. L'huile employée était

Mobil Oil

Texaco

Shell

et presque toutes les marques, actuellement il ne s'en fait pas de marque, on emploie l'huile de vidange.

17. L'arsenal, organisme militaire, ne possède ni huile ni essence, ni alcool. Quand on vient chercher un camion il faut apporter son carburant avec soi, de plus les ouvriers mettent tout de la mauvaise volonté à assurer les réparations, persuadés que tous les camions réparés prennent la route de Lybie.

20 - 8 - 1942

TRANSLATION

2977/12

GASOLINE AND ALCOHOL STOCKS

1. These stocks are very scarce even for the military who can obtain each month a supply barely sufficient for their needs. This quantity can be had either from Shell or Standard, or from the Berre Refineries. These establishments are along the sheep route behind Hussein Dey, near the Champ de Courses du Caroubier.
2. The oil used now is no longer of a good quality; no more is delivered, and regenerated drain oil is used. There is no more heavy oil for rear axles.
3. Military movement has limited these vehicles:
 1. Because the German Commission took a large share last month--about 4,000; this does not include the 10,000 which were delivered to Gabes one month before Rommel's offensive and which came from all parts of Algeria and Tunisia.
 2. Because of alcohol--many cars which recently still ran on gasoline are now in the process of changing over to alcohol, and the quality is clearly inferior.
4. There are some lorries and cars belonging to the engineer park at Hussein Dey, Lemerrier Barracks of the 19th Engineers; some lorries and Studebakers, two of which have tow lines. Some Chevrolets, the rest Renaults and Citroens. Probably about 25 lorries and 10 light cars are there.
5. There are no more spare parts. All the repairs to military cars have to be done by the EPSMA, which is controlled by the Materiel Regional Artillerie (MRA). These repairs are done at the Arsenal de Belcourt which accommodated 300 to 400 workmen and which takes care of repairs to the following:

| | |
|----------------------|--------------------|
| Autos | 150 - 76/74 |
| Bicycles | 50 |
| Motorcycles | 20 dismantled |
| Optical equipment | |
| Artillery equipment | |
| Guns | 2,000 in repair |
| Machine guns, etc. | |
| Guns, anti-tank guns | about 10 in repair |

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The repairs are slow and badly done, because of lack of repair parts and poor work organization.

6. At present there are 150 cars immobilized in the (engineer) park; 76 of these are not repairable for lack of spare parts; the others are in the process of being repaired but they could not possibly be ready before 15 days. Actually only one or two cars are finished each day--five at maximum--and all the cars which come from the EPSMA run on a mixture of gasoline and alcohol.

7. The former Hussein Dey airdrome. Repairs on light and heavy tanks; Tartevé in charge.

There may be about twenty entirely revised tanks which are used for the barracks training of cavalry and infantry soldiers across the way. Hussein Dey ground has been prepared for training purposes.

8. The Lavaysse Garage particularly furnishes new sidecars. Arrivals are fairly frequent, and it is located on Horace Vernet Street.

9. The Berliet Garages -10 lorries, gas conversion
 Peugeot " -no lorries
 Citroen " -few lorries left
 Renault " -very little left; few lorries
 Lassals " -exchange center for military lorries

10. Hangars near the Maison Carree market have automatic machine guns and light tanks.

11. The Granvick warehouses have no more cars.

12. The Harrach Garage has 12 small lorries intended for the radio networks of Algeria. They have an outfit containing sender-receiver sets with generators (ragenet) 110v - 3500 T/M-- which are run by 24V batteries (accus, cadmium, nickel--known as Edison sets); three standard radio cars, two of which have cable drums. These are the cars which participated in the maneuvers in the Sidi Ferruch region. According to individual reports the result was disastrous; the soldiers engaged in maneuvers did not even raise the antennae. Only two cars had been used; the others came back absolutely untouched.

13. Type and quantity of cars at Algiers.

| | |
|--------------------|------------------------------|
| Type - Renault | from 1500 to 3000 kgs. |
| Citroen | from 1500 to 3000 kgs. |
| Lafly | cars not accepted by Germans |
| Berliet | commandeered cars |
| Chevrolet type 158 | commandeered cars |
| Delahaye | cars not accepted by Germans |
| International | commandeered cars |
| Ford | commandeered cars |

14. From our statements these facts stand out: we have very few lorries left us, and those which are left will undergo the same fate; the Germans are only slightly concerned about the defense of Algeria; Libya interests them much more so they seize all they can--even touring cars; all that is left for us is Citroens and Peugeots.

15. The garages cannot make repairs easily; they have the facilities but not the spare parts. Before attempting anything at all, one should inquire at the Bureau of Small Parts, (Ponts et Mines, Boulevard Baudin, near the Commissariat Central) which examines its stocks, draws up an order if necessity so warrants, and sends it to the garageman concerned. This order is signed only if declaration has been made on the tires and tubes.. The scarcity of these parts results in disabled cars remaining in that state indefinitely.

16. Oil used was Mobiloil, Texas, and Shell, and almost all the brands; at present it is not a question of brands--drainage oil is used.

17. The Arsenal, a military establishment, possesses neither oil, gasoline, nor alcohol. One must bring his own fuel along when getting a lorry. Besides, the workers make good repairs with a bad grace; they are sure that all the repaired lorries go to Libya.